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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERFACE FANTASIES AND FUTURES: 
DESIGNING HUMAN-COMPUTER RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF MEMEX 
 
by 
 
Rachael Bradshaw Sullivan 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the supervision of Professor Anne Wysocki 
 
 
This dissertation is about how designers, experimental writers, and innovative 
thinkers have imagined both computer interfaces and the human/machine relations that 
might emerge through engagement with different kinds of interfaces. Although futuristic 
thinking about digital media and their interfaces has changed over time, we can isolate 
some constants that have persisted through almost all mainstream practices of interface 
design, particularly in American culture. Drawing from a historical trajectory that I 
associate with Vannevar Bush and his speculative invention, which he called “memex” in 
a 1945 essay, I name these constants sterilization and compartmentalization. They are 
two tendencies or values that I identify in mid-20th-century dreams of mastering 
information spaces by mastering their interfaces. My project shows how individuals and 
groups have reinforced or resisted these values in the engineering and design of computer 
interfaces, both speculative and real. The urge to sterilize and compartmentalize 
computers has directly and indirectly shaped what we expect and demand from our 
computers (and the things we make with them) today, and these values trace the horizon 
of what human-computer relations could be possible in the future.  
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Introduction 
 
Interface Fantasies and Futures is about how designers, experimental writers, and 
innovative thinkers have imagined both computer interfaces and the human/machine 
relations that might emerge through engagement with different kinds of interfaces. 
Although futuristic thinking about digital media and their interfaces has changed over 
time, we can isolate some constants that have persisted through almost all mainstream 
practices of interface design, particularly in American culture. I name these constants 
sterilization and compartmentalization, and they are two tendencies or values that I 
identify in the earliest dreams of mastering information spaces by mastering their 
interfaces. My project shows how individuals and groups have reinforced or resisted 
these values in the engineering and design of computer interfaces, both speculative and 
real. The urge to sterilize and compartmentalize computers has directly and indirectly 
shaped what we expect and demand from our computers today, and these values trace the 
horizon of what human-computer relations could be possible in the future.  
Beginning roughly in the mid-20th century, a pattern of self-fulfilling ideologies 
unfolded: the modern information worker’s desire for clean, minimalist, neutral work 
spaces—far removed from the dirty factory or tool shop—overlapped with the computer 
engineer or programmer’s belief in human/machine compartmentalization as safer and 
more efficient for the average user. The two desires affirmed and justified each other, so 
that users and industry insiders alike began to perceive a user’s distance and detachment 
from computer code—that is, a clear front-end/back-end partition in the computer’s 
design and construction—as more friendly and convenient. The tidy desktop is thus 
perceived as an outward indication that all is running smoothly and that there are no leaks 
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between interior and exterior. However, as the following chapters posit, the tidy desktop 
is an obsession with cleanliness not only of the work surface, but also of interior spaces 
within the computer, below the surface. As I argue in my dissertation, cleanliness, within 
and without, privileges whiteness and purity as marks of intelligence and high readability 
and as assurance of efficiency and control, so that the computer’s encapsulation in sealed 
containers (literal and figurative) amounts to a very particular—and particularly 
devious—form of abstraction. It is an abstraction that seeks to neutralize or de-color 
ideology, to bleach out all traces of the computer’s making except those that hold 
commercial appeal, to wash the user interface clean of elements that computer industry 
insiders believe are unimportant or peripheral to use, and to render the opposing figure of 
dirtiness, blackness, and messiness as immoral, less-than-human, unreadable, or even 
invisible. 
My dissertation disentangles (in some places, further entangles) the strands 
unraveling from abstractions of compartmentalization and sterilization, which have 
taught us to privilege cleanliness and human/machine detachment in digital culture and 
design thinking. I propose that fantasies about so-called “elegant” interfaces (those that 
embody sterilization and compartmentalization) fuel the bankrupt desire for flawless 
communication and effortless control of dumb or servile technologies. However, just as 
dangerously, elegance continues its dirty work by demonizing its opponent. Elegance 
offers a monolithic practice and experience of computing and constantly reaffirms its 
privileged position by shaming and thus oppressing “less elegant” (messier, clumsier, 
riskier, leakier) alternatives. These alternatives, as I argue in coming chapters, are 
non-mainstream software and hardware interfaces as well as abject bodies and 
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unwelcome, uncomfortable affects. These alternatives (dirtier, messier, less efficient and 
streamlined as they are) offer a more productive, richer future for digital culture in which 
creativity and experimentalism might better thrive by transforming computer users into 
people who relate to computers critically and caringly.  
Looking at the interface as a tool, as some interface fantasies have done, is an 
attempt to sterilize the agency of digital nonhumans. We must turn to face the interface 
(or just have patience for more moments when we face the interface) rather than 
dismissively viewing it as a channel through which we move to get at something else, or 
an obstruction that interferes with our quest. Although these confrontations and crossings 
tend to incite fear or unease, we may find something there, where the lines between the 
interface, the information, the computer, and the human disintegrate into one another—
into a relationship. And this relationship with the machine is our illicit desire, I argue, as I 
analyze examples from digital culture that treat human/computer confusion or 
betweenness as the ultimate immediacy and the ultimate intimacy. By re-tracing and 
re-membering these interface fantasies and futures, we might better prepare ourselves 
today to ask after alternative futures and seek other interface possibilities.  
In this project, I document influential fantasies about potential interfaces and 
retell stories about existing interfaces with potential to become more than they are. In the 
more utopian use cases I study, we see the Enlightenment dream of “an empowered 
individual agent capable of governing through enhanced knowledge” (Chun, 
Programmed Visions 110). Chapter 1 takes a tour through the emergence of user-friendly 
interfaces in IBM and Apple, focusing on the touch-screen interface as the culmination of 
years of striving to erase the computer from the user’s view. The first interface fantasy I 
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examine is the personal computer, and particularly Steve Jobs’ vision of simple, clean 
design and the iPad as an intimate, magical device. I argue that this vision was driven by 
the urge to sterilize and compartmentalize user interfaces, and that for touch-screens, this 
meant purging the materiality of computing. Chapter 2 moves from hardware to software, 
focusing on the interface fantasy Mark Zuckerberg has advanced through more than ten 
years building and promoting Facebook to the world. Facebook’s primary goal is to 
transform internet users into Facebook users, and I argue that this platform anticipates the 
fulfillment of Tim Berners-Lee’s fear: that the web would become a consumer-centric, 
commercial space to visit rather than an editable, creative space to build something new 
(33).  
 In the final two chapters of my dissertation, I present futures that I believe are 
more worthy of pursuit. The examples in these chapters acknowledge a distribution of 
agency across self, other, and machine. These are futures in which we might forestall 
impatience and ignorance with respect to other people and our intelligent machines. In 
Chapter 3, I continue to focus on software and trace the emergence of the “clean code” or 
“code elegance” movement in the software development community. I argue that the 
underlying force of this movement is elitist and that it works to alienate lay-users from 
the process of programming. As an alternative vision, I present a well-documented, 
remix-friendly work of electronic literature that could be one pathway to correcting 
Facebook’s transformation of the web into a sterile, easy-to-use appliance. In my final 
chapter, I return to focus on hardware and analyze the interface fantasy illustrated by the 
FOX TV series (now canceled) Almost Human. In the first season of this show, viewers 
are presented with a willful but glitchy interface (a humanoid robot) that asserts its 
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materiality and refuses to be a friendly, unassuming servant. Through the android’s 
relationship with a human partner, the show argues that more expansive, creative thinking 
happens when relations with nonhumans are figured as caring, tolerant relationships 
rather than instrumentalist usages.  
When we look at both software (e.g. the practice of coding in black-boxed layers 
which grow increasingly abstracted as we move from the machine code to the markup 
language) and hardware (the design of an object as a featureless commodity or as a 
mirror to reflect the user and have no identity of its own), we can see the influence of 
compartmentalization and sterilization as a guiding logic in both design and use of new 
media. Chapter 3 questions the first practice to some extent (at least within the electronic 
literature community) and the chapter on Almost Human challenges the second practice 
by presenting a (non-white) computer with an identity, character flaws, and supposedly 
artificial affects that make the user experience worse and not better. 
In what follows, I take up a feminist research methodology, as defined by Heidi 
McKee and James Porter. In “Rhetorica Online,” they argue that feminist research 
methodologies need not focus solely on gender and gender asymmetry. Feminist 
researchers take approaches that also involve “reflective and ethical inquiry procedures,” 
including a commitment to social justice, the care and respect of others, and critical 
consciousness of one’s own privilege (155). Refusal of binaries and typologies 
characterizes feminism that is concerned with difference and diversity generally. My 
concern with computer interface fantasies and futures is fundamentally tied to concern for 
minority groups and their systematic disappearance from technology industries and from 
creative digital practices. The glossy, high-tech stereotype of computer culture gains 
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reinforcement from the emergence of sterilization and compartmentalization as design 
values. McKee and Porter’s methodology has helped me see this inequity and to position 
it as one response to the “what’s at stake?” question.  
However, I have departed from McKee and Porter’s feminism in some ways. In 
my project, I have tried to also inhabit feminist materialist methodologies because I 
recognize that agency and expression of desire do not originate solely in human subjects. 
While McKee and Porter emphasize an anthropocentric, “person-based” approach to 
feminist research (158), women such as Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and Donna Haraway 
rethink what it means to be a “person” and ask what is at stake in privileging personhood. 
In The Companion Species Manifesto, Haraway thinks past the superiority of human life 
and casts a net that includes nonhuman life and half-life: “Feminist inquiry is about 
understanding how things work, who is in the action, what might be possible, and how 
worldly actors might somehow be accountable to and love each other less violently” (7). 
Bennett and Barad have also demonstrated the importance of “how-it-works” knowledge, 
hospitable and caring treatment of things, materiality as a process and performance, and 
the deprivileging of human actors. These new materialisms, particularly those theories 
with an inclusive feminist underpinning, have been essential in crafting my arguments 
about what intimacy with computers could mean and how it could be possible and 
productive to treat digital devices as nonhuman others worthy of care and respect.  
In this dissertation, I focus on the history of computing in the U.S. and interface 
fantasies of American thinkers. To expand my research internationally would make it 
difficult to develop and define a particularly American ideology surrounding computer 
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use: namely, that digital media have the potential to improve society and that they are 
powerful agents of change. As Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin suggest:  
American culture seems to believe in technology in a way that European 
culture, for example, does not. […] In America, collective (and perhaps 
even personal) salvation has been thought to come through technology 
rather than through political or even religious action. (61) 
This belief in the redemptive potential of technology collides with American 
exceptionalist ideas of privilege and divine providence to birth a brand of technological 
determinism that paradoxically praises or trusts technology and simultaneously seeks to 
be liberated from technology through a return to the whole or natural human. Focusing on 
American culture, the case studies in my dissertation take up this paradox from different 
angles as I examine the tension between embrace of digital media (i.e. a human/digital 
blurring) and a turning-away from digital media by drawing sharp lines between what is 
human and what is digital or computer. 
We often think of an interface as a space, like a borderland or gap between “us” 
and our technologies, a space where we communicate, encounter, exchange. The 
user-friendly interface is “one that claims to successfully bridge the gap between human 
and computer” (Emerson xi). Yet, the very concept of a gap is not so simple. Heidegger 
writes that most people think of a “gap” as “the stretch between two points” (267). “Yet,” 
he continues, 
if we step out of the house into the shade under the tree, then the gap 
between the house and the tree does not consist in the measured stretch 
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between the two. The gap consists much more in how the house and tree 
and shade, in their relation to each other, collectively concern us. (267)  
If the interface is a gap, it is an opening that has effects, hinders actions, and alters views 
even as it assists us in our daily routines. As it enlivens or “facializes” (to use Anna 
Munster’s term) the computer, the interface is not a mere threshold or neutral utility but 
rather a site and cause of anxiety. To think that this tool, this dividing line—this 
interface—has failed to do its job! That it cannot neatly maintain the distinction between 
ourselves and our technologies, that it cannot truly satisfy us and deliver what we want. It 
will break down (it has already done so!), become infested or animate, “overflow” the 
screen’s rectangle (Johnson-Eilola 2005), cause friction, or hold us in the shadows at a 
distance from the connection we want. 
The interface has an in-between status; it appears to be an empty gulf spanning 
passively between spaces full of matter, ready to be enlivened or penetrated by some 
outside intervention. However, a borderland is not an empty gulf but rather the overlap 
between two things. In this dense overlap of materialities—flesh and sweat and labor and 
plastic and countless others—the threshold of interface denies or complicates passage. 
What Alex Galloway calls the “unworkable interface” is an aporia and not a smooth 
threshold. We are losing the battle to keep our computers contained. The shaky terms we 
have for what is not digital—analog, organic, physical, continuous, offline, corporeal, 
material—have trouble holding apart something that was never truly separate. In the next 
section, I argue that theories of the nonhuman and new materialism move towards a 
workable and productive understanding of “digital materiality” for interface studies. If 
the interface stitches together two material worlds within the context of digital culture, 
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the next section suggests that we need different terms and frameworks for the places and 
practices where these worlds come together and crisscross.  
 
Digital material 
In the 1990s, a wave of persuasive narratives ranging from political commentaries 
to films to journalism to novels associated immateriality with the concept of a digital 
network and the array of new and not-so-new activities one could perform in “virtual” 
spaces. The “information superhighway” metaphor, popularized by Al Gore’s speech in 
Silicon Valley in 1994, envisioned digital information as dematerialized transmissions 
flowing speedily along data-lanes like light or electricity. If the information 
superhighway metaphor captured speed and unimpeded movement of data, the 
cyberspace metaphor implied a vast universe of virtual connections. This discourse of 
immateriality promoted a new media of disembodiment, exemplified by William 
Gibson’s representations of cyberspace particularly in his 1984 novel Neuromancer. 
Embodiment is framed as an unfortunate and flawed obstacle to achieving, as Vicki 
Kirby suggests, “a post-corporeal subjectivity configured in purely informatic and 
immaterial terms” (135). The terms “digital” and “material” thus enter the public 
imagination as clear contradictions, with an enthusiasm for the digital following the 
hierarchy of the old Cartesian mind/body split. 
Materialist counter-arguments emerged from feminist scholars working against 
patriarchy, imperialism, and other forms of marginalization and oppression throughout 
the 1990s, including Elizabeth Grosz (1994), Anne Balsamo (1995), Kirby (1997), Sara 
Ahmed (1998) and Jenny Sundén (who published her dissertation Material Virtualities in 
2003, but began work on the project at the end of the 1990s). They and other critics 
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insisted that, despite the allure of a global mediascape and an “endless loop” of pure 
numeric information (Kittler 102), the body could not be totally abandoned or relegated 
to the physical world just as the virtual world could never transcend the messiness of 
material substrates. As cultural studies theorist Susanna Paasonen writes, “although 
bodies may not be visible in text-based communications, identity categories still matter. 
[…] Identity presupposes embodiment” (28). With its publication in 1999, Katherine 
Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman marks an important point in this trajectory. 
Working at the intersection of information science and media studies, Hayles argues that 
a disembodied identity was one precondition for the seamless merging of humans and 
computers, accomplished through the dematerialization of information in the field of 
cybernetics and in digital discourse as a whole. Hayles wants to return to the origins of a 
material/information or randomness/pattern divide in order to contest it and return to the 
embodied posthuman, an “informational-material entity” (11).  
Hayles’ contribution is one of many that formed a push towards rematerializing 
what had been rendered fluid and dangerously transparent in the 1980s and 90s: the body, 
information, and the digital medium itself. “Since the early 2000s,” Anna Munster 
observes, “there has been a gathering ‘material turn’ […] with a growing 
acknowledgment that the material conditions [of the digital] had previously been 
overlooked” (“Materiality” 328). Within the fields of digital literature and textual studies, 
one key text in this material turn towards correcting 1990s immaterialism and 
cybercultural flows is Matthew Kirschenbaum’s Mechanisms (2008).  
Kirschenbaum demonstrates a “forensic” or highly medium-specific study of 
digital texts with the goal of excavating physical evidence of their history and 
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locatedness. “Medial ideology” is his term for the substitution of “popular representations 
of a medium” for the particulars of a given technology (36). Such substitution, like all 
ideology, is “constructed and culturally activated […] to perform certain kinds of work,” 
he contends (36). In a culture of screens, the challenge is to stay mindful of the fact that 
software applications and cloud-based storage all have physical inscriptions 
somewhere—inscriptions that can burn, fail, and overwrite. Kirschenbaum and other 
materially-minded media scholars like Matthew Fuller remind us that despite the 
untethered feeling of a Google doc or the seemingly untraceable circulation of an open 
source software project, digital writing and textual transmission survive as physical 
substantiations.  
We have seen that “in so far as the trope of immateriality is associated with the 
realm of computation, there is a proportional effort to restate and critically reinstate its 
necessary materiality” (Cayley, “Gravity” 204). This re(in)statement of hard-bodied 
materiality can be taken too far, some new media critics believe. In her contribution to 
the recently published collection Comparative Textual Media (co-edited by Hayles and 
Jessica Pressman), Rita Raley argues that Kirschenbaum actually overcorrects in the 
direction of material reinstatement. Demonstrating the limitations of an archaeological or 
preservation-oriented materialism, she focuses on the ephemerality of digital art 
performances and installations that incorporate elements of textuality but which are not 
themselves proper “texts.” The works she examines are, rather, part of a “TXTual 
practice” that is “enacted and decoded in the moment,” incorporating audience 
participation but often leaving no material record—“no durable object to recover and 
preserve for future study” (45). Kiosks, chat walls, LED displays, and even bodies form 
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the surfaces on which text is projected, but these surfaces are not proper substrates for the 
works. Thus, she concludes, “the material, whether framed in terms of inscription, 
apparatus, platform, or technological object, cannot alone account for [these works’] 
significance” (48).  
But what is “material” need not be defined as a rock-hard substance standing on 
the opposing side of movement, performance, and change, as Raley seems to suggest. 
There is not one but many materialities. We can find ways to unmoor a rock-hard notion 
of materiality without falling back into the romanticized roles of infobahn drivers and 
cyberspace explorers. Contemporary critical theorists, many of whom draw on 
continental philosophical traditions, are currently working to redeem the ambiguous, 
in-flux status of matter by complicating its place in binaries like subject/object, 
passive/active, and user/used. Donna Haraway’s naturecultures, Bruno Latour’s hybrids 
and quasi-objects, Jane Bennett’s glove-pollen-rat-cap-stick, and Karen Barad’s intra-
acting phenomena are attempts to express a kind of in-motion disturbance of locatable, 
discrete, independent things and acts. These terms summarize an energetic materiality 
and attempt to acknowledge an uncertainty inherent in observations and experiences, 
mediated as they are by various lively nonhumans. 
While an earlier generation of theorists emphasized a discursive and socially 
constructed physical world, the new materialist work of women like Bennett and Barad 
has highlighted the significant effects of matter itself, reclaiming an active, constructive, 
even communicative power for nonhumans. As Diana Coole and Samantha Frost 
succinctly put it: “materiality is always something more than ‘mere’ matter: an excess, 
force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-creative, 
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productive, unpredictable” (9). Similarly, the feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz has 
proposed viewing nature “in terms of dynamic forces, fields of transformation and 
upheaval, rather than as a static fixity, passive, worked over, transformed and dynamized 
only by culture” (7). A purpose of this dissertation, then, is to shape feminist or socially 
conscious pathways between digital and material, between a flowy materiality of 
performative acts, electronic user interfaces, code execution processes, virtual worlds, 
and “born-digital textual practices” (Raley 44) and a fragile materiality of fleshy bodies, 
instantiated difference, hardware gizmos, and “the instrumental touch of the mechanism” 
(Kirschenbaum 69).  
One of my premises is that interfaces both stage and define some of the central 
tensions at stake in how we address our computers and relate to them. Those are tensions 
between material and immaterial, between control and wildness, between slave and 
partner. The desire to overflow interfaces and “cut them loose” exists simultaneously and 
not always happily with the desire to dominate and regulate them. They can only be 
“wild” and expressive to the degree they remain relatively sterile and bound. There is a 
“fantasized return to the whole body” (Jones 98) and for physicality of the interface, but 
only insofar as these interface bodies remain in control and disciplined. Interfaces can 
only be human to the degree that they remain subservient—our power over them resides 
in our ability to power them off.  
Through compartmentalization and sterilization, we maintain control over 
computational ‘others’ and enforce separation or distance between us and them. In the 
next section, I will detail these two terms, calling them alternately outward tactics or 
implicit design assumptions, through the lens of Vannevar Bush’s canonical 1945 essay 
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“As We May Think.” In addition to his work masterminding the coordination of research 
laboratories across the country during World War II, Bush is a key figure in the history of 
computing. He directly influenced or was responsible for the development of military 
technologies like advanced radar, the atomic bomb, and early computers. Considering his 
essay’s status as a fundamental text in the history of new media, and considering Bush’s 
profound influence on a generation of computer pioneers and his continuing legacy as a 
prophet of today’s common technologies like hyperlinking, the computer desktop, and 
touch screen interfaces, the task of parsing latent design assumptions within “As We May 
Think” is especially earnest to my dissertation and to the field of new media studies. 
 
Historical context of “As We May Think”  
As World War II came to a close, Bush reflected on the question, “What are the 
scientists to do next?” (“As We May Think” 37). Writing at a moment of transition from 
the pursuit of military progress to domestic progress, Bush shared the concern of 
President Roosevelt and many others: how can we convert “new instruments” (37) of 
international violence and combat into tools of national growth? Bush, dean of 
engineering at MIT and the highest-ranking scientific advisor in the U.S. war effort, had 
“coordinated the activities of some six thousand leading American scientists in the 
application of science to warfare” (37). Or, so note the Atlantic Monthly editors in their 
introduction to Bush’s widely read article, “As We May Think,” published in 1945 
shortly before the U.S. nuclear attacks on Japan. Bush was the driving force behind what 
President Eisenhower in 1961 dubbed the “military-industrial complex,” a political and 
financial alignment (in the form of large-scale contracts and research networks) of 
civilian scientists, the arms industry, and government institutions (Blocker 61). 
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With peace on the horizon, Bush now hoped to turn his readers’ attention from 
creating relationships that would foster new research to the problem of managing the 
“growing mountain of research” (37) that, he feared, was threatening to overwhelm 
knowledge and wisdom and impede scientific progress. Bush urged readers to consider 
how the country should put new and potential technologies to use, but specifically for the 
sake of making “the record of the race” (46) more accessible and manageable. To frame 
his motivation simply, we might say his concern lies less with the development of 
computational technologies themselves and more with making them usable to a range of 
information workers. “As We May Think” spends most of its time describing imaginary 
technologies that would interface with human users; the essay is, amongst other things, a 
catalog of interface design fantasies.  
When Bush asked, “now what?” perhaps somewhat presumptuously in July 1945, 
the nation’s best engineers, physicists, and mathematicians had been focused on problems 
of military strategy for nearly a decade. Many innovations in computing during this 
period emerged from the demands of military logistics and the accompanying rush to 
improve outmoded, analog methods of data processing, storage, and transmission 
(Crogan). Top-secret military-funded computers like ENIAC in the US and Colossus in 
the UK made tasks like enemy code decryption and missile trajectory calculation possible 
within a reasonable timeframe. A 1946 New York Times article boasts the fact that 
ENIAC completed a complex calculation in two hours when it would have occupied “100 
trained men for a whole year” (Kennedy). “As We May Think,” provisionally drafted 
under a different title in 19391, proposes a number of emerging directions that postwar 
                                                
1 Bush actually worked out many of the ideas even earlier, in an article entitled “The Inscrutable 
‘Thirties’” published in 1933 in Technology Review (Hookway 170).  
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technology innovation could follow. In this article, Bush emphasizes the importance of 
freeing humans up for high-level “creative thought” (41) by shifting much of the grunt 
work of information processing to machines. Though, as I will argue below, Bush’s 
concept of who and what constitutes a “machine” is not without problematic 
implications, nor is it straight-forward. As Bush’s vision of human/machine relations 
develops during the essay, we can observe the influence of both his deeply held 
American exceptionalism and obvious discrimination of women and “low-level” clerical 
laborers. Thus, it is all the more disturbing that the values which underlie his writing are 
representative of the values that have informed the design of our computers today. They 
are the same values that are currently interfering with our ability to have ethical 
relationships with digital technologies and other humans we encounter mediated through 
those technologies.  
 
Memex as a solution to information overload  
The context of military applications is important to understanding the origins of 
new media and the futuristic technologies that Bush imagines (Crogan), but other dreams 
and desires shaped the emergence of new media in the mid-20th century. One of those 
dreams is the ability to conquer information overload. The phrase “information overload” 
represents a centuries-old fear that what there is to know exceeds the ability of the human 
race to know it. Information overload, across all chapters of history, hinges on a key 
claim: “information has become a problem, not a solution” (Weinberger 2). Technologies 
for managing information overload are often more complex than basic archives or storage 
systems, for the object of anxiety is not sheer quantity but rather quantity dispersed 
chaotically. They mitigate the potential of information—or thought—to “convert itself 
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into a flock of birds, scatter itself to the four winds, and occupy all points of air and space 
at once,” as Victor Hugo described the ubiquity of paper and books during the 15th 
century (168). Thus, technologies of information overload incorporate not only elements 
of storage but also mechanisms for finding, filtering, sorting, and note-taking. Users of 
digital bookmarking services such as Delicious, Diigo, or Zotero will be familiar with 
these kinds of features. The anxious condition that may cause us to religiously use RSS 
readers or digital bookmarking tools is not unlike what new citizens of print culture felt, 
and it is the same affect that Bush expresses in “As We May Think.” Although early in 
the essay, he names “the mass of the inconsequential” as the potential threat to 
knowledge (and ultimately wisdom), it is not simply mass but rather mess that causes the 
overload to hit home. 
To distill knowledge (or, at best, wisdom) from a scattered mess: this is the aim of 
information overload technologies then and now. Bush desires, like many others, to make 
a mess into a clean, well-oiled surface or process. In 1945, as he turned his focus away 
from destruction of an enemy and towards fostering what he called “the great practical 
genius of this nation” (“Science” 10), Bush envisioned such a technology: memex. Its 
purpose, had it been constructed, would have been to remedy the problem of information 
overload that Bush articulates in the beginning of his essay: “The investigator is 
staggered by the findings and conclusions of thousands of other workers—conclusions 
which he cannot find time to grasp, much less to remember, as they appear” (37).  
Perhaps the deepest fear stemming from too much information is the loss of 
wisdom. Recall the famous passage from Plato’s Phaedrus written 2,400 years ago: 
writing is “an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; [through it] you offer your pupils 
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the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom.” With these surface inscriptions piling up 
and drowning out our embodied memory, we become shallow and lose the “intellectual 
depth that leads to wisdom and true happiness” (Carr 55). This statement more or less 
paraphrases Nick Carr’s influential “Google Makes Us Stupid” argument, first published 
in the Atlantic in 2008 and lengthened into a bestselling book in 2011. Carr rails against 
the internet and its addictive, distracting pull. He joins a growing group of digital 
curmudgeons as he worries about the effects of information overload online—the decline 
of “the ethic that the book bestowed on us” (114) and the rise of “mindless consumers of 
data” (125). At root, the loss of wisdom amounts to the loss of truth, but a particular kind 
of truth. For Carr, truth is represented by the linear, focused space of the codex, or the 
figure reading quietly and solitarily. For Bush, truth has a different poster child: the 
memex user. As Wendy Chun summarizes Bush’s fear: “our product is burying us, and 
the dream of linear additive progress is limiting what we may think” (79). Truth, then, 
can be found in thinking differently about the way information is stored and handed 
down; the user of “memex” walks a nonlinear trail to truth. Unlike Carr, Bush recognizes 
that the book is not the penultimate knowledge technology and is more progressive in 
thinking about future technological adaptations. But importantly, as we shall see, Carr’s 
reader and Bush’s memex user embody the same ideals of liberal humanism: literate and 
educated citizens, “empowered individual [agents] capable of governing through 
enhanced knowledge” (Chun 110). 
The memex is a theoretical proto-hypertext system. In Bush’s words, “a 
mechanized private file and library” (45). Resembling a common desk, the device 
compactly stores an individual’s “books, records, and communications”—a ton of 
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information—by means of “improved microfilm” (Bush 45).2 Compression, however, is 
not the only important feature for technologies of information overload, nor is it the most 
important feature of the memex. While memex provides a home for ample items of 
interest, “the process of tying two items together is the important thing” (Bush 45). As a 
researcher pursues different lines of thought, memex lets the user make and record 
connections between primary and secondary sources and between his (yes, his) own notes 
and comments. Thus, the crucial affordance of memex is the construction of “intricate 
[webs] of trails” (44) that mimic the human mind’s associative thought processes but, 
unlike thought processes, are permanently recorded within a device.  
Bush describes the process of linking items in a way that uncannily resembles an 
internet user’s work with multiple browser tabs and bookmarking applications: “When 
the user is building a trail, he names it, inserts the name in his code book, and taps it out 
on his keyboard” (45). That particular item then has a code name so that, when the user 
wants to compare two things or quickly check a note, the item “can be instantly recalled 
merely by tapping a button below the corresponding code space” (45). The ability to not 
only preserve but also share trails is important in the long-term battle against information 
overload: “The inheritance from the master becomes, not only his additions to the world’s 
record, but for his disciples the entire scaffolding by which they were erected” (46). We 
can see that what Bush has in mind is not just information, but rather a patriarchal kind of 
                                                
2 In the 1920s and 30s, microfilm was a popular storage medium, especially for banks as they 
discovered that microfilming cancelled checks helped to prevent fraud (Buckland). But as more 
records became available, the more difficult it was to retrieve them. From 1938-1940, while he 
was at MIT, Bush directed a team that worked on developing a machine called the “microfilm 
rapid selector.” As its name suggests, the prototype used improved photography and lighting 
technologies to select and view microfilm documents at a much faster rate than was previously 
possible. While the microfilm rapid selector was never manufactured, it is most likely what Bush 
has in mind when he discusses compression and “improved microfilm” in “As We May Think.” 
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wisdom: the memex would be our way of distilling “the mass of the inconsequential” into 
“truly significant attainments,” as he says in the beginning of the essay (37). Those 
nuggets of wisdom might be made even more significant if future researchers could trace 
their origins, like a son re-piecing his past through his father’s upbringing.  
Bush’s vision was prescient. Memex is perhaps the most influential interface 
fantasy in the history of computing—the most famous machine that was never built. 
Noted computer scientist David M. Levy observes that “Bush has been justifiably 
celebrated, even venerated, for the influence he exerted on future generations of 
technologists” (282). Bush imagined the potential uses of technology and inspired others, 
earning him a reputation as a “seminal” and “prophetic” thinker. Of all the inventions that 
Bush imagines in “As We May Think,” the memex has certainly received the most 
attention, becoming “a model for what should be possible. It was essentially a concept or 
a model that was good to think with” (Nyce and Kahn, Memex to Hypertext 117). Many 
media scholars have shown that the memex and its linked trails had a major impact on the 
later, pioneering work of Doug Engelbart, Alan Kay, and Ted Nelson, as well as spurring 
a general trend towards hypermedia and “web” metaphors facilitated by the internet in 
the 1990s. In editorial notes for The New Media Reader, Noah Wardrip-Fruin explains 
that “with the memex in mind, Engelbart began work that would result in the invention of 
the mouse [and other] concepts of new media” (35). According to Wardrip-Fruin, the 
memex also “was a major influence [on Nelson] as he made his discovery of the 
hyperlink [and] coined the terms ‘hypertext’ and ‘hypermedia’” (36).  
But additionally and more importantly for my study, memex represents the 
beginning of a push, concretely realized in IBM’s introduction of mainframe business 
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computing a decade later (as I argue in Chapter 1), towards user-friendly design figured 
as the idealized separation of user space from machine space. Although the dream of 
engineers in the mid-20th century might have been to rescue humans from the drudgery 
of computing, attendants and scientists alike had to “design programs and enter them on 
the plugboards, prepare the data, monitor the computing process, and then analyze the 
results of the calculations” (Wurster 25). In ENIAC, “to change a program, one literally 
had to rewire part of the machine” (Evans 83), and troubleshooting or debugging was 
notoriously difficult when problems arose. In other words, computers in the 1940s were 
not user-friendly. Rather than maintain a distance, the human computers worked 
intimately with machines—those “erratic and gigantic […] mathematical whales” 
(Shurkin 301)—in a way unknown to the imaginary memex user and to most new media 
users today. Bush predicted a generation of researchers who would benefit from 
computers but who might not necessarily be trained as programmers. His interface 
fantasy thus sketched a tool that would be for personal use, easy to operate, and social, 
allowing researchers to connect and share notes with each other far and wide.  
Through his detailed description of this imaginary device, Bush articulates key 
features that not only represented current values at the time, but values that also worked 
to shape future designs in user-friendly computing.3 As Chun argues, the canonization of 
“As We May Think” within the fields of media studies and information science is 
“important to understanding the emergence of interfaces as devices that empower us by 
                                                
3 Media scholar Alex Wright has documented several less well-known European thinkers who 
envisioned a type of hypertext system before or around the same time as Bush. Those include 
Emanuel Goldberg’s “Statistical Machine” patented in 1927, which proposed to use microfilm 
like the memex would, and Paul Otlet’s desk-like “Mondothèque” which he envisioned in 1941 
through a sketch that bears undeniable similarity to Alfred Crimi’s drawing of memex. See 
Wright’s 2014 article “The Secret History of Hypertext” in the Atlantic. 
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reducing the world’s complexity and allowing us to forget profoundly” (80). Although 
one man’s imaginary machine cannot do justice to the range of important design values 
and beliefs at play in the mid-20th-century, we can use the case of memex as a lens 
through which to look for the sometimes troubling origins of interface ideologies and 
information management ideals as we confront them today. Luckily for our purposes, 
Bush imagines the memex in everyday use. Because it is not simply an object of curiosity 
but actually a site or process of negotiating both empowering and forgetful relationships 
between humans and machines, it is an apt specimen for the study of interfaces.  
 
Compartmentalize and sterilize: driving assumptions of memex as interface 
Bush discusses memex near the end of his essay, and within its description we 
may identify the culmination of two key interface design assumptions that not only assist 
with managing information expeditiously but also, more subtly, support a particular style 
of computer use—one that privileges masculine heteronormativity, organization, and 
goal-drivenness. I name these assumptions compartmentalization and sterilization; they 
are just two of many possibilities that I select to help me articulate the question of what 
conditions needed to exist in order to achieve digital user-friendliness as we know it 
today. Clearly the computers that existed at the time, including Bush’s Differential 
Analyzer, were not “user-friendly” by most standards, as I have already mentioned. Bush 
recognized that as a problem; the organizational system he envisioned had to be easy to 
the point of fitting into the research and writing process seamlessly. So how would 
memex be different from the computers of the day, like ENIAC and Bush’s own massive 
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Differential Analyzer?4 First by submerging the computational mechanism below an 
opaque surface, and secondly through presenting the user with a clean, clutter-free work 
space. The first tactic did the work of reassuring the human user that he was radically 
unlike the backgrounded mechanism, and the second exercised a kind of transference 
whereby a clean work surface (or interface) would help the user achieve cleanliness in 
other parts of his life or permit/encourage him to fantasize about purity/whiteness in the 
bodies of others.  
I would like now to summarize each of the two tactics or assumptions carefully 
because of their importance to my project and because they continue to structure our own 
expectations for what using a computer should look and feel like. While Bush is not the 
only parent of these assumptions, the canonical status of “As We May Think” makes it a 
good place to begin defining compartmentalization and sterilization. While words of 
course are the primary substance of this vehicle, I will also analyze the detailed 
illustrations created by the artist Alfred D. Crimi to accompany the Life version of the 
essay, published a few months after the Atlantic version. These illustrations have become 
iconic stand-ins for Bush’s vision, but they are a collaborative vision shared between 
author and artist. 
 
Compartmentalization: “brains working in metal boxes” 
The process of compartmentalization involves enclosing or backgrounding 
particular (often the less desirable, more cumbersome or distancing) elements in order to 
hide them and make a human user’s interaction with the computer more direct and 
                                                
4 Memex was perhaps not a “computer” as ENIAC was, but both were certainly information 
machines and both hold a prime place in the history of computing.  
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personable. In Bush’s essay, the main site of computation is located inside a desk so that 
“the piece of furniture at which he works” doubles as the archive itself (Harpold, 
Ex-foliations 28). The enclosure is thus the home of the mechanism’s drudgery while the 
desktop is “the privileged scene of mental labor” (Harpold, Ex-foliations 28). Bush 
explicitly summarizes compartmentalization as a design choice, linking it to another 
machine that serves humans: automobiles. Writing here about the imagined memex user 
at work, Bush emphasizes that “all else,” apart from intuitive judgment, creative thought, 
and other cognitive activities traditionally reserved for humans, “he should be able to turn 
over to his mechanism, just as confidently as he turns over the propelling of his car to the 
intricate mechanism under the hood” (42). Similar to driving, which would be nearly 
impossible if we had to constantly concern ourselves with the processes “under the 
hood,” the goal of compartmentalization, according to Bush, is to allow the human to 
focus more intently on the information itself rather than automated, low-level tasks that a 
computer can do.5 Artificial intelligence pioneer Joseph Weizenbaum, who later decried 
the affinity that human users felt with his therapeutic AI program ELIZA, also expressed 
a similar idea: “there are important differences between men and machines as thinkers,” 
he wrote (373). Douglas Engelbart, whose thought departed from the AI group of 
computer engineers which included Weizenbaum and J.C.R. Licklider, also emphasized a 
“two-domain system” of intelligent human supplemented or “augmented” by 
well-designed tools. The tradition of separating higher, creative thought from machine 
                                                
5 The metaphor of “driving” is a common descriptor for using a computer. Citing the work of 
Terry Winogrand and Fernando Flores, Branden Hookway points out that “the controls of an 
automobile and their tacit, subconscious use in driving become a model for computer interface 
design [in the 1980s]. Control becomes tacit and readiness-to-hand becomes a design outcome” 
(147). That is precisely the reason Marshall McLuhan cited as explanation for his avoidance of 
driving cars, according to his biographer: “he refused to become a servo-mechanism of that 
device” (Marchand 178). 
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thought, literalized in the backgrounding of technical operation, has helped limit the 
ability of a user to do anything but use the system given to her. A computer is “a tightly 
bounded space” (Johnson-Eilola 53), and its interior (what is computer) and its exterior 
(what is not computer) grow increasingly far apart.  
Few people who have read the illustrated version of “As We May Think” can hear 
the word “memex” without bringing to mind Crimi’s illustrations in Life Magazine. 
Similar to the translucent candy-color cases of Apple’s iMac G3 desktop computer, 
introduced in 1998, Crimi’s cut-away view of the memex depicts both an interface and its 
underlying mechanism (Figure 0-1). Visible in the drawing are microfilm reels and a 
projection light, a control panel with buttons and a toggle switches, a large desktop 
surface, and of course the “transparent platens” which look much like modern-day iPads. 
Taking this drawing as representative of compartmentalization, I identify a desire to 
enclose or set areas of activity apart from one another, but the desire works by 
prioritizing one area as privileged foreground (the user interface) and the other as abject 
background (the operational, mechanistic components).  
 
 
Figure 0-1: Alfred Crimi’s first illustration of memex in “As We May Think” (image from Life Magazine)  
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According to James Nyce and Paul Kahn, someone in Life’s art department 
suggested that when the condensed version of “As We May Think” appeared in their 
publication in September 1945, it should be accompanied by illustrations (“Innovation” 
217) . The essay had first appeared in The Atlantic Monthly in July 1945. Despite the lack 
of visuals, the article “apparently stirred considerable interest” (Nyce and Kahn, 
“Innovation” 217) and was summarized in an Associated Press report and a Time 
Magazine article entitled “A Machine that Thinks” (L. Smith 261). Crimi, an Italian 
immigrant, skilled muralist, and modernist painter, was asked to complete the Life 
illustrations. After accepting the job, Crimi went to Washington to consult with Bush 
personally about some drafts. They spent hours together discussing the illustrations and 
Bush’s ideas, with Crimi taking notes the whole time. After approval by Bush, Crimi’s 
revised drawings were published in Life (Nyce and Kahn, “Innovation” 217).  
Although Crimi had previously gained notoriety through street murals 
commissioned by the Works Progress Administration (WPA) in the 30s, it was 
undoubtedly his drawings of weaponry in a previous issue of Life that positioned him as 
an ideal candidate for bringing Bush’s memex and his other proposed gadgets into the 
audience’s view (Nyce and Kahn, “Innovation” 217). The Sperry Corporation hired 
Crimi onto the engineering graphics department in 1940 to make basic perspective 
drawings, but he soon progressed to making intricate and expressive drawings of Sperry 
products (Mindell 69). According to David Mindell, “Crimi captured the strange blurring 
of the human-machine boundary effected by Sperry’s control systems better than 
Sperry’s corporate photographers” (69). In a 1944 Life article entitled “Mechanical 
Brains,” Crimi’s series of Sperry aerial bombsight illustrations sit alongside detailed 
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explanations of how the various components work together to “help knock enemy planes 
out of all the skies” (66). The article particularly highlights computers that would 
calculate speeds, ranges, and other data with “inhuman accuracy” (“Mechanical Brains” 
66). Like most articles about computing during the 1940s, this one takes a sensational 
tone as it describes wonders of wartime technology: “optical devices which gave sharper 
field of vision” and “precision instruments” that make “automatic deductions” and offer 
“quicker solutions” (“Mechanical Brains” 66, 68). Unsurprisingly, the article praises 
Sperry for its contribution to the war effort, and the illustrations follow suit by 
representing the weapons as beautiful engineering achievements framed against white 
backgrounds, excised from the aircraft and divorced from context (Figure 0-2).  
We could cite a parallel here between Bush’s guidance of the Manhattan Project 
and Crimi’s past experience with drawing computer-equipped bombsights. In one 
drawing for “Mechanical Brains,” the turret gunner peers expressionless through his  
 
 
Figure 0-2: Alfred Crimi’s illustration of aircraft ball turret showing the gunner, Sperry “automatic 
computing sight” (“Mechanical Brains” 66), eyepiece, and two .50-caliber machine guns. Illustration 
originally completed in 1941 (Mindell 70) (image from Life Magazine) 
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eyepiece, focusing on the enemy aircraft and, ultimately, on us as viewers (Figure 0-3). 
Crimi’s style of representing weapons—with their central operator who wields control, 
swivels in his turret to perceive a wide landscape, and is attended to by computational 
technologies of vision—is the same style he uses in his first drawing of memex (Figure 
0-1). In a sense, the operation of memex, “an enlarged intimate supplement to [the user’s] 
memory” (Bush 45), is not unlike the gunner’s operation of the bombsight. With 
“material on any subject [at his] fingertips” (44), Bush’s memex user effortlessly 
manipulates a landscape of data “with exceeding speed and flexibility” (45). Like the 
gunner in the turret, the memex user sits with his fingers on triggers or “supplemental 
levers” (45) which control, not the flow of bullets, but rather the speed at which 
microfilmed pages fly past the projector light and appear viewable on the platen. Both the 
turret and the memex console are sites of serious decision-making; as Ted Nelson puts it, 
“The [memex] system is generally geared to tentative and thoughtful operation” (251). 
 
 
Figure 0-3: Detail of ball turret illustration shown in Figure 0-2 
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“Mechanical Brains” and “As We May Think” both emphasize that user control 
comes through compartmentalization in the design of human-computer interfaces. 
“Mechanical Brains” makes it clear that Sperry’s innovation is not simply the ability to 
build these computing devices but rather the success of “putting them up in metal 
containers” (66). A caption for the Sperry O-1 bombsight explains that the “bombardier 
reads data in dials at top, twists knobs on side to transfer data to mechanical brain inside a 
box” (69). As with the memex, control over the mechanism is enforced through 
submerging the mechanism below an opaque surface. A compartmentalized design 
constantly reassures the user that the computing device sits below the human in a 
hierarchical fashion. In Mindell’s formulation, “from aviators [to] computer operators, 
these figures stood for a masculine ideal of control over two worlds, the natural and the 
technological” (2). Part of the intrigue of Crimi’s memex illustration in Figure 0-1 and 
cut-away bombsight in Figure 0-2 is that the opaque surface has been stripped away, 
denuding the insides and revealing something dangerous, risky, or possibly taboo that had 
previously been hidden.  
That Crimi’s work appears in both articles is not coincidental. Despite the obvious 
differences between turret and memex (one serving a wartime purpose and the other 
dreamed up with peace in mind; one for soldiers and the other for scholars; one designed 
for killing and the other for information management), the well documented 
entanglement of military innovation and computer interface design warrants the 
comparison. As Paul Edwards argues in his revisionist history of military computing, 
mastery of war fueled and redefined mastery of information (and the threat of it 
overloading us) so that “human and machine components could function together in a 
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seamless web” (1). Similarly, I argue that the intentions which instructed the design of 
the Sperry bombsight—among other technologies, of course—are also the intentions (to 
master, to harm, to know and to control knowledge) that can drive unethical decisions 
and mistreatment of others through the interfaces of civilian, seemingly non-violent, non-
militaristic writing and information management technologies. However, Edwards’ 
“seamless web” of human and machine, a perfectly posthuman construct, could only be 
achieved through compartmentalization, which helps us feel the thrill of intense closeness 
with the machine while holding it at a safe distance. Through this design, we can 
immerse ourselves in an informationally rich and impressive technological world (the 
gunner’s cockpit in Figure 0-2 might be a flight simulator or virtual reality booth) while 
cordoning off (and effectively forgetting) the calculating operations and computational 
processes.  
Although memex was not intended as a weapon to harm enemies, it is a device 
that can target people. In order to show memex’s capabilities, Bush provides an example 
of a typical research task. The user in his example is comparing the Turkish bow and the 
English long bow to understand why the former “was apparently superior” (45). In 
Crimi’s second illustration of memex (Figure 0-4), we see the user has set his sights on 
images of a Turk (the darker figure at the bottom right corner of the left platen) and an 
Englishman holding their respective weapons.6  
This second and last of Crimi’s memex illustrations depicts, finally, the much-
discussed memex user in action—or at least, an appendage of the user. In the image in 
                                                
6 In a letter, Crimi explained that he went to the New York Historical Society to research the 
Turkish bow illustration: “I chose some Indian Symbols which I found interesting as illustrations 
for the transparent screen” (qtd. in Nyce and Kahn, Memex to Hypertext 59). Indeed, as Nyce and 
Kahn point out, the tiny figure on the right appears to be Native American rather than Turkish. 
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Figure 0-4, we see a disembodied, masculine, white hand carefully manipulating a stylus 
across the glass surface. The stylus, like the handwriting, seems delicate and fragile in 
contrast to the manly, muscular wrist and forearm. Bush’s example and Crimi’s drawing 
both attempt a bridge between war technologies and postwar technologies: while memex 
cannot launch arrows, it can launch “trails” and allow users to sight bodies who enter into 
the scope of memex’s telescopic aim. The empowered and unshaking gaze of the gunner 
now belongs to the memex user, but the vantage point is reversed. Instead of being 
caught in the bombsight’s crosshairs, as “objects of interactivity” (Nakamura 105), the 
viewers of Figure 0-4 may envision themselves as subjects sitting before the memex, 
surveying its landscape, hand on trigger. 
 
  
 
Figure 0-4: Illustration by Alfred Crimi showing memex in use (image from Life Magazine)  
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Our position in the cockpit of memex is one of power and domination over not 
only “the enormous mass of the common record” (Bush, “As We May Think” 46) but 
also the computer itself. The memex was to be a “powerful mechanical aid” that would 
assist those capable of “mature, creative thought” (41). Through it, users could “reacquire 
the privilege of forgetting” and rely on the device to perform the cold, simplistic work of 
mathematics and logic (47). To reach this perfect state, Bush’s workstation had to erase 
many elements common to record-keeping at the time: paper, ink, and also secretarial 
bodies. In the crucial final section of his essay, Bush imagines that the “nerves of a 
typist” are just one more layer intervening between the originator of the record and the 
capture of the record (47). He asks “Must we always transform to mechanical 
movements” if the message begins in the electricity of the brain and ends in the 
electricity of the recording device (47)? What if we could intercept electrical impulses to 
deliver pure, unmediated information, joining cognition to inscription with no secretary 
or other interface in between?  
The second desire expressed through the design of memex is to sterilize the 
interface as much as possible, removing error-prone laborers, cumbersome paper piles, 
and clumsy pens or pencils that smudge and bleed. The vision that Bush expresses in the 
final paragraphs of his essay is interface-free computer use, and this vision marks the first 
stages of a trajectory that continues today in some approaches to interface design: we 
should feel so comfortable and uninhibited in our relationship to the computer (a 
relationship figured as and through an interface) that we forget the computational 
dimension entirely.  
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Naturally, compartmentalization and sterilization are twin aesthetic urges—to 
create an appearance of cleanliness means also backgrounding the more unsightly 
components of his machine. Not only does Bush’s dream machine need to resemble an 
item of furniture in order to background its intricate parts, but it also must provide a neat 
and clean surface or work environment for its user. However, I use the word 
“sterilization” to point at something more sinister than cleanliness or tidiness, though 
certainly those qualities are at play in the design of memex as a workstation. Sterile 
interfaces are metaphorically castrated by design; they are non-generative (Zittrain), 
meaning that they serve us as appliances for pre-programmed use rather than creative 
media for the production of something new. Digging deeper into the link between 
sterilization and sterility, I also contend that interface sterilization ultimately signals a 
desire to remove the “clutter” of female and colored bodies from the space of information 
work.  
 
Sterilization: “as though he had the physical page before him”  
A constellation of adjectives—blank, clean, white, neutral, precise—revolve 
around the concept of sterility in relationship to computers. Extreme sterilization brings 
us the featurelessness of a piece of glass, the smoothness of an aluminum skin, the 
edgeless glow of a white room. All of these have their place in the design and marketing 
of computers, but sterilization is no mere advertising tactic and it is more than an 
aesthetic. It is also the drive to control information (and information workers and 
interface users) through particular strategies deployed by Western culture and its aversion 
to pollution and dirtiness perceived as threatening. It is a deeply running logic that grows 
from association of cleanliness with goodness and affluence and dirtiness with crime and 
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poverty. Sterilization in computer interface design works much like white privilege in the 
systematic oppression of people of color. In Revealing Whiteness, Shannon Sullivan has 
argued that “Blackness functions as the abject, which means not only that it is allegedly 
filthy but also that it threatens the boundaries between the clean and the dirty” (73). 
Extreme sterilization, as a totalizing, apolitical, ahistorical whiteness, not only works to 
purify the interface for a smoother and less complicated user experience, but it also 
institutes a radical polarity between sterility and contamination, similar to what Sullivan 
names as “unconscious habits of connecting whiteness with cleanliness and blackness 
with impurity” (73).  
 Looking again at Bush’s essay, we can see that memex is, on the outside, a clean 
surface, tidy and bright. Cleanliness signals safety, proper operation, and ease of use or 
fluidity. In Terry Harpold’s analysis, “Memex clears away the mess of the scholar’s study 
and bundles it neatly in the corner of his desk” (“Hypertext” 118). The effect of 
cleanliness is accomplished largely through ridding the workstation of paper and ink. 
Even the photographic mechanism within the memex uses no fluids. Bush describes how 
one might annotate a source projected on the glass surface: 
He can add marginal notes and comments, taking advantage of one type of 
dry photography, and he can [even] do this by a stylus scheme, such as is 
now employed in the teleautograph seen in railroad waiting rooms, just as 
though he had the physical page before him. (45)  
By removing the physical page from the writing scene, Bush pairs the mastery of 
information overload with the glorification of the minimalist, paper-free work space. The 
removal of paper from the workspace enforces not only a desire for cleanliness but a 
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hatred of clutter and repulsion at any darkening of the workspace. Memex, with its 
combination of microfilm, light, and glass, would be superior to paper archives and 
bookshelves because of “the clarity of the items resurrected from storage” (Bush 44). The 
move away from ink in the memex and the adoption of microfilm is representative of the 
modern impulse to turn away from “the dirty, noisy, and imprecise technology of the 
1930s” (Nyce and Kahn, Memex to Hypertext 48). Ink moves and flows. In contrast, the 
letters on touch-screens do not smudge or transfer to the fingertip. Bush eliminates the 
blackness of ink and its ability to infect and contaminate other surfaces as it transfers 
from paper to hands and back again.  
Memex is indeed what Lisa Nakamura might call a “white interface”: an 
interactive display designed as a “spotlessly clean space” (99). Crimi’s illustration gives 
us “a visual field that appears cool, silvery, washed-out, desaturated, and colorless,” as 
Nakamura describes the white interfaces depicted in the film The Matrix (124). Such 
interfaces suggest not only organized and controlled information spaces, but also 
organizing and controlling interface operators. The man who owns the hand in Figure 0-4 
is the universal, normative user—abstract and bodiless. He will not leave fingerprints in 
pencil dust or drip ink on his books. Bush notes that “control over his material 
environment” (37) is one benefit all technologies afford, and memex is no exception. Yet, 
Nakamura suggests that mastery often comes at the cost of mindfulness of our media and 
our own positions as interactors in digital culture: “The assertion of control in network 
society involves privileged, transparent interfaced relations to immersive digital 
environments” (Nakamura 124). Transparency thus suppresses both the friction of 
computer use and users’ mindfulness of their own positions of power and omniscience. 
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While Bush certainly imagined the memex as an orderly workstation to help the 
contemporary scholar manage “the matter of bulk” (45), this desktop surface also 
connects bulk or excess with dirtiness and wrongness. Remember that the central 
problem that memex would address in “As We May Think” is too much information 
threatening to drown out “truly significant attainments” (37). Thus, Harpold posits that 
“the designated aim of the device is to apply order to disorder, boundaries to the 
unbounded” (“Hypertext” 118), but so that disorder and unboundedness are framed as 
deviant and undesirable. The merging of compartmentalization and sterilization in the 
memex is the legacy of technologies of information overload. As Harpold notes, “This is, 
in a narrow sense, what Memex aims to do: straighten up the mess that confronts the 
knowledge worker of the modern era” (“Hypertext” 124).  
As such, we might combine Nakamura’s analysis of white interfaces in The 
Matrix with Bush’s “transparent platens” and clean desktop to arrive at the following: 
 
Digital media Industrial media 
Stylus and glass Ink and paper 
Order Disorder 
Cleanliness Dirtiness 
Whiteness Darkness 
Mastery of information Information overload 
Table 0-1: The modern era of information management (on left) constructs an older era 
(on right) as opposite and inferior. 
 
Although Bush’s machine was analog (not digital) and he was not yet living in a time of 
digital computing when he conceived of the memex, through this interface fantasy he 
anticipated the shift from the industrial age to the electronic age, naming some of the 
values that define digital media culture today. Not coincidentally, the values that I draw 
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out of Bush’s memex fantasy are also dualistic—each new affordance created by the 
memex has an opposing constraint tied to older media and past ways of life—perhaps 
predicting the binary encoding of the digital computer. Table 0-1 presents the problems 
with older, analog culture contrasted with the solutions that newer, digital culture 
purports to offer, but this division of old and new is part of the work that “new media 
culture” does through its glorification of the slick and streamlined digital device and user 
experience. Making a similar argument, Anna Munster has implored: “we need to 
radically question the birth of digital culture as one that has been shaped largely via a 
binary logic” (3). Her point here is that the underlying materiality of digital media, 
fundamentally encoded in a dual on/off or 0/1 structure, affects the evolution of media 
and its influence on cultures that assimilate their logics. 
Of course it would be an overstatement to say that Bush and his vision determined 
the trajectory of computer interface design as we know it today. In my project, my intent 
is not to claim that any individual’s interface fantasy imposed a future on the 
brainwashed masses. However, it is worth analyzing how designs of purity and whiteness 
work as antidotes to the septic complexity of algorithms, data rot, malware, “darknet” file 
sharing, and other less-than-desirable phenomena that are unique to the web. For 
instance, Apple’s whitewashing of their products, stores, and product rooms (a strategy 
that echoes IBM’s iconic “white room” for displaying products in Poughkeepsie, New 
York) extends sterilization to our digital culture, as I discuss in Chapter 1.  
We can find clusters of resistance to sterilization. Art and experimental writing 
communities offer many examples that take issue with the campaign of clean interfaces 
we have seen gathering momentum since Bush was writing in the 1930s and 1940s. For 
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instance, the glitch art community explicitly seeks to dirty or corrupt new media, adding 
noise and confusion to pure signals and streamlined, user-friendly interfaces. Dirty 
concrete poetry is a style of concrete poetry that highlights the materiality and messiness 
of the typewriter as a medium: “poets smeared letters with inked ribbons [and] the letters 
appeared dirty or rough around their edges” (Emerson 100). As Lori Emerson argues, 
dirty concrete is a “more politically activist alternative to clean concrete” (100). The DIY 
and maker movements could also be framed as corrections to an overly clean and 
compartmentalized mode of creativity. In 2009, computer artist John Maeda observed: 
In the last few decades, technology has encouraged our fascination with 
perfection — whether it’s six sigma manufacturing, the zero-contaminant 
clean room, or in its simplest form, “2.0.” Given the new uncertainty in 
the world however, I can see that it is time to question this approach — of 
over-technologized, over-leveraged, over-advanced living. The next big 
thing? Dirty hands. 
Indeed, hands are sometimes the most striking indicators of sterile and 
compartmentalized interfaces. The whiter the hand, the more control being demonstrated 
over computer, workspace, and interface objects. Hands, from the disembodied 
mouse-clicking hand to the thumbs-up “Like” of Facebook, are signals of mastery and 
graspability, and they often provide opportunities for analysis and insight. 
 
* * * 
 
 
Control of information flows and overflows is the direct goal of memex and the 
majority of computer interfaces since then. By enforcing radical compartmentalization 
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and sterilization in the way we conceive of human-computer interfaces, we betray an 
ultimate desire for control. But this desire for control works specifically by alienating any 
form of discomfort like information overload or malfunction, so that we cannot conceive 
of the two (i.e. a form of control mixed with the capacity to tolerate/appreciate error) 
together. The logic coming from Bush teaches new media users the polarization of 
loving/desiring cleanliness and extreme distance (enabled through the software/hardware 
interface) while hating/mistrusting contamination and intimacy with the mechanism 
doing the “heavy lifting” or “dirty work” back stage (the mechanism of how Facebook 
algorithms work or where Google stores our data, for instance). 
The closer we get to the mechanism (that is, the more that compartmentalization 
breaks down and fails to hold human apart from computer), the more sterilization 
becomes crucial to cleanse that site of interaction and entanglement. For instance, Google 
would only publicize galleries of its data centers if they were sparkling, breathtakingly 
sterile spaces. Of course, the Google data center photographs are bleach-white. No 
contamination. When we see the interior of the computing process (or when we see 
“behind the interface”), it is a positive view as long as it looks sterile and protected. The 
reverse also is true. We can witness a filthy computing space (even a photo of poor 
working conditions in Apple factories in China) or an infected computer as long as we 
are very far away from it and our device is carefully partitioned away from the 
contaminant. Compartmentalization permits detachment and sterilization permits 
intimacy. 
In the past pages I have described two design values—compartmentalization and 
sterilization—that have continued into the future, following Bush’s essay. That essay, in 
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other words, has helped to sell a particular type of new media and digital culture to 
subsequent generations of designers and users. At root, Bush’s essay is an early and 
important example of the belief that the design of new media interfaces might be 
divorced from politics and struggle—a belief that (I will be arguing) is embodied in much 
current digital hardware and software. Over and over, from Apple’s minimalist, 
whitewashed design to the extreme usability camp of web design7, we now see new 
media imitate the postwar computing trend (with Bush as the canonical example in media 
studies) towards streamlined appearances that are bleached clean of complexity, critical 
awareness, and the full range of experiences in the world. In this dissertation, I will look 
both at hardware and software interfaces that embody compartmentalization and 
sterilization, but I will also look at nonmainstream digital artists and writers to see that 
our interfaces could have been otherwise—and still could be otherwise, if we teach 
people in our classes how to approach interfaces through glitch, error, and intimate 
distance. What have we lost in following the legacy of Bush and a violent logic of 
separating human strictly from her servant or beast of burden—the computing 
mechanism? We have lost the closeness and thrill we receive through distant intimacy 
with our creative materials (the thrill described by hobbyist tinkerers and glitch art 
practitioners alike). We have inherited the assumption (evident in Bush) that some people 
are appropriate, ideal computer users (particularly those who are male, white, in control, 
poised, competent, knowing) and some are not. Demonstrating those claims, filling out 
those claims, will be the work of the following chapters. 
                                                
7 The design philosophy of this “camp” might be summarized by Steve Krug’s Don’t Make Me 
Think, which is an influential and popular web design guidebook. It encourages the belief that the 
best interface is the one that goes unnoticed by the user—one that is so frictionless, it does not 
make the user stop and think. 
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Chapter 1 
Getting in Touch with Creative Materiality 
 
“Instead of a formative power detachable from matter, artisans (and mechanics, cooks, builders, 
cleaners, and anyone else intimate with things) encounter a creative materiality with incipient 
tendencies and propensities, which are variably enacted depending on the other forces, affects, or 
bodies with which they come into close contact.” Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter pg. 56 8 
 
 
Figure 1-1: Visitors explore Shiver at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2011 (image courtesy of 
the artist) 
 
I am standing at the entrance to a room composed of three white walls, 
illuminated by glowing lights in each of the two corners. As my eyes adjust to the space, 
I begin to notice subtle, trembling movements all around me. Advancing into the room, 
drawing closer to the far wall, I see tiny streams of water making their way tenuously 
down a thick fabric surface. As I move closer to the streams, their rhythm changes and 
they multiply. Backing away, the streams converge. Again I move close, and again they 
                                                
8 In the dissertation, all Bennett citations reference Vibrant Matter unless otherwise noted. 
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disperse and multiply. Running my fingertip across the surface of the fabric, the water 
feels cold as it follows the slope of my arm and trickles off my elbow. The wall yields 
slightly to the pressure of my touch. I get the feeling that the whole room is sweating, 
telling a story through its leaky skin, making me part of that story. That is my memory of 
Colleen Ludwig’s interactive installation entitled Shiver, which debuted at the 
“Watershed: Art, Activism, and Community Engagement” exhibit at the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2011 (Figure 1-1).  
Approximately 10 miles away from where I stood within Shiver, a different kind 
of white room created a similar experience for its visitors. This white room’s ambient 
light invited passersby to enter, draw close to lively surfaces, and touch. The Apple Store, 
gleaming with aluminum and glass panels, pulsing with bodies and flashing screens, had 
recently put the first batch of iPads on display for an eager public to handle. The iPad 2 
had not yet been released, so the first-generation devices still seemed unfamiliar and 
strange to many (Figure 1-2).  
 
  
Figure 1-2: (at left) Apple Store, standard design (image from Wikimedia Commons), (at right) customers try 
out iPads for the first time in the SoHo Apple Store in April 2010 (image from Phys.org) 
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In this chapter, I trace the threads of similarity and difference between the 
interfaces we encounter in the two rooms. The spaces both encourage visitors to interact 
through touching, yet the interface fantasy embodied by each room offers different 
possibilities and futures for creative digital practice. I will first set the iPad in broad 
historical context, in order to learn from the engineering and design choices that have 
shaped the hardware interfaces of personal computing (specifically focusing on Apple) as 
we know them today. How did computer hardware go from the room-sized clutter of 
ENIAC to the smooth, handheld intimacy of a tablet? Not by a path of destiny but rather 
through a process of mutual social/technical shaping—humans worked to realize a 
preference for compartmentalization and sterilization in interfaces, while in turn those 
interfaces conditioned us to find beauty, agreeability, and control in that design style. 
Although many important influences have contributed to our contemporary desire for 
clean and neatly enclosed hardware interfaces, the futurist vision of the late Steve Jobs (a 
vision he pursued aggressively within Apple) has profoundly affected the course of 
small-device and touch-screen computing. 
After setting this historical context, I sketch some of the tangled relations between 
two different possibilities for touching (and materiality) in digital culture. One is the 
Shiver touch, material in the sense that new materialists like Jane Bennett might use the 
word “touch.” The other touch tends towards immateriality, or even “antimateriality” to 
use Bennett’s term. This is the touch of the iPad, which is intimate for the purpose of, not 
creating more generous human-computer relations, but instead strengthening the narrative 
of consumer control. iPad’s consumptive intimacy offers a faux closeness that ultimately 
obscures the material dimensions of computing—dimensions that Ludwig actually puts 
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on display as points of interest and curiosity in Shiver. The hardware mechanics of her 
interface’s operation (exposed wires, two Arduino microcontrollers, metal scaffolding, 
and other technical parts) are available for all to see and inquire after. In contrast, iPad 
screens are what Tara McPherson might call “cover stories,” or interfaces that “disguise” 
materialities such as human labor, physical components, and design + engineering 
ideology considered as a very real material dimension of a technology (34).  
I turn to new materialists including Bennett and Karen Barad, applying their 
theories to my critique of iPad’s emergence as an “intimate” device and the touch screen 
more generally as a “natural” mode of human-computer interaction. Like most touch 
screen devices, the iPad maintains a strict division between interior and exterior, 
exercising obsessive control over a hermetically sealed inside space while also satisfying 
an intense American desire (since the early- to mid-20th century) for cleanliness. Unlike 
Shiver, the aesthetics of iPad reflect the work that it and similar mainstream 
computational devices perform in our culture: sterilizing and compartmentalizing the 
very materials and processes that could have given rise to creativity and innovation in 
unexpected places by unexpected groups of people. iPad’s aesthetics of elegance and ease 
ask us to accept a universe in which the computer as computing machine, as 
computational ‘other,’ is no longer visible nor accessible to understanding. A universe in 
which only those who have privileged backgrounds and proper literacies can move from 
user to expert. A universe in which no one notices or cares about that loss. We must be 
wary of such dematerializations, divisions, and displacements—they take the thrilling 
potential of physical, human-nonhuman touch and mitigate it, filter it, neutralize, and 
neuter it through high-tech hardware abstractions.  
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Interleaf 
In an essay that details her creative process and the theoretical 
underpinnings of Shiver, Ludwig writes, “For the construction of 
Shiver, it was important to me to contain the water phenomena 
within a room-sized space to amplify the relationship between a 
visitor’s skin and the wall membrane” (“Fluctuating Border”). As I 
move in the space of the installation, I am not acting on a surface, 
but rather engaging in “non-verbal conversation” with the space 
through skin-on-skin contact. The artist argues that this 
engagement might trigger generosity and empathy in visitors, 
fostering a mutual interaction or “relationship” between human and 
nonhuman bodies. “Shiver was created to be a temple of 
compassion,” Ludwig writes. “It will not ignore or overlook you, 
but pours with sensation.” Ultimately, the installation has the 
potential to evoke that compassion in the touch of visitors, during 
the brief time they occupy Shiver but also beyond, in their 
interactions with other people, environments, and interfaces.  
 
 
 
Figure 1-3: interior view of Shiver (image courtesy of the artist) 
 
Digital-material threats 
“So here I sit gossiping in the early candle-light of old age—I and my book—
casting backward glances over our travel’d road” (Whitman). In “A Backward Glance 
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o’er Traveled Roads,” an essay-memoir first published in 1888, a nearly 70-year-old Walt 
Whitman reflects on his magnum opus, Leaves of Grass. The “our” of collective travel 
signals that Whitman’s book is not the vehicle of his writing journey but rather the 
companion. “My Book and I,” he writes, “what a period we have presumed to span! those 
thirty years from 1850 to ‘80—and America in them! Proud, proud indeed may we be, if 
we have cull’d enough of that period in its own spirit to worthily waft a few breaths of it 
to the future!” Whitman here expresses a deep identification between a writer and his text 
as a living, breathing, responsive, at times gnarly and surprising thing.  
When I think about the current state of digital creative practice, Whitman’s 
passage makes me wonder about issues like longevity, preservation, and any medium’s 
capacity to bear history forward. Mostly, however, I think about the challenge of 
achieving such complicity between composer or artist and her medium in a digital 
production environment. A steep learning curve combines with increasingly complex 
systems and locked-down devices to create conditions that make it harder for the average 
computer user to produce digital work in any mode other than what professional 
designers and engineers intended. Hardware and software obsolescence (as well as 
changing standards) eliminates, in some cases, the ability of a work to endure through the 
years of iteration Leaves saw. How could we revise “My Book and I” if we were to 
imagine Whitman speaking this line today? Perhaps by moving creativity to 
prefabricated, buttons-and-boxes software applications. “My Tumblr and I”? “My 
E-portfolio and I”? “My Facebook and I”? Will these platforms last to see the “candle-
light of old age”?  
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If Whitman had grown up with an Altair 8800 computer kit instead of typesetting 
and ink, he surely would have been at the center of trends and creative practice in new 
media today. Whitman self-published (literally handcrafted) many of his books, 
maintaining involvement with them from start to finish. His conception of the composing 
process was material, through and through. In Re-Scripting Walt Whitman, Ed Folsom 
and Kenneth Price capture this claim in precise terms: “Ideas, Whitman's poems insist, 
pass from one person to another not in some ethereal process, but through the bodies of 
texts, through the muscular operations of tongues and hands and eyes, through the 
material objects of books.” 
Katherine Hayles argues that “the view that the text is an immaterial verbal 
construction is an ideology that inflicts the Cartesian split between mind and body upon 
the textual corpus, separating into two fictional entities what is in actuality a dynamically 
interacting whole” (“Print Is Flat” 86). Whitman was passionately devoted to this whole 
of content enmeshed with technology. The codex for Whitman was a radical prosthesis: 
he “conceived of the ‘body of his work’ as something more than a dead metaphor,” as 
Folsom and Price put it, and he sought the mutual absorption of composer and 
composition. This thoroughly materialist approach to writing fits Hayles’ criteria for 
media-specific literary practice. If we take into account the broader scope of Whitman’s 
lifelong writing project, what Folsom and Price call an “extraordinary conflation of book 
and identity,” Hayles’ term “technotext” seems appropriate. According to her, a 
“technotext” is a work that draws attention to its medium and to itself as a technological 
construction. Artist, technology, and (verbal or graphic) content form a “dynamically 
interacting whole” (Hayles, “Print Is Flat” 86). As prime examples, Hayles points to texts 
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such as Mark Danielewski’s House of Leaves, Tom Phillips’ altered book A Humument, 
and the canonical hypertext work Patchwork Girl by Shelley Jackson. Leaves of Grass 
also exemplifies Hayles’ definition of the technotext by mobilizing “reflexive loops 
between its imaginative world and the material apparatus embodying that creation as a 
physical presence” (Writing Machines 25).  
Consider, again, what it would take for Whitman to achieve those loops of 
technotextual conflation and make the same statement today—“My Book and I”—with a 
digital medium taking the place of the capital-B Book.9 It might take knowing a markup 
language and maybe one or two programming languages. It might take familiarity with a 
software platform and an operating system to run it. It might also take devotion to staying 
up-to-date with changing web standards and new mobile devices. I could envision 
Whitman being quite fond of commenting his code—he would mark up his HTML body 
as if it were his own. Yet (and imagine he continuously revised and updated the same 
digital text over and over for thirty years), it would take an incredible amount of technical 
skill, support, and ambition even if he ultimately collaborated with a team of designers, 
programmers, and other experts. 
                                                
9 In exulting Whitman’s capital-B book, I know I am treading dangerously close to a print-centric 
ideology of the divine Book of Nature—the ideology of gathering and boundedness—of a linear, 
ordered, and planned universe. Here Book means law. The absolute, ubiquitous book. Or a 
dialectic circling toward resolution; in Derrida’s formulation, “the onto-encyclopedic or neo-
Hegelian model of the great total book, the book of absolute knowledge linking its own infinite 
dispersion to itself, in a circle” (Paper Machine 15). Elsewhere, Derrida has identified the 
distinction between capital-B Book and little-b book as a contrast between “divine or natural 
writing and the human and laborious, finite and artificial inscription” (Grammatology 15). 
Writing, Derrida points out, here is a metaphor: “that is to say, a natural, eternal, and universal 
writing, the system of signified truth, which is recognized in its dignity” (Grammatology 15). 
That does not characterize Whitman’s capital-B Book. His Book is not about order, resolution, 
totality, or dignity. The “human and laborious” is a more fitting description, as his writing 
continuously revels in disorder, incoherence, and—famously—contradiction. 
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In trading book for computer or adding computer into his process, he would have 
encountered a host of logistical difficulties. As Hayles notes, “Whereas computers 
struggle to remain viable for a decade, books maintain backward compatibility for 
hundreds of years” (“Print is Flat” 84). In 2012, a discussion about the “critically 
acclaimed” New York Times webtext “Snow Fall: The Avalanche at Tunnel Creek” on the 
TechRhet listserv (an email list for the computers & writing community) captured some 
of today’s technical demands of truly innovative and boundary-pushing digital 
production. One conclusion emerging from the TechRhet thread (via Dan Anderson, one 
of the final commenters) is that, simply, getting digital work to embody an argument or 
idea through a cutting-edge digital interface is extremely time-consuming and expensive 
for an individual—and the effort is only becoming more so. Because “most users will 
simply not have entrée to the mechanisms governing their interactions with […] 
electronic information” (Kirschenbaum 58), the access point for the functionality of paper 
is just a much bigger target than it is for computers.10 
The materiality of paper as an interface is harder to repress. Its “aura” more 
readily comes into view and it requires less specialized knowledge and fewer resources to 
experiment with paper and draw attention to its materiality. Paper engages a different 
range of senses than does the digital—we can smell paper, stain it, tear it, live through it. 
A deep paper cut makes us wince. The paper gives a wound but also receives a tiny red 
                                                
10 For example, in Mechanisms, Matthew Kirschenbaum needs nearly 50 pages of close reading 
and deep, sleuth-like research to root out the forensic materiality of the early text-based computer 
game Mystery House. He draws on specialized knowledge and a willingness to participate in a 
discourse that might be unfamiliar to humanist readers. Such effort is not readily encouraged—in 
fact, it is increasingly discouraged—in everyday digital media use. 
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measure of the human, absorbed into the paper’s fibers. What becomes of this bodily 
exchange in digital media environments? 
The blood of a paper cut might bring to mind a T-Mobile television ad entitled 
“Bloody Fingerprints.” The ad begins by showing strange, dark smears and smudges on 
different surfaces and objects in a house: toothbrush, light switch, water glass. A phone is 
ringing in the background and the camera zooms in on a smartphone with a cracked glass 
screen. The next shot shows a man (actor and comedian Bill Hader) with bandaged 
fingers sitting on a couch, anxiously contemplating the ringing phone. As he grimaces 
and answers the call, we see the masochistic man has been dealing with this problem, not 
by purchasing a brand new smartphone through a T-Mobile upgrade plan, but by slicing 
his fingertip raw against the jagged surface of his broken phone, over and over again. The 
fingerprints seen earlier, we realize, are smears of blood. Although the ad was likely not 
aiming for a sense of uneasy horror provoked by blood and self-harm, it successfully 
creates a scenario in which a symptom of handling paper crops up unexpectedly in the 
use of a digital device, despite the phone’s rounded curves and smooth surfaces. The ad 
shows a side of digital materiality—and digital touch—that is undesirable but also quite 
strange because of how the digital often seems less corporeal and less material (smoother, 
cleaner, lighter) than the analog. 
Of course, that was not always the case. Prior to the 1960s, the general public 
would have almost immediately associated computers or “electronic brains” with 
heaving, noisy, hot physical matter. The word “digital” went through a gradual process of 
becoming tied to fluidity and ease more than roughness and presence. Changes in the 
design and engineering of computer hardware—the tangible bodies, wrappings, or 
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surfaces of our digital devices—helped to precipitate this shift. To make this point, I will 
trace how hardware design and engineering choices tried to hide or emphasize various 
processes of computing and worked to dematerialize the digital, giving rise to a situation 
in which the “innards” of a computer appear sloppy, ugly, or threatening when/if they are 
visible. Although many computer historians have already told the story of how computers 
became smaller, affordable, and easier to use, I would like to think critically about the 
enclosures of our computers while scouting around for compartmentalization and 
sterilization as specific patterns in this well documented history.  
 
Dematerializing the digital  
In the 1940s, the U.S. military began publicly revealing bits and pieces of the 
computing technology it had developed during World War II, and computing pioneers 
emerged from behind the scenes for interviews with The New York Times and other 
papers. At this point, “digital” was beginning to take root in the public imaginary as 
binary data—fast, efficient, and easier to use than adding machines and paper. Yet, 
importantly, it was still hard to ignore the materiality of computing. A 1946 New York 
Times article shows the ENIAC, a tremendously large early computer that occupied an 
entire room, alongside human “programmers” or “attendants” adjusting wires and 
controls (Figure 1-4). The article reports on speed right alongside brooding complexity 
and architectural, creature-like features: “The ENIAC has some 40 panels nine feet high, 
which bristle with control and indicating material” (Kennedy). These photographs give an 
impression similar to Shiver—the computerized room nearly swallows humans whole.  
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Figure 1-4: Images of ENIAC printed in 1946 article “Electronic Computer Flashes Answers, May Speed 
Engineering” in The New York Times 
  
 Part of the spectacle surrounding the news media’s coverage of digital mid-20th-
century computers was the metaphor of a mechanical, electronic, or electric brain. A 
1950 article in The New York Times, for example, reports on a “4,000-tube ‘brain’” 
designed to simulate the paths of guided missiles. The article’s feature photo (Figure 1-5) 
shows Arthur Vance, head of the Electronic Computer Section at RCA (Radio 
Corporation of America), one attendant, and the “brain” itself, a giant computer 
codenamed “Project Typhoon” (Small 93-94). The computer occupied a 50 x 80-foot 
room in RCA’s research lab in Princeton, NJ (Small 95). Like ENIAC and Project 
Cyclone in the 1940s, the U.S. Government contracted RCA to build Typhoon for solving 
air defense problems. Vance sits at a control console with papers spread out on the 
desktop while an attendant checks the “plotting boards” to track the missile’s path.  
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Figure 1-5: Photograph of Vance (in the center) printed in 1950 article “4,000-Tube ‘Brain’ Cuts Out 
Years In Designing and Testing Missiles” in The New York Times 
  
 The concept of a brain became a trope in news articles that tried to make the first 
computers into spectacles, but also into things the public could (sort of) understand. The 
metaphor was encouraged by engineers who wanted to explain their invention’s 
significance as well as its technical components like “memory” in clear, accessible terms. 
Although the “electronic brain” label misrepresented computers to the public, as Howard 
Aiken pointed out in an interview about the Mark IV in 1954, the metaphor did keep the 
digital computer tied to a sort of materiality and animacy. Additionally, apart from the 
brain metaphor, when the primary role and identity of the digital computer was a 
counting machine, the “digital” remained linked to the old manual, tangible sense of 
digits as fingers. For example, a 1949 article in The Washington Post declares that 
“actually, it is a ‘digital calculator’—just like your ten fingers” as it tries to describe 
ENIAC.  
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However, as computers got smaller and as the field of graphical user interface 
design established itself as a profession and area of study, the principle of immateriality 
as a desirable user experience emerged. The “digital” was then increasingly engineered 
towards that goal (Kirschenbaum 84). “The essential function of the operating system 
that thus paved the way for personal computing was to remove the inscriptive act from 
the direct oversight of the human user, screening it first by the command line and then by 
a graphical user interface” (Kirschenbaum 84). This screening is part of a 
compartmentalizing obsession in digital culture.  
In December 1982, Time Magazine broke with tradition and did not name a 
“Person of the Year.” Instead, 1983 had a “Machine of the Year”: the computer. But this 
computer, the personal computer, was different from those that came before it. In A 
History of Modern Computing, Paul Ceruzzi argues that the personal computer revolution 
in the 80s was preceded by two phases in computing, both happening at the same time: 
the mainframe era and a “pioneering” hobbyist phase (Ceruzzi 145) or what Susan 
Barnes referred to as “a play-driven stage.” Hobbyist culture stood in stark contrast to the 
corporate designs of mainframe computers that were the other face of the computing 
industry in the 1970s.  
 
Parlors and coal cellars 
The mainframe computer, pioneered by IBM throughout the 1950s, 60s and 70s, 
was a symbol of American technological and industrial development as well as 
forward-thinking mid-century design. The term “mainframe” primarily denotes scale and 
visual coherence: room-size installations of large, furniture-like units, each one 
responsible for a different information processing task but all bearing a subdued, uniform 
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appearance. At IBM, designers intended that the computer and its interface—i.e. the 
input/output devices like keyboards and control panels—should all come together as “a 
functional, organic whole” (Harwood 79). Peripherals like memory, execution circuitry, 
card sorters, printers, and the Central Processing Unit (CPU) itself were all wrapped in 
sleek cabinets on wheels. The influential IBM industrial designer Eliot Noyes called this 
configuration the “parlor and coal cellar division.” The parlor is the space the computer 
operator inhabits—the interface. The coal cellar is the “concealed, distant space in which 
the machine itself operates” (Harwood 12). This design not only partitioned end users off 
from the actual computing process—a move that John Harwood argues set a precedent 
for today’s prevailing beliefs about human-computer interaction (12). The parlor-coal 
cellar division also split users into two groups: system operators who monitored console 
readings and print-outs, and those less visible, often male users who could program the 
computer. Harwood claims that for both groups, the mainframe era ultimately resulted in 
the isolation of the end user from the computing industry itself.11  
In his detailed study of IBM’s industrial design aesthetic in postwar America, 
Harwood demonstrates that values of compartmentalization and sterilization were at the 
forefront of the company’s effort to create a computer that would appeal to different 
kinds of businesses in the 50s and 60s. The parlor-coal cellar was the organizing logic of 
IBM’s aesthetic. Noyes, Edgar Kaufmann Jr. (an architectural historian and industrial 
design curator at MoMA who did consulting for IBM starting in 1957), and other IBM 
                                                
11 According to John Mueller, during the mainframe era, a business would buy a single large 
machine to be stored in a vault distant from many of its users, and only the “computer priesthood” 
had access to programming the actual computer. As Mueller points out, the split between user and 
operator, or user and programmer, had to happen in order for user-centered design (UCD) to 
make sense as a design logic beginning around the 1980s.  
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insiders called it “the furnace approach,” and Harwood argues that the concept 
(spearheaded by Kaufmann) had a major influence on the future of ergonomically sound 
and beautiful computer design (81). In a memo dated 1957, Noyes summarized a note 
from Kaufmann about their logic:  
The “parlor-coal cellar” idea which he [Kaufmann] refers to is what we 
have called the furnace approach to the design of a computer in which 
only components used by the staff are exposed on a main floor and all 
others are buried in the cellar or in a back room. (Noyes qtd. in Harwood 
248, note 58) 
Noyes and Kaufmann believed that the most efficient, safe, and “dramatic” way to 
operate a computer was from the space of a parlor or front room, and they pursued this 
goal of compartmentalizing most of the computer “not only visually but also spatially” 
(Harwood 81). Their designs used distancing strategies. Kaufmann, thinking like an 
architect, suggested that the problem of designing the externals of the computer was one 
of how to seal off or conceal the machine's inner operations. In collaboration with 
Kaufmann, Noyes brought to mainframe computing an interface fantasy that he had first 
realized in the 1940s with the redesign of IBM’s electric typewriter: 
Evidence of the machine’s inner workings was systematically erased from 
its surface, gaps and holes were closed, and the complicated machine was 
enclosed by a single die-cast metal volume. This served not only to bring 
the various “busy multiple parts” of the machine into a coherent organic 
“whole,” but also to [underscore] the productive unity of the workspace. 
(Harwood 34)  
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Through these particular strategies, especially the parlor-coal cellar division, IBM 
designers created a “harmonious, systematic, unified” look and feel for the computer 
(Harwood 84), which reflected a modernist belief that a clean, streamlined casing was 
more beautiful and more natural than the older, dirtier, mechanistic look that 
characterized wartime computers like ENIAC and Typhoon.  
In the 1960s, IBM released the System/360 mainframe, which set a new standard 
for sophisticated computer design. By the mid-1970s, System/360 had helped to secure 
IBM’s place as the leader of the U.S. computer industry (Ceruzzi 145). IBM became 
famous for its highly trained, sharply suited salesmen and customer executives who sold 
“solutions,” or packaged systems tailored to the needs of government and business 
clients. The various models of the System/360 released throughout the 1960s-70s ranged 
from approximately $3,000-$80,000 for a monthly rental and $115,000-$3.5 million to 
purchase (“Mainframes product profiles”). These were obviously not computers for the 
average consumer.  
To create stunning promotional photographs of computers like System/360, IBM 
constructed a temporary building at the company’s Poughkeepsie, NY location (Figure 
1-6). Ugly from the outside, the makeshift building housed a breathtaking space inside. 
Known as the “white room,” it was almost like an early version of the Apple Store’s 
pristine consumer playpen: “blank white walls, white plastic floor and ceiling tiles, 
utterly window-less” (Harwood 93). The white room is the clearest manifestation of 
IBM’s idealization of the computer interface. By fantasizing about the workspace as pure 
white and sterilized to the ultimate degree, IBM could exercise exceptional control over 
its vision and construct the ideal computer user (the company often hired models to “use” 
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the computer prototypes during photo shoots) as a well-behaved and decorative prop who 
would stick to the parlor and never venture into the masked-off cellar. 
 
 
Figure 1-6: IBM System/360 in the “white room” in Poughkeepsie, NY (1964) (image from 
ComputerHistory.org) 
 
Hobbyist computing and the PC revolution 
While IBM was busy selling multimillion dollar mainframes to businesses, a 
different culture was emerging around much smaller computers. The hobbyist phase was 
cotemporaneous with the mainframe phase, but its culture was oriented towards the 
amateur rather than the professional. Far removed from the shiny spotlight of commercial 
mainframe computing, the intersection of locally organized practices and newly 
available/affordable technologies fostered “backwater environments [that] cultivated 
forms of amateur tinkering” (Zittrain 17). The availability of microprocessor chips 
(namely the Intel 8080, priced at $360 in 1974), inexpensive minicomputer kits like the 
Altair 8800 (priced at $439 for the kit or $621 assembled in 1976), and the spread of 
hobbyist newsletters and computer clubs all supported a style of computing that could not 
be more different from the mainframe culture (Ceruzzi 225-6, 231). Through these 
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newsletters, magazines like BYTE: The Small Systems Journal, and weekly meetings at 
bars and private homes, people who were passionate about programming and building 
computers “turned to one another rather than to suppliers” (Ceruzzi 216) for help.  
Despite help from the hobbyist community and the encouragement of a 1975 ad 
for the Altair Computer Kit, which claimed that “if you can handle a soldering iron and 
follow simple instructions, you can build a computer,” the Altair was notoriously difficult 
to assemble, and users suffered bruised fingertips from pressing toggle switches over and 
over in order to enter a program into the memory cards (Ceruzzi 231). This was not a 
user-friendly computer—but these were not typical users. They were not “parlor” users. 
Many computer historians, like Ceruzzi, attribute the later success of mass market 
personal computers to the rich soil tilled by hobbyist newsletters and user groups. The 
community of hobbyists grew more concentrated and unified in response to IBM’s neat-
and-clean vision of computing, which amounted to packaged “systems” or “solutions” 
that highly trained salesman would recommend for customers with particular business 
needs. This was the revolution of System/360, but it was an antagonist for hobbyists who 
wanted to create a subculture in opposition to the corporate computing culture.  
In 1975, IBM introduced its first “personal computer,” the Model 5100 which 
“could fit on a desk and contained a processor, keyboard, cassette tape drive, and small 
video terminal in a single package,” all for a hefty $9,000 (Ceruzzi 248). The IBM 5100 
had a business-like metal case that would have fit in with the sleek office style of the day. 
Over the next six years, a few more “portable” (for those who lift weights regularly) IBM 
PC models would follow, but with limited software available and at similar price-points, 
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these computers were suited primarily for business users and scientific researchers. They 
did not attract the cult following of tinkerers that grew around the Altair (Ceruzzi 248).  
The golden example of hobbyist culture is the Homebrew Computer Club, a 
group of electronics enthusiasts, mostly male, who met between 1975 and 1986 in Menlo 
Park, California. Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs met in a garage at one of these meetings, 
where Jobs would eventually learn about the personal (i.e. made by one person for one 
person) computer Wozniak had built. Wozniak went to the first club meeting on March 5, 
1975. The Altair 8800, which ran on the Intel 8080 microprocessor, was a highlight of the 
meeting. The microprocessor was of particular interest to Wozniak. Unlike the Alto PC at 
Xerox PARC, which grew out of an academic time-sharing system in which networks of 
computers depended on a distant CPU, the silicon microprocessor or “computer-on-a-
chip” had the potential to power an individual, fully functional computer. That is what 
made the Commodore and Altair different from the Alto, Wozniak realized at the 
meeting: “Using a microprocessor, he could put some of the capacity of the 
minicomputer inside the terminal itself, so it could become a small stand-alone computer 
on a desktop” (Isaacson 107). But Wozniak wanted to make something that would be 
easier to use and different than any existing computer: “keyboard screen, and computer 
all in one integrated personal package” (Isaacson 107). Thinking back to the meeting on 
March 5,1975, Wozniak recalled, “This whole vision of a personal computer just popped 
into my head. […] That night, I started to sketch out on paper what would later become 
known as the Apple I” (qtd. in Isaacson 107). The Intel chips turned out to be too 
expensive, so Wozniak had to find cheaper alternatives. 
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He built the computer at night and on the weekends, and powered it on for the 
first time in June 1975. When he debuted the computer (the Apple I) at a Homebrew Club 
meeting one evening, Jobs and others were interested. Wozniak recounts the demo:  
Personal computer keyboards and video screens were not well established 
then. There was a lot of showing off to other members of the club. 
Schematics of the Apple I were passed around freely, and I’d even go over 
to people’s houses and help them build their own. (“Homebrew”) 
A little over a year later, Jobs and Wozniak had founded Apple Computer Company and 
received their first order for fifty Apple I computers, which were all hand-soldered in 
Jobs’ parents’ house. The Apple I’s main attraction was gaming. Wozniak rewrote 
Breakout (a game he and Jobs made for Atari) in BASIC, then added speakers, a joystick, 
and push button controls to show off at the Homebrew Club. The Apple I was very much 
a hobbyist computer. It had no casing and the delivered product was essentially a bare 
circuit board and operator’s manual. Apple I was different from other kit PCs because it 
could accommodate a “human-typable keyboard” (Wozniak qtd. in Isaacson 116), since 
Wozniak thought the Altair’s finger-bruising binary switches were less than ideal.  
 When they saw the sleek metal cases on PCs at the Personal Computer Festival in 
September 1976, Jobs and Wozniak were somewhat embarrassed by their unenclosed 
Apple I, which looked juvenile and toy-like next to the competition (Isaacson 122). 
While Jobs took on the task of deciding what the Apple II would look like from the 
outside, Wozniak remained enchanted with “wires, valves, and technical manuals. … I 
fell in love with these little descriptions of computers and their insides” (Wozniak qtd. in 
Segaller 137). While Wozniak was a brilliant circuit engineer, it was Jobs who steered the 
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future of Apple’s hardware interfaces. He envisioned an innovative design for a 
consumer product in an appealing and complete package. Jobs’ design preferences, 
however, went beyond any basic standard of eye-appeal and functionality. From the 
moment the company started planning a case for the Apple II, Jobs obsessively pursued 
perfection and streamlined simplicity in Apple designs, a pursuit that would only grow 
more determined as he went through his career. For Apple II, he snubbed the metal cases 
(common for many PCs at the time) and instead opted for a molded plastic case inspired 
by Cuisinart food processors at Macy’s (Isaacson 126). It is not surprising that Jobs took 
a design cue from products in the cleanliness-obsessed kitchen appliance industry. The 
connection between uncluttered design, user-friendly appliance, and clean workspace is 
more than coincidence. These ideals form the core of Jobs’ interface fantasy, even from 
the first year of Apple’s existence.  
 
Interleaf 
Ludwig has compared Shiver to a body turned inside out: “Images 
of guts, spine, nerve-endings and muscle are depicted by the 
circuitry, wiring, valves and exoskeleton of the room. Inside, the 
clean, smooth walls create an impression of the skin surface” 
(“Fluctuating Border”). Through this configuration, Ludwig 
creates an interface that exposes itself to visitors in two 
directions—by facing outward to perform a “clean” space and also 
by facing inward to reveal the “guts” of construction and 
operation. However, as Ludwig explains, the inward and outward 
of the body-as-interface are reversed. The interface becomes, not a 
surface to view or touch from a safe distance, but rather a strange 
space to enter. The skin or surface of the room is designed to 
envelop the visitor, immersing him or her in lively processes of 
flow and sensation. Moving outside the room, visitors encounter 
what Ludwig calls the “spine” of shiver—a vertical tower holds the 
colored cords connecting the “sensor matrix in the ceiling” to 
microprocessor software that regulates water flow based on 
visitors’ movement in the room. By exposing the technical 
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elements that we would usually expect to be hidden, encased by 
drywall or boxed up, Ludwig retains a rough, unfinished 
materiality that contrasts sharply with the “clean, smooth” walls 
inside.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-7: (at left) exterior view of Shiver, (at right) detail of the “spine” (images courtesy of the artist) 
 
The hobbyist style was many things, but it definitely was not clean and 
uncluttered, nor did it privilege user-friendliness. Hobbyists approached the computer as 
a sandbox where hands could get dirty. A “user interface” was nothing more than a 
convenience—a sandbox cover easily lifted. In this respect, hobbyist computing departed 
defiantly from IBM’s sales rhetoric, represented by the ethereal “white room” in 
Poughkeepsie. While working on the Apple II throughout 1976, Wozniak’s hobbyist 
spirit fueled a growing rift between him and Jobs: “Most hackers and hobbyists liked to 
customize, modify, and jack various things into their computers. To Jobs, this was a 
threat to a seamless end-to-end user experience. Wozniak, a hacker at heart, disagreed” 
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(Isaacson 128). “My dream for the Apple II,” Jobs said, “was to sell the first real 
packaged computer. I got a bug up my rear that I wanted the computer in a plastic case” 
(qtd. in Kahney, Inside Steve’s Brain 71). Jobs’ design vision for Apple II began to break 
with hobbyist culture: “it should look not like a piece of laboratory equipment or a 
hobbyist’s lash-up of wires and bulbs; rather, it should look like a domestic appliance” 
(Jobs qtd. in Segaller 155). Wozniak, however, did not much care about the aesthetics of 
the Apple II. He loved the features that appealed to the hobbyist market—Apple II had 
“eight slots for expansion” if the user wanted to modify the computer and add 
components like peripherals or more memory (Wozniak, iWoz 209).  
In his autobiography, iWoz, Wozniak expressed his pleasure that “the Apple II 
could grow into the future and had so much versatility built in” (209). However, despite 
this versatility, reviews mainly picked up on the consumer appeal. After the Apple II 
launched in 1977 at the first West Coast Computer Faire in San Francisco, a review in 
BYTE speculated that it “may be the first product to fully qualify as the ‘appliance 
computer’ [i.e.] a completed system which is purchased off the retail shelf, taken home, 
plugged in and used” (Helmers 10). On the heels of new-found success, Apple launched 
an IPO of its stock in 1980. As the conflict developed between Jobs and Wozniak, the 
company’s staff roster grew bigger every day and Wozniak began to feel like he no 
longer had a necessary place there. Wozniak, an amateur pilot, was injured in a crash in 
1981 and never really returned to the company.  
In order for the PC to become a household staple, it was perhaps inevitable that 
Wozniak would fade away and the experimental hobbyist years had to end. Ceruzzi 
pinpoints Radio Shack’s TRS-80, introduced in 1977 for $400, as the “end of the 
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experimental phase of personal computing and the beginning of its mature phase” (264). 
The TRS-80, along with the Commodore PET and later the Apple II, signaled the first 
efforts to “domesticate” the computer and target a truly general audience, composed not 
of hackers nor electronics hobbyists but rather grandmothers, children, baseball coaches, 
students, teachers, and all people. By most accounts, though, the Apple II started the PC 
revolution, and the TRS-80 and Commodore PET were trailing competitors.  
 
“Bright and pure and honest” 
In The Future of the Internet, Jonathan Zittrain, an Internet scholar and lawyer, 
makes the important point that the lineage of our personal computers today is not the 
IBM mainframe but rather the hobbyist kit (12). Personal computing was born in a 
culture of messy amateur experimentation and not sleek corporate control of design. If 
IBM mainframes were solutions to problems, then PCs in the mid-70s were “solutions 
waiting for problems” (Zittrain 13). In terms of functionality, that is a key difference 
between the mainframe and the PC. Unlike the mainframe, which was outfitted with 
custom peripherals and configurations that were not easy to modify after purchasing, the 
PC was (and, in many cases, still is) a general-purpose machine primed for modification. 
Even if one locks down a computer to make it perform specific functions, it is still a 
general-purpose machine that is simply loaded with spyware or specialized software. As 
Cory Doctorow notes, there is no such thing as a special-purpose PC (“Lockdown”). 
Behind the PC is an interface fantasy that sees the materials of computing as malleable 
fodder for users—not the polished mainframe we see in IBM’s white room. 
Ease has taken over as the guiding principle in computer interface design, and 
here we might observe a clash between users who preferred the IBM PC over the much 
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friendlier Macintosh in the early 1980s. During this period, companies like Apple, Radio 
Shack, and IBM were figuring out how to produce multipurpose machines that could 
appeal to home, office, and classroom buyers. To be marketable, the PC had to be small. 
It had to be relatively affordable. But above all, it had to be easy. In 1981, IBM tackled 
the “small/affordable/easy” trio head-on with its Model 5150, also known as the IBM PC, 
which sold for $1,565 (“IBM Personal Computer”). A few years later, Apple released 
“the next big thing” to follow Apple II—the Macintosh, accompanied by the infamous 
1984 Super Bowl ad (directed by Ridley Scott of Blade Runner fame) and a $2.5-million 
buyout of all advertising space in a single issue of Newsweek (“Apple Macintosh”). The 
Macintosh was eventually priced at $2,495 after a dispute in which John Sculley, then 
CEO of Apple, prevailed over Jobs who wanted to price Mac at $1,995 (Isaacson 242). 
While it was more expensive than the IBM PC at the time, the Mac’s graphical user 
interface (GUI) was truly revolutionary. Very few people had seen anything like it, and 
concepts like pointing and clicking at icons and cutting and pasting text needed clear 
explanation in ads. Looking through the 39-page Newsweek spread announcing 
Macintosh, ease-of-use is by far the most emphasized feature of this product.12 
Also in 1984, IBM released its $1,300 PCJr. Marketed as “the easy one for 
everyone,” it was intended as the home computer to complement the information 
worker’s full-size IBM PC at work. IBM, however, was fighting a losing battle against 
“clones” (IBM-compatible software and accessory equipment made by companies like 
Compaq) that infringed on sales. Ultimately, without a GUI, IBM computers would retain 
their reputation as workhorses and the prize of advanced users who shunned friendliness 
                                                
12 The entire ad is available in full-color scans at the “Apple Advertising and Brochure Gallery,” 
<http:www.macmothership.com/gallery/gallery3.html>. 
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and instead “preferred the raw horsepower and access to individual bits that MS-DOS [a 
non-graphical, command-line interface] allowed. For those who were not members of the 
computer priesthood, the Macintosh was a godsend” (Ceruzzi 276).  
 
  
Figure 1-8: Pages 18-19 of Macintosh ad in Newsweek, Nov./Dec. 1984 (image from macmothership.com) 
 
Although the GUI of the Mac OS and software applications was an essential 
expression of the PC’s ease, the hardware’s casing and peripherals played perhaps an 
even more important role in introducing this new product to the masses and portraying 
computers as friendly. Jobs knew that in order to attract people who had never used a 
computer before and who might associate computers with complexity and specialization, 
he would have to make the external casing immediately familiar and inviting. Figure 1-8 
shows a scene reminiscent of an illustration of the memex in “As We May Think,” as one 
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white, disembodied, male hand emerges from the edge of the frame to effortlessly control 
information in the workspace. Like the memex desktop, the surface in Figure 1-9 is 
equally crisp and paper-free thanks to the mouse, which eliminates “the complicated keys 
that clutter a keyboard [and] the complicated keystroke commands that can clutter your 
brain,” according to the Newsweek ad (“Apple Advertising and Brochure Gallery”).  
 
 
Figure 1-9: Page 4 of Macintosh ad in Newsweek, Nov./Dec. 1984 (image from macmothership.com) 
 
While Vannevar Bush imagined a stylus as a way to communicate with the machine 
intuitively, the Macintosh ad boasts the natural movement of pointing to show consumers 
that computer use does not require any special knowledge. The Macintosh plays a 
decidedly anthropomorphic and secretarial role in this marketing rhetoric. Emphasizing 
manual control, the ad deems Mac “a whiz at helping you put your finger on any 
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information you have on hand” (“Apple Advertising and Brochure Gallery”). The 
computer is there to make life easier, and to look good doing it. 
For Jobs, accessible friendliness was a goal, but he was also passionate about luxe 
ideals of elegance and sophistication, particularly in relation to the color and shape of the 
computer case. Recall the IBM consultant Edgar Kaufmann Jr. (mentioned earlier in this 
chapter), whose background was in the history of design and who also worked as a 
curator at MoMA. Despite Apple’s desire to distance its products from the cold, 
corporate feel of IBM’s metal cases and cabinets, there are parallels between the interface 
fantasies of Kaufmann and Jobs. At the Aspen Design Conference in 1983, Jobs spoke 
about his aspirations for Apple products: “Very simple, and we’re really shooting for 
Museum of Modern Art quality” (qtd. in Isaacson 199). By referring to the fine arts, Jobs 
was not trying to say that Apple products would look untouchable and distant. A “human 
face” (Isaacson 203) was a design goal for the team of industrial designers who 
prototyped the Macintosh case under Jobs’ watchful and critical eye. 
However, after Jobs had attended the Aspen Design Conference for a few years 
starting in 1981, he became immersed in the aesthetic of Bauhaus (Isaacson 198), a 
German art school and design philosophy that spawned the tenets of modern design, from 
architecture to typography, in the early 20th century. Principles of Bauhaus, such as 
functional forms and clean, rational lines, grew from “generalized longings for 
transcendence, for hope, for a new horizon” post World War I, according to historian 
Roger Griffin (167). Tracing the co-trajectories of modernism and fascism, Griffin argues 
that Bauhaus “obeyed the compelling new imperative […] to clean up, to sterilize, to 
re-order, to eliminate dirt and dust” (167). While there is a much larger argument here 
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about the connections between modernism’s formal simplicity and the violence of ethnic 
cleansing, we might identify a totalizing impulse in Jobs’ interface fantasy. 
In his 1983 talk at Aspen, Jobs addressed the major influence of Bauhaus on his 
design sensibilities. Suggesting a departure from the darker gunmetal-gray look of Sony, 
Jobs said that “what we’re going to do is make the products high-tech, and we’re going to 
package them cleanly so that you know they’re high-tech. We will fit them in a small 
package, and then we can make them beautiful and white” (qtd. in Isaacson 199). Jobs 
here refers to both the “package” of the shipping box as well as the “package” of the 
plastic case enveloping the Macintosh computer. Both had to be perfect: “We will make 
them bright and pure and honest about being high-tech, rather than a heavy industrial 
look of black, black, black, black, like Sony” (qtd. in Isaacson 199). At this point, Jobs 
“had embraced […] the new concept of simple, additive shapes, standing boldly in white, 
with no added color” (Esslinger 56). Thus, high-tech perfection, beauty, or “good design” 
meant free from dirt and darkness—pure, white, and sterilized. Jobs’ use of the word 
“honest” likely comes from Bauhaus talk of honesty and integrity in design, but the word 
also betrays a tendency in American culture to associate darkness with crime or 
suspicious activity, while whiteness seems more pure and forthright. 
Jobs was always obsessed over the computer’s casing, but in the 1980s he 
broadened his sights to a larger design vision for Apple. Jobs called for proposals from 
designers across the world to create a visual language that would guide Apple’s product 
line in the future. It was called the “Snow White design contest” because each 
hypothetical product was code-named after a different dwarf in the fairytale. (The 
second-generation Macintosh was code-named Happy.) A German designer, Hartmut 
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Esslinger, presented his prototypes and concepts to Apple in July 1982, while the 
Macintosh was already in development. Esslinger understood how design could be 
emotional and sensory as well as functional: “we wanted [the design language] to express 
the new spirit of computers as ‘thinking machines,’ by both rooting them in history and 
projecting them as extensions of the user’s psyche” (Esslinger 34). For Esslinger, the 
computer was to be a prosthesis of the human user, so intimate that it might feel linked to 
his cognition, almost in the way that Bush imagined tapping into the electricity of the 
body’s nerves in order to bring thought straight into the written record, with no medium 
intervening. Importantly, Esslinger’s designs sought to create a future for personal 
computer interfaces as a whole: “lines, slates, no angles (except for transitions), and 
white (or as nearly white as possible) was the way to go” (Esslinger 48). Through an 
“emotional message” of design, white came to represent a friend and a human face 
(Esslinger 136).  
The tension between two goals of Apple’s hardware design—warm, approachable 
friendliness versus the colder feeling of gallery-clean white—finds some resolution in 
Esslinger’s proposal. For example, the body of Macintosh SE (Figure 1-10) is smooth 
and uniform, but not overly fussy or surgically perfect. The softly curved edges seem to 
frame an animate screen-as-face (perky and inviting), alluding to the “Happy Mac” icon 
users saw every time they booted up their computers. Susan Kare, who created the 
now-famous icons (like Happy Mac and the trash can) for the original Mac, had worked 
with industrial designers Jerry Manock and Terry Oyama in 1981-2 to realize the 
anthropomorphic, user-friendly (or “user-cuddly,” as one customer put it in a testimonial 
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letter printed in the huge Newsweek ad) hardware design Jobs had demanded. Notably, in 
a recent interview, Kare commented that:  
This [Happy Mac] icon was designed to be seen when the original 
Macintosh computer was turned on. The idea was to create an image to 
suggest that the new computer was friendly and accessible. Plus a stylized 
smiling face is inclusive—it looks like everyone. (qtd. in Elliott) 
 
  
Figure 1-10: (left) Macintosh SE, released in 1987, shows influences of the Snow White design language 
(image from Wikimedia Commons) and (right) the “Happy Mac” startup icon designed by Susan Kare for 
the original Mac in 1981-2 (image from kare.com) 
 
Although Esslinger arrogantly questioned the “abilities” of the original Macintosh team, 
including Kare, he did draw on and benefit from their prior work and influence (Esslinger 
37). When he met with Kare and other Apple visionaries in 1982 while researching 
prototypes for the second-generation Macintosh, he recalled thinking that her “bit-map-
driven graphic user interface […] would make the ‘Mac’ a totally new paradigm for 
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electronic consumer products” (Esslinger 37). Following this lead, he tried to “design 
Apple’s computers to look like little people, and to transform the display screen into a 
face” (Esslinger 35). The Macintosh was indeed more intimate and “cuddly” than other 
personal computers at the time, but that aesthetic wagered its popularity on public 
acceptance of a totalizing, all-inclusive monolith.  
Apple’s interface fantasy became reality because uniformity and predictability 
superseded other kinds of human and computer identities and other kinds of 
human-computer relations. The emphasis on whiteness and tightly-enclosed boxes 
expressed values of ease and distaste for any kind of learning curve. That is why the 
Newsweek ad boasted that customers could use Macintosh “without ever taking the 
cellophane off the instruction manual” (“Apple Advertising and Brochure Gallery”). That 
is why the ad makes a distinction between “a computer that’s compatible with another 
computer,” the IBM priority supposedly, and “a computer that’s compatible with people,” 
the Apple priority (“Apple Advertising and Brochure Gallery”). The smiling, people-
oriented Mac represented a new, easier, thoughtlessly simple type of computer use. The 
rhetoric of Apple design and marketing helped to condition a generation to expect 
effortless interfaces and to assume that “knowing almost nothing about computers” (as 
the Newsweek ad says) would never be a problem. Why crack the shell of computational 
knowledge when the computer’s exterior is so smooth and “cuddly”? Why choose the 
“dizzying liberty” (Ive qtd. in Parker) of complexity when Apple products offered 
simplicity and purity?  
The phrase “dizzying liberty” (spoken by Apple’s current head of industrial 
design, Jony Ive, who I discuss in the next section) goes to the heart of Zittrain’s fear that 
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computers would gradually become sterile appliances and lose their identity as generative 
media. The broad acceptance of modernist design logics and Apple’s aesthetic of 
seamless compartments and clean surfaces severely limits the lay-user’s capacity to 
“encounter a creative materiality with incipient tendencies and propensities” (Bennett 
78). In place of creative materiality, in all its dizzying but rich, generous complexity, we 
receive (and grow to desire) the streamlined superficiality of commodities that promise 
deeper, more authentic identities and more intimate relations. In reality, though, these 
sterile and compartmentalized interfaces only intensify the gap between user and 
materially conscious maker.  
 
Deep surfaces 
Esslinger and his firm won the Snow White contest and worked on Apple designs 
until approximately 1990. Esslinger’s lasting legacy is the Snow White interface fantasy, 
lauded by Jobs and later Jony Ive as the ultimate high-tech aesthetic. Ive started working 
at Apple in 1992 during Jobs’ decade of “separation” from the company. With a penchant 
for minimalist white and clean lines, Ive, a “hot young designer” from London who had 
earned recognition for his Bauhaus-inspired work, seemed to be an ideal candidate to 
help maintain Apple’s reputation for innovation and elegance in the post-Esslinger era (S. 
Levy 93). However, when Ive arrived in California, he began to see that the company had 
already “lost what had once been a very clear sense of identity and purpose” (Ive qtd. in 
S. Levy 93). Ive was promoted to head of industrial design in 1996, but was ready to 
resign from the company by 1997 because of mismanagement and general downturn. 
Jobs returned to Apple at just the right moment, though. In him, Ive found a “spiritual 
partner” and someone who finally understood that design was not a cute enclosure for 
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wires and logic boards but rather “the fundamental soul of a man-made creation” (Jobs 
qtd. in Isaacson 499).  
According to Ive’s biographer, Leander Kahney, “Snow White designs would 
eventually win all the major industry awards and be so widely copied that it became the 
de facto design language for the entire PC industry” (Jony Ive). Perhaps more than 
influencing the aesthetic agenda of Apple, Esslinger also impressed upon Jobs the 
importance of putting design choices before engineering choices. That had not always 
been the case at Apple. Designers and engineers collaborated closely, but in “the 
engineering-driven culture of Silicon Valley” (Esslinger 7), form followed function. 
Engineers would come to designers and say “Here are the guts—processor, hard drive—
and then it would go to the designers to put it in a box,” according to Phil Schiller, 
Apple’s head of marketing (qtd. in Isaacson 501). Esslinger helped reverse that trend by 
encouraging Jobs to see design and engineering as interwoven, but with the balance 
tipping towards design so that the look of the product would never be at the mercy of 
engineering and manufacturing considerations.  
This philosophy meant that when Jobs and Ive talked about purity, simplicity, and 
beauty, they were thinking not only about the casing of the computer itself, but also about 
the interior components, the packaging, the manufacturing center, the assembly process, 
the salesroom—in other words, the design language worked to control and sterilize the 
entire concept and history of “computer.” Apple customers did not only buy a computer, 
but they also bought into a way of thinking about computation as an untouchable, clean, 
and elite industry. Jobs brought his high expectations to every stage of the computer’s 
creation, insisting that even the manufacturing process appear pure and white: “I’d go out 
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to the factory, and I’d put on a white glove to check for dust” (qtd. in Isaacson 277). 
Whether the factory wall or the shipping box or the device itself, these surfaces serve as 
active boundary-marking and norm-defining agents of white men in positions of power. 
Men like Jobs have used interface design to indirectly construct an other (user, interface, 
body) who will always be measured against a “normalized, accepted form of goodness, 
wholeness,” an other who stands in the way of “what is normal, familiar, and civilized,” 
to use the words of affirmative action activist Monica Beatriz deMello Patterson (103). 
When Ive comments that he and Jobs “think alike about how products should be 
made to look pure and seamless” (qtd. in Isaacson 500), we may read this design 
philosophy not only as a positive move of attracting buyers but also as a negative, 
reductive move of exclusion: to hide the seams and exalt the pure is to close the door on 
any unsanctioned entrance or leakage into the computer. The philosophy also excludes a 
certain type of user: one who is “impure” or who might prefer to work through and 
between seams—a hacker or an amateur experimentalist. Seams and cracks and openings 
in a hardware casing might permit a different kind of creativity or wildness: a “dirty 
hands” approach to computing similar to what we saw with the hobbyist kit and 
Wozniak’s antithetical approach to design.  
Jobs spoke volumes when he remarked that “People think it’s this veneer [but] 
that’s not what we think design is. […] Design is how it works” (qtd. in Walker). The “it” 
here is not just the computer as product, but the computer as divisive ideology that 
defines a borderline between those who make and those who use. Significantly, design 
does not signify “how it works” on a superficial level. Design, this mantra would have us 
believe, is a much deeper expression that reassures the user “all is well”—“bright and 
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pure and honest”—on the inside of the machine. Ive and Jobs have both indicated this 
“depth of design” concept, but Ive perhaps does so most clearly in an interview with 
Isaacson, in which he echoes Jobs’ “veneer” comment: 
Simplicity isn’t just a visual style. It’s not just minimalism or the absence 
of clutter. It involves digging through the depth of the complexity. To be 
truly simple, you have to go really deep. For example, to have no screws 
on something, you can end up having a product that is so convoluted and 
complex. The better way is to go deeper with the simplicity, to understand 
everything about it and how it’s manufactured. (Ive qtd. in Isaacson 499) 
Here, Ive reinforces the idea that a clean exterior is a non-lossy representation of a clean, 
uncluttered (as well as honest and ethical) interior. That is the paradox of what I call 
“deep surface,” a design strategy through which a flat appearance takes on dimension so 
that it can “say” something about how the product was made or how it works. During an 
interview with Ive in 2003, a New York Times journalist pinpointed the ideology of deep 
surface: 
The surface of the iPod, white on front and stainless steel behind, is 
perfectly seamless. It’s close to impenetrable. You hook it up to a 
computer with iTunes, and whatever music you have collected there flows 
into the iPod—again, seamless. Once it’s in there, the surface of the iPod 
is not likely to cause problems for the user, because there’s almost nothing 
on it. Just that wheel, one button in the center, and four beneath the 
device’s LCD screen. (Walker) 
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Design here is a form of enlightened, specialist knowledge that makes the computer more 
opaque rather than more knowable for the average user. Simplicity (configured as both 
hardware compartmentalization and sterilization) is thus a form of violence in which 
reduced complexity is a strategy of “watering down” the full scope of what computers 
can do, thus obstructing the lay-user’s pursuit of technical knowledge and 
understanding—and extinguishing her desire for that pursuit.  
The “design is how it works” philosophy is one way to understand how design 
preferences keep alive the well-worn stereotypes of whiteness as more honest, 
personable, sophisticated, and pure than blackness. Here, we might let “blackness” 
represent not only people of color, who without question have been deliberately and 
routinely distanced from positions of power in technology fields, but also the blackness 
left by the absence of whiteness—whatever is “non-white” or colored is demonized 
simply through the invention of whiteness as the colorless and preferred side of a binary. 
As Richard Dyer argues in his well-known analysis of race in mainstream cinema, a 
“clear black-white binarism” tends to associate “whiteness with order, rationality, 
rigidity, qualities brought out by the contrast with black, disorder, irrationality, and 
looseness” (47-8). In essence, the quest to humanize computers and make them more 
friendly is not simply a quest for a particular hardware design—it is, deep down, a 
process of connecting whiteness with friendliness and humanity and of alienating 
darkness (broadly constructed as unfinished, rough, and disorderly) by demonstrating it 
to be less human and scarier.  
Apple’s design philosophy, from the neatly enclosed devices to the spotless walls 
of the factory to the glass panels of the retail stores, has always linked whiteness with 
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neutrality—but never total invisibility. While speaking about the iPod, the first product 
for which Ive took full design credit, he captured this nuance as he fumbled for words to 
express just what was so beautiful about the device:  
If you think about white, white is such a… a…. I mean, on one hand it’s 
neutral. But it is such a bold neutral. […] It is just so… so brutally simple. 
It’s not just a color. Supposedly neutral—but just an unmistakable, 
shockingly neutral. (Ive qtd. in S. Levy 98, emphasis added) 
Ive’s struggle to articulate the elusive allure of iPod creates a kind of mystique around the 
device, as though it possesses some quality—perhaps like magic, or perhaps like the aura 
of a fine work of art—that cannot be named nor fully understood. Lisa Nakamura rightly 
describes this aspect of Apple’s “visual digital aesthetic code” as “intuitive, universal, 
pre- or post-verbal, white, translucent, and neutral” (109, emphasis added). Perfection 
means white as a baseline and a backdrop—white as default—white as innocence, as the 
paper that awaits language. Though, unlike the empty sheet of paper, Apple’s neutral is 
never bland, blank, or quotidian. It never sells itself as a basic utility. It is rather an active 
signal of perfection that works hard to be noticed for its whitewashed elegance and 
high-tech efficiency, which promises user and device will work together in perfect 
unison.  
The black backdrop in Figure 1-11 has an effect of screening out the “coal cellar” 
of Apple’s design and manufacturing processes while simultaneously enhancing the 
whiteness of the device and the floating hand in the foreground. “Impossibly small,” iPod 
Nano successfully stores 1,000 songs within its modern casing, emphasizing how easy it 
is for a disembodied hand to emerge from the shadows and grasp the coveted device and  
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Figure 1-11: Screen shot of Apple website, October 2005, announcing release of iPod Nano                 
(image from imgkid.com) 
 
its data. The imagery in the iPod Nano campaign resurrects a nameless, faceless figure 
from “As We May Think”: “a future investigator in his laboratory. His hands are free, 
and he is not anchored” (Bush 40). The miniaturization of data within the “impossibly 
small” iPod was also important to Bush in the context of memex; recall that microfilm 
was Bush’s solution to achieving impossible smallness—“the record of a race” (46) 
elegantly compressed into a single enclosure. Like Figure 1-11’s spotlight on handwork, 
Bush repeatedly stresses the manual fluidity of the memex user—under his fingertips 
rests a trove of data “readily available for distribution or for later further manipulation” 
(Bush 41). In essence, the memex assumed the same goal as all computer hardware 
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interfaces have assumed since: to reduce complexity and compress volume through the 
appearance of a calming, simple, easy-to-use surface. Jobs summarized the goal 
concisely: “We make progress by eliminating things” (qtd. in S. Levy 96). 
The influence of Bauhaus modernism and an obsession with sterilized, 
compartmentalized elegance continue to define Apple’s influential vision of “high tech” 
computer hardware. This totalizing vision collapses difference and smoothes out rough 
texture in order to elevate modernist simplicity as “the most potent goal of all for people, 
products, emotions” (Esslinger 8). If we accept that interfaces shape not only our 
interactions with computers and technological artifacts, but also our feelings about and 
expectations of others, then it is an interface fantasy worth fearing.  
 
Interleaf 
Water can invigorate touch and make contact seem charged and 
more sensual. Setting foot into Shiver, I am immediately struck by 
the rivulets skittering down white walls, beading up on the fabric 
like wet skin in a rain shower. In her artist’s statement, Ludwig 
notes that Shiver’s design might trigger “a sense of physical 
intimacy, within a space that functions as if it is a sentient 
organism.” Indeed, I feel I might be on the inside of a body’s 
organ, its delicate enclosure flexing with life. Yet, that intimacy is 
also tempered by a heightened sense of danger in the space. It is a 
distant intimacy. As a visitor within Shiver, I feel slightly 
frightened by the mixture of electric currents and water currents, 
but that only adds to the thrill of touching the installation and 
interacting with the water. As Ludwig comments, “The effect can 
be both soothing and unnerving, as the beautiful, watery forms 
invade a space we expect to be dry and neutral.” It is precisely the 
lack of neutrality and anticipation of possible danger that makes 
interaction with Shiver a visceral, encompassing experience. As an 
interface, its main purpose is not to protect and serve humans 
endlessly. Rather, Shiver is a surface with moods and some agency 
to thrill me and surprise me. This shifting distribution of 
subjectivity and objectivity in my experience of Shiver establishes 
a more equitable human-nonhuman relationship—one founded on 
something other than pure use or handheld control.  
82 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-12: Touching Shiver (images courtesy of the artist) 
 
Intimacy on demand 
  As Esslinger explains in his memoir about his years at Apple, a design language is 
not only a strategy for communicating a brand identity in the present, but it is also “visual 
DNA” that unifies a product line in anticipation of future demands and advances (32). 
Twenty five years after the Snow White contest, CEO Tim Cook took the stage at the 
Apple Watch product launch and declared that “Apple is still trying to create the future.” 
Despite Cook’s rhetoric, design and engineering choices do not create nor determine the 
future, but they do persist through a process of mutual shaping that both realizes and 
constrains possibilities and alternatives for what computers could look and feel like.  
The interface future of iPad is a so-called “post-PC” era in which the computer is 
more intimate, intuitive, and natural than ever. The days of a friendly desktop, sitting and 
waiting to be of service, are giving way to an era of the take-it-everywhere device, never 
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out of arms reach. With touch screen devices like iPhone and iPad, we see a different 
kind of intimacy than we saw in the relationship between the body and iPod. In her study 
of wearable computing, Susan Elizabeth Ryan calls iPod a “body-centric device” to 
describe the attraction between the hand and the smooth iPod plastic, as well the way its 
design encourages users to attach iPod to their bodies using clips, lanyards, and wrist 
straps (172). Through these configurations, iPod users achieve hands-free movement in 
space. Ryan argues that, in contrast, smart phones like iPhone are “bearables” rather 
“wearables” because they demand constant carrying (174). While iPod users are “upright, 
participating in their environments,” iPhone users often appear “hunched over, immersed 
in the escalating programmable and virtual social relations supported by these phones” 
(Ryan 174). This hunched-over, inwardly-inclined stance is also typical for iPad users. 
Apple has marketed iPad as an object to be cradled during bouts of multitasking or 
time-passing, as one might cradle a paperback in an armchair. In fact, on the day of 
iPad’s launch in January 2010, Steve Jobs sat in a black leather armchair to demo iPad’s 
features, assuming the posture of one absorbed in a paperback novel, summarizing the 
story out loud for the audience.  
The buildup to iPad’s unveiling had been extraordinary. In the packed San 
Francisco auditorium, which Emerson describes as emulating a magic show in its lighting 
and drama, the sense of anticipation was palpable. Of course, the focal point of iPad was 
the vivid touch screen. “The precise multi-touch interface makes surfing the web on iPad 
an entirely new experience, dramatically more interactive and intimate than on a 
computer,” Jobs declared (“Steve Jobs Introduces Apple iPad”). Browsing the web, he 
remarked: “It’s that simple. The whole website in the palm of your hands.” Later, he 
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would expand that to say “it’s phenomenal to hold the internet in your hands.” By 
emphasizing the hand-held size of iPad—doing big things on a small device—Jobs 
replayed an ancient ideology that associates graspability with comfort, security, and 
dominance.  
 
 
Figure 1-13: Steve Jobs demonstrates iPad in January 2010 (still shot from product launch live stream) 
 
During the demo, it was clear that Jobs wanted to emphasize the size of iPad and 
the way the body enfolds it, with Jobs’ hand (Figure 1-13) playing a similar role in the 
interface fantasy as the memex user’s hand and the Macintosh user’s hand years before. 
The iPad sense of touch appeared to be one of increased closeness and control. Jobs 
repeated phrases like “the palm of your hands” and “in your hands” during the demo. 
After the demo, Jobs said, “I have to say though, watching it is nothing like getting one in 
your hands and feeling all of that in your hands and right underneath your fingertips” 
(“Steve Jobs Introduces Apple iPad”). Touching seems friendly, non-threatening, and 
familiar. With nothing more than fingertips and a screen, iPad navigation would be too 
simple not to understand. If Lori Emerson is right, when she argues that “learning 
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through doing, tinkering, experimentation, and trial and error is how one comes to have a 
genuine computer literacy” (54), then widespread desire for simple, Apple-influenced 
interfaces has serious implications.  
In Reading Writing Interfaces, Emerson argues that iPad is the ultimate 
information appliance, simple to the point of being a sterile black box: “the iPad works 
because users can’t know how it works” (15). During the iPad launch, the audience 
watched a video that featured Ive celebrating the triumph of intuitive use over curiosity 
and what Emerson calls “how-knowledge” (177). “This is a new category [of product], 
but yet millions and millions of people are going to be instantly familiar with it. They’re 
going to know how to use it. In many ways, this defines our vision, our sense of what’s 
next,” Ive said in the video. The user doesn’t have to come to the device; the device 
comes to the user. However, this “triumph” is also a limitation because it actually 
narrows the range of what we could imagine and believe to be possible if the device were 
not so seamless. The Apple design philosophy claims to achieve higher degrees of 
perfection with each new product, focusing on design and engineering choices as though 
each object were hand-crafted to accommodate the individual user. With crisp white 
backgrounds in product videos, the iPad appears less labor intensive. In Figure 1-14, 
almost like a mirror reflection of Figure 1-9, we see a setting that exemplifies digital 
culture, a scene quite distant from the workshop, farm, or factory’s heavy, dirty, manual 
labor. Information is pure and white to reflect the efficiency of the information worker’s 
desktop and clean, manicured hands. Yet, the devices we use for supposedly immaterial 
labor—the sleek and pocket-sized touch-screen tablets and smartphones, ergonomic and 
human-centered—are actually reshaping us in crippling ways, limiting our activities to a 
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set of patented gestures and actions, most of which fall in the category of consumptive 
rather than creative. 
 
 
Figure 1-14: Still shot from iPad promotional video shown during launch event, January 2010 
 
The iPad launch event set a new standard for user-friendly computing: in order for 
a digital device to be user-friendly and elegant today, the computer part of the thing must 
be totally out of sight. During the mainframe era, if “the problem of designing the 
externals of the computer was one of how to seal off or conceal the machine’s inner 
workings” (Harwood 81), then that concern translated to the design of Apple’s PCs in the 
1980s and it persists in full force—perhaps most clearly—in iPad’s ideals of intuitive 
touch screen design. When using an iPad, the computer should completely disappear, and 
the designer has failed if it doesn’t. “It’s so much more intimate than a laptop,” Jobs said 
as he handled the aluminum device (“Steve Jobs Introduces Apple iPad”). Yet, this type 
of intimacy is characterized by control and restraint.  
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Figure 1-15: (at left) interior view of IBM’s “white room” showing the System/370 Model 165 in 1970 
(image from ComputerHistory.org), (at right) interior view of Apple’s “hands-on pavilion” after product 
launch event in September 2014 (image from apple.com) 
 
To end the event, Jobs managed to fit in a few more “hands” references: “we’ve 
got a hands-on area next door and we’d like you to get your hands on an iPad, because 
when you feel all this power and this much… and the internet in your hands, you will 
never want to go back” (“Steve Jobs Introduces Apple iPad”). The spaces that constitute 
Apple’s domain—the bright white stores, the prodigious stage of product launches, the 
intriguing white cube that houses the “hands-on pavilion” where guests try out products 
after launch events—these are all are all manifestations of an urge and effort to close off 
undesirable parts of the computing process and to present a clean front stage area, similar 
to the marketing tactics IBM used in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 1-15). These 
representations of what counts as acceptable and beautiful computer space work to not 
only glorify whiteness and purity, but to further demonize dirtiness and messiness. 
Moreover, the human-computer relationship staged in the gallery or on the fashion 
runway conditions users to grow comfortable with the computer as a sublime object, too 
perfect and too compact to be disassembled. In concert with his design team, Jobs’ 
88 
 
interface engenders devices worthy of a pedestal in a gallery as much as a spot on your 
wrist. They are devices to use and admire—not to explore (Figure 1-16). 
 
 
Figure 1-16: Gold MacBook on display in “hands-on pavilion” after Apple Watch event, March 2015 
(image from apple.com) 
 
Relationships between users and computational devices are too often framed in 
terms of consumerist fantasies, as we see in Figure 1-16, rather than as serious bonds 
between human and nonhuman. In 2005, iPod Mini’s advertising campaign breathlessly 
trumpeted the aesthetic draw of these devices as things designed to be seen: “iPod mini 
caters exclusively to your individuality and sense of style. […] Each iPod mini is brighter 
than ever and completely wearable, ensuring that it will spice up any outfit” (qtd. in S. 
Levy 105). In consuming the device, one could possess an identity. Alternatively, when 
the bond between human and technology is taken seriously, it becomes a site of struggle 
in which the human remains whole, vulnerable, but essentially good-natured and the 
technology appears insidious as it poses barriers to real connection or real intimacy. To 
depart from the comfort of a consumer product means accepting the riskiness of a device 
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with no 1-800 number or Geek Squad to save us. In between these poles, we may feel out 
a different, less instrumentalist kind of intimacy: a relationality that Shiver suggests.  
 
Touching, materializing, shivering 
The overwhelming majority of contemporary principles of computer interface 
design target an experience of immateriality for users. For example, when asked about 
touch screen technology in May 2013, Bill Buxton, pioneering interface designer at 
Microsoft Research, commented that “If you're aware there's a computer there, we've 
failed” (qtd. in Ion). Buxton crystallizes the aim of interface designers: to obscure the site 
of computation and foreground the site of interaction. The effortless movement of fingers 
and the immediate responsiveness of the glowing screen envelopes humans in 
information rather than matter. As Anna Munster points out, activity-oriented HCI 
subsumes all machine agency in the depth of a user's desires, motives, and goals (126). 
The user is prescribed to a purely communicative or information-seeking role in which 
efficiency and a sense of accomplishment are top priorities. However, interface 
invisibility (or user-friendliness) enforces a misunderstanding of digital technology as a 
tool, i.e. something you do something with.  
Shiver accomplishes what most touch screen interface designers hope to achieve: 
envelop the user in an intuitive experience, make the user feel like she is interacting with 
a responsive other, give the interface a “human” or “natural” feel. Except Shiver breaks 
with human-centered interface expectations in a few important ways.  
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Figure 1-17: Touching Shiver (image courtesy of the artist) 
 
The installation puts participants into contact with the agency of the interface, 
unlocking the riskiness and unpredictability of dealing with unwieldy materials. By 
“contact” I mean awareness or sensing—a proximity that produces not knowledge but 
rather the ability to be responsive. In Vibrant Matter, the political philosopher Jane 
Bennett argues that not all agency is human, nor is humanity the sole origin of creative 
activity. Through “cultivated, patient, sensory attentiveness to nonhuman forces,” contact 
with technologies leads not to demystification but rather to a greater sense of wonder, 
mystery, and self-other-inquiry (Bennett xiv). Bennett calls “demystification” a 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” arguing that it “should be used with caution and sparingly” 
because it “tends to screen from view the vitality of matter and to reduce political agency 
to human agency” (xiv-xv). Experimental or non-mainstream interface design can loosen 
the comfortable strongholds of identity, nativity, and certainty that so often come along 
with computer use. Interfaces like Shiver open up the possibilities of difference rather 
than manage possibilities through a foreclosing, winnowing focus.  
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Ludwig’s installation activates the evocative force of two distinct materialities. 
First, the flowing, moving materiality of water presents itself to visitors in the form of 
rivulets snaking down the walls and the sound of constant trickling (Figure 1-17). Second 
is the tangible, located materiality of skin, which we encounter in the vaguely translucent 
surface of the walls when they meld with human fingers for a moment of mutually 
responsive contact. This touch is full of awareness and potential—it is easy to identify as 
material. The iPad offers a different type of touching, the digital touch. “Koi Pond” (by a 
group of game designers called Blimp Pilots) is an app for iPhone and iPad (Figure 1-18). 
The app is a simple but beautiful work of interactive media. Users customize their ponds 
with things like rocks, lily pads, and turtles. They can also select weather effects and 
interact with the koi by touching “the cool surface of the pond,” as the app developers 
suggest. The fish skitter away when making abrupt swipes, but they gather around a 
fingertip held patiently on the screen. 
 
 
Figure 1-18: “Koi Pond” iPad/iPhone app screen shots 
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 But what is the “Koi Pond” user really touching? A sheet of glass, about 10 
millimeters thick, and she is not disturbing water or fish but rather electrons as she 
conducts heat and electricity from her body to the device’s display. Consider in contrast 
Ludwig’s “temple of compassion” which permits a more direct and materially conscious 
touching. Interacting with the koi pond is still touching, but it is a different kind of touch 
than the Shiver touch. Compared to typing or using a mouse, which both take more or 
less skill, there is something natural or innate about touch as a mode of interaction. In the 
koi pond, there is a closeness with the objects of attention, a closeness that we do not 
have with the keyboard/mouse, but there is also a displacement and distancing at work 
here. I change the electrical properties of the screen every time I touch it: “The 
[capacitive touch screen] records this change as data, and it uses mathematical algorithms 
to translate the data into an understanding of where your fingers are” (Wilson). It might 
be more accurate, then, to say that I am touching a lively algorithm rather than a glass 
surface. It feels me as much as I feel it. Yet I am distant from that algorithm—at a 
remove from an essential facet of my device’s materiality. What Munster has called 
“facialization,” or the extreme anthropocentrism of human-centered design, keeps me 
safely in “the friendly but inept world of the ‘user’” (118). If, as Kirschenbaum writes, 
“Computers have been intentionally and deliberately engineered to produce the illusion 
of immateriality” (135), touch screens then must amplify this illusion and potentially 
advance immateriality to the point of antimateriality.  
 I take the term “antimateriality” from Bennett, who argues convincingly that the 
separation of inert, passive object from purposeful, active human subject is neither ethical 
nor accurate. Adopting theoretical models like Derrida’s messianic thought and Latour’s 
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notion of the actant—an intervener or operator that is not necessarily human—as ways to 
get around the association of agency with intention, morality, and goal-directedness, 
Bennett champions “a vitality intrinsic to matter itself” (10). Stronger than immateriality, 
antimateriality actively devalues ways that computers shape what is possible in creative 
activity and how that activity happens between the electrical conductivity and movement 
of fingertips, sensitive surfaces, and increasingly complex layers of software and 
software developers. For the vital materialist, antimaterialism is not simply ignorance of 
matter but an accelerated sweeping-aside or aggressive disposal of matter and its messy 
complexities. She invokes antimaterialism in the context of consumer culture: “It is hard 
to discern, much less acknowledge the material dignity of the thing when your […] 
thoughts are scrambled by the miles of shelving at a superstore. […] Too much stuff in 
too quick succession equals the fast ride from object to trash” (“Force of Things” 351). 
Through the lens of what she calls “thing-power,” objects or “stuff to ignore” become 
lively things—“stuff that command[s] attention” (“Force of Things” 350). An 
acknowledgement of “thing-power” means “respect, and sometimes fear of the 
materiality of the thing [and the] ways in which human being and thinghood overlap” 
(“Force of Things” 349). Ludwig brings a hint of fear into the human-interface encounter 
by evoking risk of bodily harm through her combination of water and electricity (recall 
the exposed wires of the “spine” in Figure 1-7) and an experience that is already strange 
and exploratory.  
 While Bennett’s objects of study are metal crystals, fatty acids, and electrical power 
grids, this concept of antimaterialism applies to the particular logics of digital culture and 
shapes creative practice, when we are interacting with language or code rather than fish, 
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and when we are communicating with audiences as well as with technologies. The 
trajectory of effortless interface design, influenced by corporate revenue-generating 
innovations like Facebook’s “frictionless sharing” and Amazon’s “one-click buying,” is 
detrimental to creative materiality.  
In contrast, Shiver espouses a distant intimacy, a near-but-far contact that puts us 
in touch with technologies “in ways that enable response-ability” as Karen Barad puts it 
in her essay, “On Touching: The Inhuman that Therefore I Am” (2). Contact implies not 
groundedness, but rather unmooring or dislocation. Barad writes, “Matter is 
condensations of response-ability. Touching is a matter of response. Each of ‘us’ is 
constituted in response-ability. Each of ‘us’ is constituted as responsible for the other, as 
being in touch with the other” (7). Things become less, not more clear through contact. 
Response-able contact with technologies is becoming increasingly difficult because the 
technical aspects of digital technologies too often alienate and demotivate the average 
user from trying to learn ways of interacting other than use. But response-ability is even 
more important in creative practice. Touch, when it is regarded as nearness and 
proximity, becomes an ill-fated pursuit of relations that are direct or immediate. When 
artistic production and experimentation is figured as touching, either through touch 
screens or through direct access to an expressive voice, then creative practice is 
essentialized as purely and immediately human. To touch something physically and 
directly seems to be a form of knowing or controlling. But Ludwig and Barad both argue 
that touching is not knowing. In fact, it is the opposite. Touching, making contact with a 
surface, radically multiplies the possibilities of who, what, where, and how we know. 
Knowing with too much certainty does violence to the other.  
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As tablets and wearables become more intimate and as they draw closer to the 
skin, they intertwine with our human relationships and we may increasingly struggle to 
separate the human from the nonhuman, the relationship from the usage, the 
consciousness from the program, the skin from the screen. Technologies not only shape 
our selves and the relationships we have with other people; computational others are 
themselves worthy of ethical treatment—of tolerance, patience, and empathy. 
Mainstream touch-screen interface designers work to create intimacy between human and 
nonhuman, but it is an intimacy without risk. The iPad’s power and agency simply 
transfer to the individual by virtue of ownership having it, literally, in-hand. Intimacy 
on-demand. The magic of engineering and design theatrics clouds over the magic of 
“vibrant materiality… enchanting and dangerous matter-energy” (Bennett xix). If Shiver 
teaches us anything about attitudes towards handheld digital devices, it might be that 
restoring some of the thrill or danger of touching interfaces (along with 
acknowledgement that human subjectivity cannot account for all kinds of agency) does 
not subtract from our humanity and creative potential but rather strengthens it.  
 
Conclusion 
We do not always want to make contact with our technologies. When we are just 
trying to check something off the to-do list, it is best if our tools remain tools and stay as 
immaterial, silent, and out-of-the-way as possible. Since most web interfaces target 
information-seeking users who are just trying to get something done quickly, it makes 
perfect sense that most web sites follow the user-centered design approach neatly 
summarized in the title of Steve Krug’s well-known web design handbook entitled Don't 
Make Me Think. 
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However, we also devalue the materials themselves when we lose contact with 
them, when we uncritically prefer what Karl Stolley calls “excessive mediation,” or using 
an overwrought, prepackaged digital tool as a shortcut around difficulty towards easy 
accomplishment of a task. People who wish to do creative things with digital 
technologies would benefit from a closer affinity, nearness, or contact with their writing 
tools and the countless layers and significances that a “tool” assembles around. 
Computational “tools” are for creatives to write with(in), about, and against. Artists, 
writers, and designers benefit from making contact with their media, and “it seems 
important to not just consider the interface but also reach into the formal workings of 
these programs, as some scholars and some students in interdisciplinary programs are 
already beginning to do” (Montfort, “Continuous Paper”). Those who wish to pursue 
creative materiality in digital media may find more potential in this kind of contact 
instead of being content to graze their fingers across the cool surface of the pond. 
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Chapter 2 
Obstacles and Pathways to Creative Resistance in Web 2.0 Platforms 
 
 
The previous chapter set touch-screen computer interfaces in historical context 
and explored how those contexts have, at times, encouraged us to prefer beautifully clean 
and tightly enclosed surfaces for our computers, potentially at the expense of engagement 
with a richer, more materially conscious creative practice. I argued that the very 
technologies used to democratize computing, sold to the public in a physical and 
rhetorical package of happiness and approachability, also exacerbate divisions between 
makers (designers, engineers, programmers) and users, performing an exclusionary and 
compartmentalizing function. The promise-threat of ease and friendliness, in fact, has 
characterized the emergence of personal computing from the late-20th century to today.  
In this chapter, I turn from hardware interfaces to software interfaces (a different 
kind of computer packaging) and focus on Facebook as a particularly pervasive and 
persuasive interface fantasy. At the time of my writing, more than 890 million people use 
Facebook every day, and the average user spends nearly 21 minutes per day on the site 
(C. Smith). Despite Facebook’s design choices that use neutral and utilitarian rhetoric, 
many users are aware that Facebook is not neutral. In looking back at the history of 
Facebook, we can identify dramatic swings between users’ high-alert paranoia or fear of 
the platform and almost blind embrace of it as a friendly or harmless utility. In each case 
of broken trust or exploitation, users have struggled to find an effective form of resistance 
or counter-action. I will discuss one of those situations in this chapter: the negative 
response sparked by Facebook’s introduction of the two-column “timeline” profile format 
in September 2011.  
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If software is “the interface to our imagination,” as Lev Manovich has claimed, 
then studying interfaces may reveal how software programs organize the world and ask 
us to approach (or avoid) creative endeavors online, whether written, graphic, sonic, or 
otherwise (“The Algorithms of Our Lives”). If “software engineering is simultaneously 
social engineering,” as Simon Yuill has claimed (165), or “technology is society made 
durable” as Bruno Latour asserts in the title of an article in 1990, then we must not only 
study interfaces but also their terms of use, code, development processes, and 
promotional rhetorics that build the social into an interface. I consider all these 
dimensions to be part of the software interface as an object of study, although in this 
chapter I focus on interface design, in part because Facebook’s code is not open source. 
The rhetorical design strategies (such as compartmentalization and sterilization) 
of hardware interfaces are, in many ways, easier to sense than the appearance of those 
same strategies in software interfaces. To begin with a simple reason, we might say that 
hardware is more touchable or accessible to hands. We can hold the body of a computer 
in our palms or against our wrists and ears, or we can place the object on a desktop or in a 
purse or pocket. We can press buttons, tap keys, or stroke screens. In contrast, software 
interfaces, although they might remediate tactile materiality through skeuomorphic 
design, seem to have no materiality of their own. They appear to deal in abstractions and 
flatten material space into the rectangular space of the screen—a phenomenon that 
Matthew Kirschenbaum investigates at length in his book Mechanisms. Abstraction 
layers help programmers manage “software’s dynamic porousness,” but they are part of 
the reason that “software is extremely difficult to understand. Who really knows what 
lurks behind our smiling interfaces, behind the objects we click and manipulate?” (Chun 
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2, 3). Friedrich Kittler has contributed to the perception that software is immaterial with 
his influential answer to “what lurks behind.” In “There Is No Software,” he argues that 
all computational media can be reduced to essences: “all code operations, despite their 
metaphoric faculties such as ‘call’ or ‘return,’ come down to […] voltage differences.” 
Software, rooted squarely in the hegemony and homogeneity of digital on/off pulsing, 
seems to ultimately reside in the imperceptible, inaccessible, too-small and too-fast world 
of the microprocessor. Understanding the digital as voltages and light pulses within fiber 
optic cables does little to shift software into visibility or tangibility so that the average 
user might see it as an object worth noticing and wondering about.  
Fostering creative digital practices (including acts of resistance to one-size-fits-all 
design) among a wider range of people depends, in part, on overcoming the belief in 
software immateriality. Such work may begin with helping people in our classes and in 
our communities to see software—to see its existence as a designed thing, to see (and 
sense) its co-operation with us humans, and to see (and understand) software as an 
assemblage of various material parts and processes. To encourage modes of materially 
conscious making, playing, exploring, communicating, and computer-using, we must 
readjust and expand our responses to interface invisibility—particularly in web 
applications, a type of software developed to run in a browser.  
In this chapter, I argue that Facebook consciously repels generative and inventive 
forms of internet use. Those in power at Facebook use compartmentalizing and sterilizing 
design choices (which are closely tied to policies and terms of use) to shape the site into a 
coherent and well-organized database. That trajectory has been expressly engineered for 
the purpose of easily monetizing user-generated content (Gehl 112). The site’s 
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minimalist, homogeneous design, a boon for marketers and advertisers, is an obstacle to 
creativity and difference among users—different designs, different cultures, different 
identities, different worldviews. Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg would like 
users to see that homogeneous design is not constraining but rather that it helps to keep 
everything and everyone organized and makes it easier to let one’s life flow smoothly 
onto the screen. In fact, uniformity of the interface is one reason many middle- and 
upper-class white teenagers cited for leaving MySpace in favor of Facebook around 
2006-7, according to danah boyd (“White Flight” 204). In her study of this transition and 
the complex issues of race and class embedded in it, boyd suggests that the downfall of 
MySpace is ultimately a loss for amateur web design literacies, since MySpace allowed 
users to customize their profile pages while Facebook mandates a single template, 
described by boyd’s interviewees as “clean” and “minimal” (“White Flight” 214). 
Following this line of thought, I also contend that Facebook makes it more difficult for 
users to grow interested in web design and the “how-knowledge” of Facebook’s (or any 
site’s) creation. In the era of Web 2.0 “platforms” and “template-driven design” (Arola 
12) on social media sites like Facebook, we are seeing the dimensionality of a user 
reduced to a user/sharer and never web designer—at least within the walls of Facebook. 
A user on Facebook only makes sense to algorithms if she remains knowable as an active, 
positive user—nothing more and nothing less. This situation fans out to have a larger 
effect on the internet as a whole, as more people gain access to the web and fewer people 
can design (or even think about how they would design) the interfaces they call “home” 
on the web. 
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My aim in this chapter is not to suggest that we should give up trying to exercise 
agency in the shadow of a looming presence like Facebook, nor do I want to claim that 
we must embark on a quest for reclaimed agency and liberation.13 The conditions of 
“agency” (particularly a design or “maker” literacy) are continually changing in the many 
different contexts and circumstances that software platforms and their creators present. I 
want to draw attention to how Facebook’s claim of neutrality has been largely an attempt 
to sterilize and compartmentalize, not only the use of its platform, but also a richer, 
deeper understanding of the web and web-based technologies. Further, by honoring 
feminist tactics of resistance in oppressive, silencing environments, we may identify 
agency in the act of finding space to respond creatively and to imagine alternative 
possibilities. This agency is much smaller than words like “resistance” often imply. In 
online communities, an action may be understood as resistance simply through users’ 
perseverance or resilience rather than a hacker’s resistance of programming change into 
the system itself. As the editors of Feminist Rhetorical Resilience explain in the 
introduction to their collection, resilience “is transformative not necessarily through 
effecting a change in circumstances—which may remain bleak or oppressive—but in 
changing the way a life is lived” (Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady 18). Resilience as resistance 
entails small acts of creativity (such as creating a personalized MySpace background) and 
trying to reinvent selves and relationships with other selves and materials in light of 
“pernicious circumstances” and in lieu of “available and resources [and] taken-for-
granted access” to the means of more structural, substantive change. As Elizabeth Flynn 
                                                
13 We find an example of such a quest in the 2010 South Park episode, “You Have 0 Friends,” 
which imagines an epic battle against Facebook. Stan enters a virtual world and must fight (i.e. 
win a Yahtzee match) to regain control over his rogue Facebook profile, depicted as a oversized, 
monstrous version of himself.  
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and her co-editors write, “This may not be dramatic or global change but change as small, 
local, fluid, provisional, and ongoing. Resilience as rhetorical agency continually 
recreates possibility” (19). This is a different understanding of agency than we often 
encounter in the rhetoric of Web 2.0 participation and empowerment.14  
However, in addition to Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady’s “small agency” of human 
resilience, this chapter also accounts for sources of agency that are not entirely human 
and which do not emerge solely through human relationships and psychologies. I 
integrate strands from Bruno Latour’s theory of nonhuman agency to ground my 
discussions of digital materiality and the role of an individual’s creative or resistant voice 
within a complex assemblage such as Facebook. As with Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady’s 
concept of resilience, Latour’s notion of agency is profoundly relational. In his recent 
writing on what “agency” could mean in a time of global climate change, he puts forth a 
description of the subject that moves away from the familiar subject/object binary 
associated with “the dream of control” (5), i.e. empowered human agents using (or, in the 
nightmare of control, being used by) technologies figured as utilities. Latour writes in 
defense of the “quasi-subject,” an actant 
which gains its name of ‘subject’ because he or she might be subjected to 
the vagaries, bad humor, emotions, reactions, and even revenge of another 
agent, who also gains its quality of ‘subject’ because it is also subjected to 
his or her action. (“Agency at the Time of the Anthropocene” 5)  
                                                
14 For example, Howard Rheingold’s “smart mob” (2002), Yochai Benkler’s “networked public 
sphere” (2006), Clay Shirky’s “wikiculture” (2008), Lawrence Lessig’s “read-write culture” 
(2008), and Henry Jenkins’ “spreadable media” (2009) all emphasize that, in contrast with 
broadcast media, users gain strong agency and activist potential through participation in social 
media. 
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Adding Latour’s theory of reciprocal, cycling subjectivity to feminist rhetorical resilience 
gives us a mode of agency not focused on the individual human life nor on heroic action 
to make a huge, transformative change. Instead, we may find agency in simply 
responding to or acknowledging agency in other people and things. Or, we may find it in 
making micro-adjustments to our daily habits and outlooks. Latour argues that “to be a 
subject is not to act autonomously in front of an objective background, but to share 
agency with other subjects that have also lost their autonomy” (5). From Latour, we 
gather a sense of distributive agency, and with feminist perspectives we see that 
distributive does not mean diminished for the individual human. Instead, the individual 
human does not need to feel obligated to master, control, or change the infrastructure of 
platforms through which she participates online. She can make a difference through small 
acts of resistance that may only change a mindset, add a new bit of knowledge to the 
commons, or contribute a voice to the collective of people and technologies that 
constitutes the materiality of software.  
 
Facebook as utility, MySpace as sandbox 
Zuckerberg is quick to speak about the company’s idealistic vision, but he has 
never outlined anything like the elaborate and deliberate “interface fantasy” that Steve 
Jobs articulated for Apple. In contrast with Apple, a company that advertises design as 
much as functionality, Facebook only occasionally highlights its design. Unlike Jobs, 
Zuckerberg puts no emphasis on elegance and high art. In fact, he avoids associating 
Facebook explicitly with luxury and modern aesthetics, choosing instead to market the 
site as a public good, unpretentious and communal. When Zuckerberg does discuss the 
design of Facebook’s interface, he stresses its utilitarian and unassuming aesthetic. While 
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the image of Jobs is a man obsessed with perfection, Zuckerberg’s image is nearly the 
opposite. At Facebook’s headquarters in Palo Alto, visitors find a motivational phrase 
painted in big, red letters on the wall near the entrance: “Done is better than perfect” 
(Figure 2-1). It is a standard that Jobs would have never accepted without a fight. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Wall mural next to the evacuation plan at Facebook Headquarters in Palo Alto, CA (image 
from Mashable.com) 
 
Yet, despite their differences, Jobs and Zuckerberg both have a similar design 
philosophy that is expressed differently in their products. They both subscribe to “it just 
works” as the ultimate goal of any interface. For Jobs, the “it just works” philosophy is 
more centered on elevating the product as a beautiful object and staging it like artwork to 
comment on, gaze at, and covet. He repeatedly said “it just works” during his demo of 
iPad in 2010, but the device was in the spotlight as a marvel of design and engineering 
and a new standard of elegance plus functionality. For Zuckerberg, the “it just works” 
philosophy is more about getting the job done while design choices should, ideally, go 
unnoticed. 
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 If we examine Zuckerberg’s vision as he and other Facebook employees have 
articulated it throughout the history of the company, we can see that Facebook strives to 
present itself as a mundane technical artifact and that, from the early years of the 
company’s existence, Zuckerberg and colleagues engineered the platform to be just that: 
a boring utility. In an article from 2005, when Facebook was only available to high 
schoolers and students at certain universities, Jeff Clavier summarized a presentation by 
Zuckerberg about “the Facebook”: “Mark said that he has not conceived the Facebook as 
a social network, which is a community application. [Facebook] is a directory that he 
considers a utility that students use in order to find information which is socially 
relevant” (Clavier). In this passage, it appears the goal is to make Facebook into a 
specialized, detailed telephone book or “who’s who” reference source. The profile’s plain 
blue-and-white design had a business-like aesthetic, and decorative binary code in the 
banner image communicated a high-tech, professional tone (Figure 2-2).  
However, later statements by the company reveal that officials intended the 
website to be more like a telephone company rather than telephone book. In a 2007 
interview, when asked to comment on what “social utility” meant15, Zuckerberg 
responded: “What we’re trying to do is just make it really efficient for people to 
communicate, get information and share information. We always try to emphasize the 
utility component” (qtd. in Locke). In 2012, Zuckerberg wrote a letter to accompany the 
company’s IPO application in which he repeatedly called Facebook a “service” and 
referred to it as a “raw tool” like a cell phone (qtd. in O’Brien). In September 2013, 
Zuckerberg did an interview with Atlantic in which he stated that “a lot of people really  
                                                
15 At that time, Facebook was billing itself, on the sign-up page and in promotional content, 
explicitly as “a social utility that helps people communicate more efficiently.” 
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Figure 2-2: Facebook profile interface design, 2004-2005 (image from EndGadget.com) 
 
rely on this and use it for a lot of their day-to-day connecting” (“Watch Mark 
Zuckerberg”). We can see that Facebook has become essential in his view, as though it 
functioned like a power company or cell phone provider, to which everyone must 
subscribe. In the same Atlantic interview, Zuckerberg went on to say: 
Maybe electricity was cool when it first came out, but pretty quickly 
people stopped talking about it because it’s not the new thing. The real 
question you want to track at that point is, are fewer people turning on 
their lights because it’s less cool? (“Watch Mark Zuckerberg”) 
Finally, in November 2014 Zuckerberg reiterated the electricity metaphor during a 
Facebook-hosted “Q&A with Mark” event:  
Facebook should be useful and always there, like a utility. You go home, 
you turn on the lights, right? You’re probably not like, “Yeah, electricity!” 
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It just needs to work. My goal is that the ability to connect and 
communicate should be that. It just should work. (qtd. in Cho) 
This brief history shows that Zuckerberg imagines Facebook as a neutral medium, even a 
non-medium, no more obtrusive and no less necessary than electricity. Ubiquitous. 
Frictionless. Mundane, woven unobtrusively into the fabric of daily life.  
Despite Zuckerberg’s seeming lack of an explicit design philosophy relating to 
the Facebook interface, other than to constantly reinforce the “utility” concept, David 
Kirkpatrick has documented Zuckerberg’s influence on the site’s aesthetic. In the summer 
of 2005, Zuckerberg collaborated with Aaron Sittig, a graphic designer and programmer, 
to update Facebook’s appearance. Then known as “Thefacebook.com,” the company had 
only been incorporated for a year, and the entrepreneur Sean Parker was president at the 
time (Kirkpatrick 144). Sittig, a close friend of Parker’s, met with Zuckerberg in the 
company’s Palo Alto headquarters and the two worked closely together that summer on 
what they called “the Facelift project,” their effort to “disentangle software code and 
simplify how everything worked,” including the interface design (Kirkpatrick 144). As 
Kirkpatrick describes,  
The simplicity that later came to characterize the site was deliberate. “We 
wanted to get the site out of the way and not have a particular attitude,” 
says Sittig. “We didn’t want people to have a relationship with Facebook 
so much as to find and interact with each other.” (144-5) 
The declaration that Facebook is unworthy of a “relationship” with the user indicates a 
deep desire to dematerialize the interface and project it as a mere means to an end. Sittig, 
whether he is being genuine or not, implies that the goal of the redesign was to hide any 
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traces of design—to cleanse the site of “attitude” and any trace of made-ness. The way to 
accomplish this goal, apparently, was through design choices that privilege some of the 
same values that Apple privileges: “Sleekness and efficiency were the image [Zuckerberg 
and Sittig] sought, rather than frivolity. […] Thefacebook’s white and barren functional 
look stood in stark contrast to the florid excess of MySpace” (Kirkpatrick 144).  
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Adding an animated post-it note feature to a MySpace profile page through inserting HTML 
code in a text field (screen shot taken ca. 2005) 
 
During the period that MySpace was competing with Facebook for users, from 
around 2006-2008, MySpace had a reputation for being more eclectic in design and 
demographics when compared with Facebook at approximately the same time period 
(boyd, It’s Complicated 167). Unlike Facebook, MySpace allowed users to modify the 
design of their profile templates. That “feature” started off as a bug. According to danah 
boyd, the first wave of MySpace users discovered a flaw in MySpace’s source code and 
exploited it, inserting lines of HTML, CSS, and JavaScript into text fields (Figure 2-3) to 
create new additions and layouts for their profile pages (It’s Complicated 182). As boyd 
writes in her latest book, It’s Complicated, “this technical glitch—combined with teens’ 
passion for personalizing their MySpace profiles—ended up creating an opportunity for 
teens to develop some technical competency” (182). Not only did many teenagers seize 
this opportunity to “pimp” their profile pages by learning the code they needed for the 
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desired modification, but the flaw also “prompted an influx of template-generating sites 
that function[ed] to assist those unable to tweak the code themselves” (Arola 10). 
Although boyd and Kristin Arola both say that these template-generator sites thwarted the 
learning opportunity afforded by the glitch, especially after MySpace fixed the flaw, I 
propose that this kind of experimentation has the potential to become much more than 
superficially playing with a “limited set of options,” as Arola says about MySpace design 
and template customization practices (11). Even small code changes within the confines 
of “limited options” can be a form of resilience and agency (Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady), 
especially for people who might not otherwise experiment with interfaces or think 
critically in terms of design. The example of Ashley Qualls shows the exciting 
possibilities of allowing users (especially girls and other groups who tend not to identify 
with a “computer nerd” stereotype) to tinker with their profile pages’ appearance and 
structure. 
Qualls was just 14 when she created her website WhateverLife in 2004 (Salter). 
Qualls had been teaching herself web design since she was 9, and for years she had loved 
to play around on her family’s Gateway computer. “I was the dorky girl who was into 
HTML,” Qualls told journalist Chuck Salter in 2007. On WhateverLife, she started 
sharing her design work and eventually began posting MySpace templates for friends and 
other teenagers to use. According to Salter, her site became popular fast and attracted so 
much traffic that she needed a dedicated web server by 2005 and six more servers by 
2007. As she started to earn money from Google AdSense advertising, which creates 
revenue based on site traffic, she quit babysitting and stopped attending her high school, 
opting to complete her degree through online courses so she could have more time to run 
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her business. In 2007, Salter gathered statistics on WhateverLife that help explain how 
the site could make so much money (nearly $1 million in revenue by 2007) from 
advertising alone: Qualls drew “more than 7 million individuals and 60 million page 
views a month. That’s a larger audience than the circulations of Seventeen, Teen Vogue, 
and CosmoGirl! magazines combined” (Salter).  
 
 
Figure 2-4: Part of Ashley Qualls’ website WhateverLife, showing options such as “Design your own,” 
“Profile editor,” and “Make your own” (image from TechSeeks.com, screen shot taken ca. 2007) 
 
WhateverLife was much more than a wildly popular source for MySpace 
templates, though. Qualls would often host design contests, inviting community members 
to submit their own handmade templates. WhateverLife had a forum where users 
exchanged tips and tricks related to template customization and web design, as well as 
discussing issues and concerns relevant to teenagers. Qualls also offered a suite of tools 
for creating new layouts, drop-down menus, animated pictures, quote banners, and other 
special features and decorations for MySpace profiles (Figure 2-4). But perhaps most 
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importantly, Qualls, known as “AshBo” online, made an encouraging online tutorial and 
website editor to help other teens learn how to make a website from scratch: “The more 
you practice, the better you get – I promise,” she wrote on the tutorials page. “Everyone 
always asks, ‘How do I make my own website?’ And I think it’s about time I show you, 
first hand! Have fun!” (qtd. in Salter). According to Salter, when Qualls launched the 
website builder and “one-teen-to-another tutorials” in 2006, around 28,000 people signed 
up for the feature in the first week.  
Compared with the sterile interface of Facebook, MySpace provided a generative 
environment for digital creation beyond just composing in text boxes and uploading 
photographs through a pre-set interface. With WhateverLife, Qualls capitalized on the 
affordances of MySpace and also shared technical knowledge with other girls in her age 
group, simply because she cared about web design and somewhat accidentally built a 
community around that interest. In contrast to statements made by Zuckerberg and 
Facebook developers, Qualls wanted a social networking site that was not designed to 
disappear—a site for which the top design priority would not be “it should just work” or 
“the site should get out of the way.” Instead, Qualls focused on difference and 
self-expression through design choices in a low-pressure environment. Importantly, 
WhateverLife was focused on an audience of teenage girls. Today, “learn to code” 
campaigns associated with various organizations are trying to get girls interested in 
computer science and code literacies, but Qualls succeeded simply by sharing her love of 
web design and getting girls like her to care through a shared interest in MySpace.  
There will be no Ashley Qualls of Facebook. Although WhateverLife as a web 
design resource for girls has long since been transitioned into a general lifestyle site for 
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teenagers, Qualls’ legacy is a rejoinder to Zuckerberg’s very real interface fantasy that he 
sometimes pitches as if it were inevitable. As he has said in multiple interviews, “If I 
hadn’t created it, someone else would have.” However, the design and structure of the 
site were not predetermined factors, as though Zuckerberg is just one of many developers 
who could have realized a single path to a social media destiny. WhateverLife is a 
reminder of how different the social web could have been, perhaps, if it were now 
dominated by the vision that originated with a teenage girl from a single-parent 
household in Detroit instead of a 20-year-old boy who attended a pricy prep school in 
Exeter, New Hampshire before enrolling at Harvard. 
 
Facebook’s sterilizing and compartmentalizing interface fantasy 
MySpace was a leaky interface. The boundary line between inside and outside 
was permeable, as users discovered when they began tampering with code. However, 
Facebook is tightly compartmentalized in a business-blue package that evokes the “Big 
Blue” persona of IBM and its office computers. MySpace offered a homemade aesthetic, 
while Facebook’s is a corporate aesthetic. These differences materialize in the site’s 
policies, in their treatment of users, and of course in the interface designs.  
In his essay “Real (Software) Abstractions,” Robert Gehl argues that MySpace 
failed because it held on too tightly to the “chaotic, user-led and -created world of Web 
2.0,” with its values of “freedom, personalization, and participation” that departed (the 
story goes) from industrial-age culture and broadcast media (106). While both MySpace 
and Facebook succeeded at transforming users into digital laborers and their personal 
data into profit, MySpace permitted too much chaos: fake user profiles and design hacks 
fueled the public perception that the site was a dangerous space, a world of 
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cyberbullying, viruses, and disguised predators (Gehl 110). However, those were not the 
only dangers that appeared to lurk on MySpace. Gehl writes: 
the architecture of MySpace is constantly restructured by users who rely 
on the pimped codes to radically alter their pages, and as danah boyd has 
argued, these users often express “dangerous” ideas such as Black and 
Hispanic racial identities and raw, working-class sexuality in their 
profiles. (109)  
Thus, difference is framed as a threat—an idea that I explored in Chapter 1, in which I 
described Apple’s goal of eliminating difference and complexity (in both design and in 
consumer demographics) in favor of a safer, cleaner, more muted look and feel. Darkness 
in digital culture is often associated with criminal activity or “shady” under-the-radar, 
off-the-network behavior, while whiteness and brightness signify sanctioned and visible 
spaces.  
Gehl argues that Facebook “is so aesthetically clean [that] it renders the content in 
the frames nonthreatening; one imagines the most subversive content being muted within 
this architecture, reduced to a series of HTML divs, smooth images, clinical text, and 
well-structured code” (108). Here, Gehl succinctly captures the co-operation of 
compartmentalization (which encloses the “dangerous” parts of the system) and 
sterilization (the “clinical” and “clean” aesthetic). Not only did some teens boyd 
interviewed turn away from MySpace and its more eclectic design, but they also 
associated “clean” and “minimal” with “safer” and ultimately “better.” Unsurprisingly, 
boyd spoke to a few white teens who mentally assigned communities of racial minorities 
to the “ghetto” of MySpace, with its more flamboyant and colorful pages (boyd, It’s 
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Complicated 167). Such associations likely are not neatly contained to the teens’ feelings 
about social networking sites but undoubtedly contaminate their attitudes about other 
areas of contemporary life and form a pervasive tendency to privilege 
compartmentalization and sterilization in the designs of digital culture.  
While Gehl’s point about the clean aesthetic of Facebook provides an easy 
connection to logics of sterilization and compartmentalization, it can also be informative 
to look at how these values crop up in practice and to ask how these values affect 
attitudes towards web interfaces and user agency. In the next section, I analyze what I 
interpret as sterilization and compartmentalization surfacing in the habits and 
expectations of users on Facebook during a period of unrest about an interface redesign. 
This case study suggests the degree to which Facebook has succeeded at blocking users 
from any sort of agency in the design process, but it also indicates a change in the users’ 
perspective—we witness their willingness to consider design and think differently about 
Facebook and what “Facebook” represents in their lives. As such, we might read the 
incident for the way it reveals both user disempowerment and user agency.  
 
From “wall” to “timeline” 
In 2011, Facebook changed “the wall” profile format to “timeline.” Although it 
was not the first interface redesign for the site, it was by far the most dramatic overhaul 
since Facebook had become mainstream. With the announcement of timeline and no 
choice to “opt out” and stay with the wall, many users saw an interface that had 
previously been invisible or neutral. Based on comments I collected from Facebook users 
during this transition, we can see many users starting to think more about how an 
interface may enable and constrain different expressions and performances of self.  
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The change from the wall to timeline marked a significant shift in aesthetic and 
in Facebook’s attitude toward users. To promote the redesign and cast it in a positive 
light, Facebook created a special web page (no longer online) to introduce users to 
timeline. The page featured an interactive “mock timeline” to scroll through and test 
drive, as well as an introductory video under the header “Tell your life story with a new 
kind of profile” (Figure 2-5). The video follows the story of one man’s profile unfolding 
through time, from baby photographs, through school and marriage, up to the birth of his 
child. Near the end of the video, viewers begin racing through the man’s photos and 
posts, tracing a straight line like a highway advancing into the distance of his life.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: “Introducing Timeline” website on Facebook.com (screen shot taken January 27, 2012)  
 
After months of rolling out the new profile design to selected groups of users and 
building speculation about whether or not the redesign would be provided on an opt-in 
basis, a post on Facebook’s official blog in December 2011 declared that timeline would 
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be automatically pushed out to all users whether they had already opted in or not (Tow, 
“Timeline”). Users were informed that they would have a 7-day period to review the 
contents of their timeline and hide or highlight posts. The blog post touts timeline’s 
ability to collect and re-tell stories: “Timeline gives you an easy way to rediscover the 
things you shared, and collect your most important moments” (Tow, “Timeline”). Even 
though Facebook appeared to want to foster and support the self-expression and creativity 
of individuals, it simultaneously treated users as a mass, similar to a broadcast media 
audience, and handed down changes as law. Over the course of 2012, users who had not 
already chosen to change their profiles to timeline received a notification that “You Now 
Have Timeline” (Figure 2-6).  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Timeline notification (screen shot taken August 23, 2012)  
 
The previous profile format, the “wall,” showed posts and messages as a stream 
of content, similar to Twitter, but with much more alphabetic text than videos or images. 
With the passage of years, older posts were virtually lost. The timeline format, however, 
promised to group posts by year and arrange them chronologically beginning with birth 
or the date a user joined Facebook (Figure 2-7). To scroll down and view past updates on 
the wall, one had to click “Older Posts” over and over again. In another blog entry, a 
Facebook engineer explains why timeline is better than the wall: “The way your profile 
works today, 99% of the stories you share vanish. With timeline, now you have a home 
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for all the great stories you’ve already shared. They don’t just vanish as you add new 
stuff” (Tow, “Tell Your Story”). The timeline profile allowed some posts to be prioritized 
as “life events” or “milestones” so that these would remain more visible over time. 
Facebook sought to be a permanent “home” for memories that might otherwise “vanish.”  
 
 
Figure 2-7: Timeline profile as presented in December 2011 promotional video (image from 
Facebook.com)  
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When the timeline change was announced in 2011, a portion of Facebook’s users 
reacted with frustration, anger, or desperation. On Twitter, #newfacebook became a 
trending topic with most of the tweets fuming hatred at the redesign. In the span of 
approximately a week, over 3,800 of Facebook’s 900 million (in December 2011) users 
had commented on the announcement blog post, adding to the thousands of comments 
already left on an earlier blog post about timeline. The primary complaint from users, 
aside from disliking the design, was a concern about their past activity on Facebook 
suddenly becoming much easier to find. A majority of comments expressed 
disempowerment and a sense of loss. “You cannot herd us like cattle of the edge of such 
a horrendous precipice” writes user Ryan Jones.16 “I feel Like Hell when Facebook 
change something without asking their users,” writes user Zurmat. User Jackie 
Ek-Pangerl wrote: “I HATE the timeline, and I HATE that Facebook has forced me 
without my permission to accept this crap. It is a confusing nightmare and I skip over my 
friends that use it. DISLIKE DISLIKE DISLIKE!!!” The user backlash for timeline was 
not quite as staunch as protests surrounding News Feed in 2006, the short-lived Beacon 
advertising program in 2007, or the “share with everyone” privacy changes in 2009. 
However, the timeline launch was different from these other changes, as evidenced by the 
many users who commented on interface design. Timeline dramatically revised the 
appearance and functioning of the profile page, which users tend to see as a personal 
space. At the same time, making older updates and stories “easier” to find left many users 
feeling like their privacy was at risk since, to them, it felt like a governing official was 
changing the rules in the middle of the game.  
                                                
16 I have retained the commenters’ original spelling and syntax in all transcriptions. 
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Facebook is hardly a utility or mundane artifact; it is an active and constantly 
circulating object that can change social realities and thereby “accumulate agential force” 
(Mackenzie 82). Latour argues that objects like Facebook have “values, duties, and 
ethics” (“Where Are the Missing Masses?” 157). He calls this infrequently observed 
dimension of nonhumans “prescription.” Through prescribing actions and suggesting 
what we can and cannot do with a particular technology, machines “impose behavior 
back onto the human” (157). The mode of prescription on Facebook is driven by ideals 
such as openness, connection, and positive relationships. On the site we can have only 
friends, never frenemies. We can only like something, never dislike or “sorta like” it. We 
can only tell our story, never destruct our story or rearrange the chapters of our story. 
Facebook, like so many other computer interfaces, carries with it practically endless 
programs of action that prescribe duties for humans to follow. Critically, Latour asks: 
How can the prescriptions encoded in the mechanism be brought out in 
words? By replacing them with strings of sentences (often in the 
imperative) that are uttered (silently and continuously) by the mechanisms 
for the benefit of those who are mechanized: do this, do that, behave this 
way, don’t go that way, you may do so, be allowed to go there. Such 
sentences look very much like a programming language. (157) 
Facebook is programmed by humans, but as Latour’s concept of the prescription 
suggests, there is another type of programming at work. “Share this with a friend.” 
“Learn about new privacy settings.” “Tell your life story with a new kind of profile.” 
Through the process of prescription, Facebook defines what user activity is most valued, 
and it programs us to accept those values.  
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Users who do not follow the programs prescribed by technologies are often 
vilified. When Latour resists his car’s automatic seatbelt warning sound by disabling the 
mechanism, he becomes an anti-safety jerk, someone who is above the law. The car’s 
alarm seems to ask, “You don’t like to wear your seatbelt, you jerk?” Facebook works in 
much the same way. You don’t like having friends? You don’t like telling your story? 
You don’t like to like things? A criminalizing, excluding effect surfaces when an 
interface prescribes so much. As one blogger complained, “I don’t want to tell my life 
story with a new kind of profile. Because my life has largely been boring if you don’t 
count the drugs” (Hall). Disengaging with Facebook’s prescriptions is not a neutral act—
it can make others suspicious, concerned, and annoyed. 
If we follow Latour’s thinking, all technologies deliver prescriptions. Google 
Maps, for example, prescribes driving to the point that I have inadvertently followed 
Google’s directions even when I know that a particular route is closed for construction. 
Facebook’s prescription, though, is particularly sinister in predicting or designing (Latour 
might call this “pre-inscribing”) a user base confined to a single, uneditable profile 
design. Facebook knows that its users have been pre-inscribed into its network—
everyone is there. Thus, Facebook can increasingly assume that their “built-in users” (or 
imagined, ideal users) are their “users-in-the-flesh” (Latour 161). Facebook tries to 
pre-inscribe everyone: “Now, you and your friends will finally be able to tell all the 
different parts of your story—from the small things you do each day to your biggest 
moments” (Tow, “Tell your story”). Everyone is welcome! Yet, the site punishes and 
undoes the work of programmers who try to modify the interface’s functionality or 
appearance. This underlying mode of excluding those who hack the interface or mock 
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Facebook’s rhetoric does not enact the values of a collective network. In a software 
program—even Facebook—everything cannot be programmed. Software always reaches 
outside itself and exceeds itself. It cannot account for everything and everyone.  
When Facebook decided to change the interface “without asking their users,” as 
Zurmat wrote in a comment cited earlier, many felt they were being disempowered and 
that their agency was being taken away. Yet, at the same time, by speaking up about their 
displeasure and by seeing the Facebook interface in a new light, these users did express 
some agency in a struggle with a force they could not control. Alongside melodramatic 
please and complaints, a good number of the comments showed an awakened awareness 
of design. User Bob Lowassa Jr. said he felt forced to wear unflattering attire, as though 
Facebook’s timeline was dressing him for a prison stay or a factory shift: “With this 
changes, its like somebody forcing you to wear cloth which doesn’t look good in you….. 
Please Facebook give us an option.” Similarly, user Silviu Butunoi wrote that “you 
should let each one the right to choose… it’s their personal space and it should look how 
the person wants.” Other users compared the new design to a scrapbook, diary, or history 
book in order to emphasize the archival, backward-looking sense of timeline. This 
“stalkers love it” dimension of timeline disturbed some commenters. User Pao Pantoja 
noted that “I think the past have to stay in the past , I am not so sure about this time line, 
it will come with so many problems between people.” Another user, Dragos Gabriel, 
backed up Pao’s comment by writing “I do NOT think that adding the time period where 
I was married or had some surgeries will help me socialize even more/better!” This 
selection of comments shows an interest in design rhetoric. Yet, to ask Facebook why it 
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has power to implement a redesign is like asking a landlord why he can prevent tenants 
from painting the walls.  
The language that user Marielle Santiago chose in her comment is instructive: 
“Dear Facebook, before you impose updates and upgrades, you should atleast give the 
people options […]. Or atleast give us an UNDO button.” She sends up an appeal, like a 
prayer, and then all she can do is wait until she has that Undo button. In word processing 
programs, the Undo button is sometimes a last resort when we accidentally execute an 
action and do not even know what we have done. The look of panic on someone’s face 
followed by the urge “click Undo!” is something many of us have seen or experienced 
first-hand when using software. With a simple click of a button, we have the satisfaction 
of regaining control over our intentions. With no Undo button, we must accept the 
changes and move on.  
All of the commenters I have discussed are stuck in a bizarre parallel universe: 
“facebook is getting old – it’s like living in a world where someone changes the 
fundamental laws of physics all the time on a whim,” wrote user Richard Frąckiewicz 
astutely. He and other commenters wrote as though their profile, and their world, is out of 
control, and Facebook is responsible. The rhetorical positioning of these commenters 
shows that most are totally confused about who or what they are addressing, and most are 
not sure how to articulate what they are feeling and thinking. The users who write, 
“Facebook, do something please” or “give us an undo button” are strange reincarnations 
of the business mainframe consumer in the 1970s, who would ask IBM to deliver “a 
solution.” Reading these comments, I fear that we are a long way off from the 
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microcomputer hobbyist and the generative internet which are a part of digital culture’s 
legacy and, hopefully, its future. 
 
“The web we lost” 
  In a 2013 talk at the Harvard Berkman Center, blogger and tech critic Anil Dash 
argued that, as a society, we have drifted away from the original spirit of the internet. 
Noting a shift over the past decade, Dash described a trend of tech entrepreneurs, driven 
by concerns of investors and the need to show evidence of profitability, developing 
“web-hostile” products and platforms that discourage and prevent average internet users 
from “build[ing] innovative new opportunities for themselves on top of the web.” For 
Dash, this is “the web we lost.” He summarizes that loss as users’ unwilling or 
unknowing surrender of digital literacies such as web design, well-informed identity 
construction online, and website maintenance/ownership: 
In the early days of the social web, there was a broad expectation that 
regular people might own their own identities by having their own 
websites, instead of being dependent on a few big sites to host their online 
identity. In this vision, you would own your own domain name and have 
complete control over its contents, rather than having a handle tacked on 
to the end of a huge company’s site. This was a sensible reaction to the 
realization that big sites rise and fall in popularity, but that regular people 
need an identity that persists longer than those sites do.  
Dash notes that the social web post-2010 is disturbing because companies such as 
Facebook assume that exerting more control over users translates to more profits. These 
sites become like an AOL interface for the web, blocking users from participating in the 
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original vision of the internet, described in the block quote above. Because these 
companies have neglected and abandoned the core values of the World Wide Web, 
“they’ve now narrowed the possibilities of the web for an entire generation of users who 
don’t realize how much more innovative and meaningful their experience could be” 
(Dash). 
 Looking back at the history of the internet, we can see this situation has been 
foreshadowed. The World Wide Web was Tim Berners-Lee’s attempt to join hypertext 
(invented by Ted Nelson, who paid homage to Vannevar Bush for the idea) and the 
internet. Like many computer visionaries before and after him, Berners-Lee was inspired 
by Bush’s proposal to create a system (memex) that would let users make free 
associations and connect ideas and people through a network of links and shared 
documents (Berners-Lee, “Hypertext”). The first browser was essentially software that 
Berners-Lee wrote in October 1989 to make the internet useful to more people at CERN, 
where he worked at the time: “Tim had wanted the particle physicists [at CERN] to know 
more about what each other was doing” (Segaller 286). Berners-Lee called his browser 
program “WorldWideWeb.” It included a “virtual library subject catalog” and was a way 
of navigating documents on the internet (Segaller 286). The WWW browser made 
hypertext “a chief communications component for the first time [and] was intended to 
facilitate the sharing of information among researchers across the broader internet” 
(Long). WWW’s other innovations included the establishment of URL (Uniform 
Resource Locator), HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol), and HTML (HyperText 
Markup Language) (Segaller 288).  
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Importantly, Berners-Lee’s original 1990 WorldWideWeb was both a web 
browser and a web editor: “Tim wrote the software for the first World Wide Web servers, 
and for the first client—a ‘WYSIWYG’ hypertext browser/editor” (Segaller 286). During 
the 1990s, “Web-based content and source code were often found together in the same 
page. In other words, the Web was experienced as a ‘text-based’ programming 
environment, a phrase that expresses the extent to which the line between text and code 
was blurred” (Rieder 82). Although Stephen Segaller claims that the first web browser 
used a “streamlined, user-friendly procedure” for transferring files and pulling up 
documents, the WWW was not profitable nor user-friendly, and it didn’t go mainstream 
until it received a truly easy-to-use interface in the form of Marc Andreessen’s Mosaic 
browser. Along with his colleagues at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
Andreessen’s goal was to make the web more accessible: “What we were trying to do 
was just put a human face on the Internet” (qtd. in Segaller 296). Prior to Mosaic, the web 
had been difficult to use: “it was the equivalent of a DOS interface,” but Mosaic was 
different because it had a graphical user interface (Segaller 295). Segaller makes the point 
that, just as Apple helped personal computing find mass appeal because Macintosh was 
user-friendly, likewise the internet needed Mosaic to “express to the nontechnical person 
what all of us in computing knew was the tremendous value of having networks 
interconnected” (Schmidt qtd. in Segaller 298). Kim Polese was a product manager at 
Sun Microsystems in the mid-1990s, and she summarizes the web’s transition from 
specialized to accessible: “with the invention [of Mosaic] you didn’t have to know these 
arcane protocols. You didn’t have to be a nerd anymore to access the Internet” (qtd. in 
Segaller 298). 
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However, Berners-Lee was not as hopeful about the future of the internet. He 
expressed misgivings about Mosaic and later Netscape Navigator, as the web started to be 
dominated by commercial forces that wanted, regardless of the long-term impact, to 
transform nerd-users into customer-users. Berners-Lee believed that the internet should 
be a read-write (RW) rather than read-only (RO) platform. Associating “nerd” with a 
descriptor like “arcane” drives a wedge between RW and RO philosophies of software 
development. In Weaving the Web, Berners-Lee describes a time period when “browsers 
were starting to spread” in the early- to mid-1990s, but “no one working on them tried to 
include writing and editing functions” (57). Without a hypertext editor in the browser, 
“people would not have the tools to really use the Web as an intimate collaborative 
medium. Browsers would let them find and share information, but they could not work 
together intuitively. […] Part of it was that editors were more difficult to write” 
(Berners-Lee 57). People like Andreessen developed new point-and-click, graphical 
browsers and focused on “putting fancy display features into the browsers [which 
created] much more buzz among users” (71). This gain was a loss, in a sense. Beginning 
at this moment, we can see the emergence of the web as a utility or application, and it 
might be apparent that Facebook is repeating history.  
 
The internet according to Facebook 
“Zuckerberg’s ultimate goal is to create, and dominate, a different kind of Internet” (Vargas). 
  
In a previous section, I contrasted Facebook and MySpace to highlight the 
obvious aesthetic differences between these two social networking sites, but the contrast 
also reveals two different futures for the internet. As José van Dijck notes, “instead of 
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conforming itself to the reigning norm, [Facebook] started to work on changing the very 
norm” by moving towards an internet of increased content sharing but limited platforms 
on which to share (63). This situation is exacerbated by a general population of internet 
users who need those platforms to have a presence on the web. Through an interface 
fantasy that tries to erase itself—to become a non-interface—the company extends an 
incredibly active and influential visual aesthetic and spreads a corrosive view of the 
internet itself as a commodity or utility rather than a creative medium. Each new feature 
added to the site has been engineered with “mostly invisible algorithms and protocols 
that, to a great degree, control the visibility of friends, news, items, or ideas. […] You 
have to look under the hood, into the technical specific features, to understand the 
implications for users and society at large” (van Dijck 65). While Qualls’ approach 
assumed that internet users would want to “look under the hood” and create or at least 
change interfaces if they had a reason, Facebook has done everything, practically, to 
prevent that access and extinguish that desire.  
For example, technological interventions that tamper with Facebook code and 
“platform integrity” are thwarted quickly, as with the cases of EnemyGraph and UnFuck 
Facebook. EnemyGraph was a Facebook application created in 2012 to critique the 
just-released, controversial “Social Graph” search feature and the obligatory positivity of 
the site’s insistence that users only have “friends” and only “like” things. Bradley 
Griffith, the UT-Dallas student who programmed the app, explained one of the key ideas 
behind the project: “It’s dangerous for us as a society to move in this direction where 
everything has its worst qualities removed from it” (qtd. in Mead). The app was picked 
up in stories by major news outlets before Facebook disabled it after a few months. 
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Similarly, UnFuck Facebook was a client-side script created in 2007 that removed ads 
and other panels from Facebook’s interface. The script’s creator, who went by the name 
“sizzlemctwizzle” on Userscripts.org, had to update the program regularly in order to 
keep it working, eventually giving up in 2010: “I’m constantly trying to keep this script 
up-to-date and working. Facebook is one of the hardest sites to write a script for because 
they are always changing their shit.” These failed efforts to manipulate Facebook through 
literally reprogramming it (at least, parts of it on a limited scale) are reminders that 
“Software is abstract and therefore seems as if it should be infinitely malleable. And yet, 
for all its ethereal flexibility, it can be stubbornly, maddeningly intractable, and it is 
constantly surprising us with its rigidity” (Rosenberg 58). The rigidity that creators of 
EnemyGraph and UnFuck Facebook encountered is not the friction of artists’ materials 
but rather the firmness of an impenetrable, compartmentalized utility. 
The application code that runs Facebook is closed source; users are blocked from 
knowing how the site works or from modifying the code, even in their own browsers, 
without significant effort. This is a future in which the internet is compartmentalized 
behind the Facebook interface and sterilized through its design as a communication 
appliance. This future blocks out the potential that internet users—and yes, even 
Facebook users—might want to be “nerds,” to misuse, abuse, counter-use, or otherwise 
reimagine their self-representations on the site. It also blocks the possibility for having 
other, non-user relationships with Facebook by attempting to eliminate the possibility for 
any kind of relationship at all. As Sittig stated in a passage quoted earlier, “We didn’t 
want people to have a relationship with Facebook so much as to find and interact with 
each other” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 144-5).  
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In Gehl’s convincing analysis, Facebook “reduces […] concrete complexities into 
a clean, white template, awaiting user implementations” (113). This trajectory echoes the 
“appliancization” that Zittrain documented in the history of personal computing, when 
hobbyist machines gradually fell out of circulation as locked-down, one-size-fits-all 
devices began to dominate the market (104-7). With clarity, van Dijck pulls Zittrain’s 
ideas into the history of social media: 
Whereas before (2005), websites were generally operated as conduits for 
social activity, the new platforms increasingly turn these conduits into 
applied services, rendering the internet easier to use but more difficult to 
tinker with. […] When companies started to build their platforms on the 
generic Web 2.0 infrastructure, they often presented themselves as utilities 
transmitting communication and information data. (15-16) 
As van Dijck admits, “Facebook’s design makes subscribing feel like hooking up to a 
utility” (66). Zuckerberg has always been clear about this vision: “Think of it as just this 
massive stream of information. […] It’s almost the stream of all consciousness and 
communication” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 313). If we follow this metaphor to its limit, we may 
imagine Facebook as a water company. With the Facebook-led program “Internet.org,” 
which sees “the promise of connectivity as a human right” and pursues the mission of 
“getting the world online” (“A Focus on Efficiency” 1), Zuckerberg apparently believes 
the internet (and so Facebook) is a basic human right not too different from water.  
Of course, the work of media studies has been to trouble and caution against this 
type of relationship between technology and humans. In sum, the more a technology 
interweaves with our habits and routines—the more its tendencies and effects become 
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familiar and invisible—the more power that technology has and the harder it is to ever 
see the technology without great effort and technical skill. McLuhan, for instance, urges 
that increased technical convenience and efficiency often trigger “inattention and 
unawareness of the situation,” blinding us to how these technologies extend and alter our 
senses and cognition (92). Wendy Chun’s forthcoming book theorizes this phenomenon 
in a contemporary context, calling it “habitual media” because of our nonstop and 
ubiquitous technology use that renders those very technologies and implied patterns of 
use difficult to even notice let alone challenge and resist.  
Facebook uses ubiquity as a tool to eliminate routes of resistance. Former 
Facebook president Sean Parker stated that, in the early years of Facebook, “we knew 
we’d be successful when we were no longer cool—when we were such an integral part of 
peoples’ lives that they took us for granted” (qtd. in Kirkpatrick 144). Facebook 
continues to pursue the mission it has been following for at least the past decade. Recent 
data shows that over 1 million web services use the “Login with Facebook” feature and 
approximately 40 percent of traffic to online news sources comes routed through 
Facebook (Williams). In 2014, a study of 1.3 billion URLs found that 242 million of 
them (or about 22 percent) linked to at least one Facebook URL, “such as the Like and 
Share buttons and other social widgets, but also traditional links to Facebook profiles or 
Facebook Group pages” (McGee). More recently, the Belgian Privacy Commission 
reported that the Facebook Like button appears on 32 percent of the top 10,000 websites. 
The Commission found that, through tracking cookies associated with these social 
buttons and plugins, sites can gather data about users even when they are logged out of 
Facebook (Vincent). The articles that report these statistics have titles like “Facebook’s 
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Grip on the Web,” “Facebook Has Totally Reinvented Human Identity,” and “The Costs 
of Leaving Facebook.” While individually the titles appear hyperbolic, the reach of 
Facebook and its impact on the internet is hard to overestimate. Facebook relies on 
algorithms that sort and gather information in order to know users and the content they 
generate, yet at the same time those very algorithms remain unaccountable and 
unknowable.  
Overall, Facebook is making good progress on its mission to be ubiquitous and 
mindlessly usable—as common as electricity or a chair. In a recent editorial in The 
Huffington Post, internet researcher Zeynep Tufekci perhaps summed up the consequence 
most clearly: “for many people I encounter, Facebook is almost the whole Internet -- it's 
all they know how to use and it’s where their social networks are.” Just as Berners-Lee 
once feared that people focused on Moasaic “as if it were the Web” (71), Facebook is 
trying to transform the internet into an app through its own interface. The company hopes 
that everyone (even the people in impoverished, rural areas who Zuckerberg is trying to 
get online via Internet.org and, of course, a Facebook mobile app17) will be happy in this 
future.  
 
Sensing the interface 
In light of this somewhat discomforting and misguided interface fantasy, how can 
one resist Facebook’s prescriptions while still avoiding dualistic subject/object pitfalls? 
How can one surrender individual agency to the chain of agential events while still 
                                                
17 In a white paper describing Internet.org’s mission, the authors write: “As founding members of 
Internet.org, we believe it’s possible to build infrastructure that will sustainably provide 
affordable access to basic Internet services in a way that enables everyone with a phone to get 
online” (“A Focus on Efficiency” 1). 
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resisting a controlling interface? Perhaps through small actions, such as modifying a 
plugin or thinking different about the conditions of software use. 
For example, scholars in composition have urged us to enact correctives to 
interface invisibility, forgetfulness, and naïve screen essentialism in their classrooms and 
in their own technology use. To encourage more generous and more ethical relations with 
technologies, they suggest ways to spark interest in how the interface works and curiosity 
about how it might have been designed differently. For example, in 1994, Cynthia Selfe 
and Richard Selfe, at the end of “Politics of the Interface,” suggest a set of exercises or 
tactics for heightening critical awareness of the interface through causing discomfort with 
the status quo and remapping the interface’s borders: “one of the ways to come to this 
understanding is through working with students and computer specialists to re-design/re-
imagine/re-create interfaces” that remap and “rewrite” borders (Selfe & Selfe 495-6). The 
redesign for Selfe & Selfe might be both literally getting involved with software design 
or conceptualizing an imaginary/hypothetical redesign “either though prose descriptions 
or paper-and-pen drawings” (499). Anne Wysocki and Julia Jasken proposed something 
similar ten years later, writing that we should view our students not only as writers but 
also as interface designers. “One set of strategies for [fostering critical media awareness 
and digital literacies] is to ask students (and ourselves) to redesign, through sketches on 
paper or on screen, the interfaces we use everyday” (45). Finally, Kristin Arola in 2010, 
observing that students use web templates but “rarely have the opportunity to create these 
[design] choices for themselves,” suggests strategies for renewing agency: “Teachers can 
ask students to redesign an interface—either in an image-editing software program or 
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with crayons and paper—for a different purpose or a different audience.” For example, 
“design a MySpace interface for your Grandmother” (Arola 12).  
Facebook gives us a template that channels all affect and identity through a single, 
universal aesthetic which claims it is “social by design” but is really also sterile by 
design. Exercises like those suggested above can help to defamiliarize and analyze that 
aesthetic. By doing so, we may ask what relationships Facebook’s interface promotes 
between people, as well between people and technologies. Latour argues that agency is a 
quality shared between and created by and emerging from a network of human and 
nonhuman actors. Key features of this network are reciprocity and symmetry: “agency” 
only happens in a space where associations can form and an actor has the opportunity to 
respond to another actor with meaningful activity. As Latour puts it, “An entity gains in 
reality if it is associated with many others that are viewed as collaborating with it. It loses 
in reality if, on the contrary, it has to shed associates or collaborators (humans and 
nonhumans)” (Pandora’s Hope 158). Instead of thinking about agency as self-determined 
action, then, he urges us to think about agency as all-inclusive action: “Responsibility for 
action must be shared among the various actants” (180). Through relational agency, 
Latour argues that we can discover a fuller version of the human and a more complete 
understanding of agency in this way, by looking at how activity is a response among 
actors in a network. This approach also shifts attention away from mastery: “Whenever 
we make something we are not in command, we are slightly overtaken by the action: 
every builder knows that” (Pandora’s Hope 280).  
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Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have pointed to a shift in the late 1990s and early 2000s away 
from a generative Internet (one that is a fertile medium for creating and making new 
things) and towards a platform-based or user-friendly, sterile internet. Zuckerberg 
describes Facebook’s key benefit as “giving people the power to share” (qtd. in O’Brien). 
However, that supposed empowerment comes at a price. Though Zuckerberg emphasizes 
the accessibility of the platform, he is also asking users to let him control how they share 
and what they share. Moreover, Facebook’s colonialist agenda to get everyone in the 
world online and on Facebook is contributing to fewer groups of people with skill or 
interest in making their own interfaces for the web—interfaces for artistic expression or 
resistance to norms. Zuckerberg hopes to do for the internet what Jobs did for the 
personal computer: to make it so easy to use and so ubiquitous that its interface becomes 
neutral and even invisible. While any attempts to create transformative change in 
Facebook’s policies or infrastructure seem hopeless, I argued that we can realize 
meaningful change through micro-actions. In terms of classroom practice, scholars in 
rhetoric and composition suggest tactics that align with feminist rhetorical resilience, 
such as assigning students to analyze interface or redesign (i.e. re-imagine) an interface 
using scratch paper. 
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Chapter 3 
From Layers to Oceans: Fostering User-Programmers through Source 
Code Comments in Sea & Spar Between 
 
Perhaps following Descartes’ elevation of an immaterial mind over a material 
body, a hierarchy of layers of abstraction is one of the most dominant thought constructs 
used to describe computers—their design and their functioning—in both scholarly and 
popular discourse. Paul Ceruzzi, a historian of computing, captures the description 
clearly: “a computer system is like an onion, with many distinct layers of software over a 
hardware core” (80). My focus in this chapter is source code or the “software layer.” 
Abstraction layers certainly serve a purpose in software engineering: to compartmentalize 
complexity and sterilize messiness in order to maintain control over vast quantities of 
data and many lines of code. However, layers have become pervasive beyond the 
software development community. Layer metaphors extend into popular discourse, where 
they shape perceptions of “good code” and who is a “fit” subject to write programs or 
make things with code. When envisioned as a stacked hierarchy, layers shape perceptions 
of software: the hierarchical ordering of an interface layer on top of a more complex code 
layer works to alienate lay-users and encourage them to stay in their user layer. 
Imagining software in this way, as layers, has helped to engender a wide gap between 
professional and amateur coders, and I propose that web-based digital literature can help 
route a path around elitist, purist ideas of computer code as necessarily elegant, elevated, 
and out of reach for the average user. Considering computer code as “dirty,” “impure,” or 
blended with natural language narrows the distance between a knowledgeable, skilled 
programmer and a user and may help recruit more diverse people to compose 
experimental digital literature. 
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First, I trace the history and pervasiveness of layer abstractions in software 
engineering, demonstrating that programming conventions like encapsulation and “clean 
code” emerged from efforts to manage large software development projects, set standards 
of a “good” program, and define computer science as a field. Then, I show how layering 
metaphors have influenced the most vocal theorists of electronic literature (e-lit) and 
argue that, at times, e-lit criticism reflects the same elitism and purism found in the 
writings of structured programming and clean code advocates. Lastly, I use an example 
of a web-based work of e-lit to illustrate the possibilities of treating e-lit as an act of 
public engagement. If we recognize the lack of diversity in the field of e-lit and in the 
larger software industry, then we must make efforts to appeal to would-be coders and 
new media authors. To make e-lit an agent for recruiting diverse digital makers, we could 
do more to write criticism and make creative works that appear interesting, technically 
and financially accessible, and well-documented from the lay-user’s point of view.  
The example that I analyze, Sea & Spar Between by Stephanie Strickland and 
Nick Montfort, is an interface fantasy. This work imagines one future of e-lit in which the 
source code of texts is thoroughly, even excessively, documented, and appropriation of 
source code is encouraged. Sea & Spar Between is about the struggle to navigate the web 
and to wade through excessive information. At the same time, it makes a case that digital 
literature has the potential to engage larger publics, generate more interest in the process 
of making digital art, and thus promote literacies of reading and writing code.  
 
Layering emerges as solution to a software engineering problem 
As programming projects grew in purpose, cost, and work hours throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, it became essential to break down complexity into modules or objects 
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and distribute program components across teams of programmers. While a team of just 
eight programmers worked on the Univac in 1952 to calculate results of the 1950 census 
(Brooks 215), approximately 800 programmers contributed to the SAGE system, or 
“Semi-Automatic Ground Environment” project started in the early 1950s and finally 
made operational in 1963 (Pugh 213). Described in a 1956 press release as a 
“supersensitive continental air defense system,” SAGE encompassed 23 “direction 
centers,” each with their own IBM computer capable of tracking up to 400 planes (Pugh 
213). As IBM historian Emerson Pugh writes, “the size and scope of SAGE was almost 
unbelievable” (215) at the time and even today.  
SAGE was one of the earliest large-scale, software-intensive development efforts. 
Since the project “received almost unlimited technical and financial resources” from the 
government during a time of Cold War paranoia, the scope of SAGE scaled up and up 
over the years (Pugh 218). Its series of delays and setbacks instilled a lasting hatred and 
fear of project bloat within the software development community: more team members, 
more code, more bugs. Years after the project was over, one of the SAGE project 
directors was asked, “If you had it to do all over again, what would you do differently?” 
He responded, “find the ten best people [to] write the entire thing themselves” (Horowitz 
74).  
The question of how to manage and scale large software projects found one 
answer in IBM’s Operating System/360—but, like SAGE, the OS/360 project answered 
with a model of “what NOT to do.” In his influential book on software project 
management, The Mythical Man-Month, Fred Brooks reflects on his experiences working 
as manager of the OS/360 project starting in 1964. Although in his book Brooks 
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downplays the financial and psychological toll that OS/360 development had on IBM and 
its programmers, the time between 1966 and the first release of the software in mid-1967 
was the source of many scars and “war stories” for those who worked on the software 
(Campbell-Kelly 94). Initially, in 1965, the project employed 150 programmers, but a 
pattern of missed deadlines and additional programmers continuously joining the team 
resulted in 1,000 programmers totaling 5,000 years of labor expended all together, which 
far exceeded the initial plan and was excessive in relation to the product they were 
developing (Campbell-Kelly 95). Plagued by code errors discovered daily and continuous 
modifications to the code, his experiences working on OS/360 led Brooks to write his 
canonical guide to dividing labor through layers of abstraction. “Software construction is 
inherently a systems effort,” he concluded: “an exercise in complex interrelationships” 
(Brooks 19). In the most well-known chapter from The Mythical Man-Month, “No Silver 
Bullet,” Brooks advocates for “fashioning abstract conceptual structures of great 
complexity” in order to fight a “monster of missed schedules, blown budgets, and flawed 
products” (180-1). Through his writing and teaching, Brooks worked to shape computer 
science as a field in the 1960s and create software engineering standards that are now 
common practice today: successive layers of abstraction which fan out from the code 
itself to the larger project organization.  
Two related but distinct styles of programming grew out of the realization that 
tackling complexity in software engineering required layers with clearly regulated lines 
of communication between them: structured programming and object-oriented 
programming (OOP). For my purposes, the precise differences between the styles are not 
as important as their shared principles: code encapsulation and code elegance are two 
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terms that guide the practices of programmers in both structured programming and OOP 
camps. These principles are extensions of the tendencies we observe in Vannevar Bush’s 
memex fantasy, i.e. his desire to compartmentalize and sterilize the interior space of 
computing as well as the exterior desktop. Elegance or “clean code” is the principle that 
keeps the format and structure of code even and uniform within collaborative 
programming efforts. Closely related to elegance, encapsulation or “information-hiding” 
delineates individual parts of code (objects or functions) so that a large program gains 
modularity and structure. As Katherine Hayles puts it, “object-oriented programs achieve 
their usefulness principally through the ways they anatomize the problems they are 
created to solve—that is, the ways in which they cut up the world” (My Mother Was a 
Computer 58). The concept of encapsulation works to maintain what Matthew Fuller and 
Andrew Goffey have called “ignorance” about how software works. In OOP, 
“well-programmed routines, a well-defined vision of labor, and a formal protocol for 
exchanging messages between objects or defining their interaction keep the outside world 
at bay” (Fuller and Goffey 121).  
In order for structured programming and OOP to separate code from the interface 
and divide functions up through encapsulation and hierarchical order, it was necessary to 
jettison anthropomorphic terms and focus on the code without the messy human layer 
intervening—the code should be clean, pure, and controlled. The founder of structured 
programming, Edsger Dijkstra, thus renounces terms like “mechanical brain” (popular in 
the 1940s and 50s as the public was still trying to understand the idea of a digital 
computer) because these terms introduce shades of human impurity and uncertainty in 
perceptions of programming. He argues that programmers can better “control the beast” 
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of a software project through layering (Dijkstra). The more hierarchical layering we see 
in the conception of the computer, the higher up the human rises to a “position of 
control” (Chun 87), the lower the “machine” and its materiality sinks, and the more 
deeply engraved the distinction between a knowledgeable human and a programmable 
computer becomes. 
 
Abstraction layers beyond software engineering 
This idea of layered abstractions, in which we float up from most abstract (most 
hidden) to least abstract (most exposed)—i.e. voltages to machine code to programming 
language to control structures to user interface to the human user—has been and 
continues to be immensely powerful beyond the profession of software engineering. 
Layers or levels, as a metaphorical concept emerging from a very real problem in 
software engineering, proved useful to literary theorists trying to understand interactive, 
complex, “born-digital” literature during one of its most important periods in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Hayles has identified this period as “second generation e-lit,” 
contrasting it with first generation works composed between 1995-97, often in Storyspace 
or Hypercard. First generation works are “largely or exclusively text-based with 
navigation systems mostly confined to moving from one block of text to another” 
(“Deeper”). In contrast, she continues, 
Second generation works, authored in a wide variety of software including 
Director, Flash, Shockwave and xml, are fully multimedia, employ a rich 
variety of interfaces, and have sophisticated navigation systems. The 
trajectory traced by developments subsequent to 1997 can be broadly 
characterized as moving deeper into the machine. (“Deeper”) 
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In a 2007 essay, “Electronic Literature: What is it?” Hayles places her periodization 
within the context of literature made specifically for the internet:  
The major factor in precipitating the shift [from first to second 
generation], of course, was the huge expansion of the World Wide Web 
after the introduction of the Netscape and other robust and user-friendly 
browsers. In any construction of periods, there will always be areas of 
overlap and remediation, but it nevertheless seems clear that a major shift 
took place around 1995.  
As a way to talk about the reading, writing, or playing of digital literature and to make 
distinctions between digital and print, the relationship between code layer and interface 
layer has been a particular focus of critical work on electronic literature (e-lit) in the first 
years of the 21st century, in the second generation period of e-lit. Authors in this period 
demonstrated a wide variety of user interaction styles and interfaces, leading Mark 
Marino to suggest that Volume 1 of the Electronic Literature Collection, published in 
2006, “can be seen as a literature of the interface.” In fact, we could accurately say that 
much second generation e-lit is experimentation in interface design, or attempts to use 
new media to make “interfaces that are novel and, more critically, technologically rich” 
(Marino). Each work realizes a different interface fantasy and invites the reader into the 
unfamiliar textual space, challenging him or her to expend “non-trivial effort” (Aarseth 1) 
playing with, reading, encountering, or exploring “the work.” 
In some sense, all experimental literature could be called literature of the 
interface. Each time we visit a work of innovative, experimental writing for the first time, 
we are often “reading” less than we are teaching ourselves how to use or navigate the 
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text. Yet, e-lit theorists have always been acutely aware of the interface as just one level 
of meaning possible in digital media. Nick Montfort and Matthew Kirschenbaum have 
both cautioned against “screen essentialism,” or treating the graphical user interface as 
the “ground zero of the user’s experience,” i.e. as the only or the most important level of 
meaning (Kirschenbaum 34). In 2004, Montfort called computer code the “material 
level” of digital literature (”Continuous Paper”). The interface, he argued, is a high-level 
surface we must “reach into” if we want to find “the formal workings” of programs. Like 
Montfort and Kirschenbaum, Hayles has written extensively about “why we cannot 
ignore code” (My Mother Was a Computer 61), offering along the way an advanced 
definition of digital materiality that encompasses both digital, performative materiality 
and analog, physical materiality of electronic literature. Loss Pequeño Glazier, a veteran 
e-lit author and critic, similarly advances a concept of materiality inclusive of digital 
code, arguing that such materiality is central to e-lit practice: “HTML coding has material 
dimensions and that writing, as an act, means working within such dimensions. 
Therefore, such ‘writing’ of HTML is an engagement with the materiality of the 
medium” (Digital Poetics 110). Coding, like writing, is “a compositional activity 
engaging the material properties of the medium” (105), leading Glazier to use terms like 
“code/writing” and “poet/programmer.” Rather than view a program as a “black box” 
artifact, Glazier encourages his readers to look “behind the scenes” and see the process of 
making e-lit: “Code is a scene of poeisis, as real as ink or an awl in the hands that guide 
its impression into the pliant but invisible grooves of the magnetic medium” (113). 
Gaining momentum from the early work of Hayles, Glazier, Espen Aarseth, Stuart 
Moulthrop, Shelley Jackson, and others in textual studies and e-lit circles, the early- to 
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mid-2000s saw a trend towards understanding the new materiality of digital texts—to 
grasp or complicate what sets digital writing apart from literary creation of the pre-digital 
past. Moves of definition, categorizing, and sense-making characterize e-lit criticism in 
this period. For Hayles, that meant rethinking materiality by both expanding it to 
encompass the unique signifying strategies of digital literature and by refocusing 
materiality through the lens of what she called “media-specific analysis.” In 2003, she 
wrote that “We urgently need to rethink [the assumption that] work and text are 
immaterial constructions independent of the substrates in which they are instantiated” 
(270). I see this return to the materiality of the text, for Hayles and others, as a response 
to the dominance of layers as a thought construct. Certainly writing has always been 
materialized through layers, but with the digital, we see an executive layer of code now 
responsible for activating the text on the screen before our eyes.  
One way to approach this multilevel materiality of e-lit it is to ask after the 
relationship between the digital work’s layers—its source code and interface—and to 
follow lines between depth and surface. Indeed, depth and surface, as literal and 
metaphorical figures, have fascinated both e-lit authors and critics. Hayles was one of the 
first to apply a layered reading approach to works of e-lit: “The main difference between 
print and electronic text is the fact that electronic text is generated through multiple 
layers of code processed by an intelligent machine before a human reader decodes the 
information” (My Mother Was a Computer 108, emphasis mine). In pointing to the 
layered quality of digital texts, at stake in most of Hayles’ work is an effort to understand 
how digital text is different from print text. She began this effort early in the 1990s and 
was one of the first to attempt to articulate ontological differences between print and 
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digital literature. In a 1993 essay (later incorporated into her 1999 book How We Became 
Posthuman), she used the example of typesetting (i.e., ink stays in one place once it has 
marked the page), whereas “flickering signifiers on a video screen” may not be in the 
same place when we look at them a second time (“Virtual Bodies” 77). With her term 
“flickering signifiers,” she hoped to show how the digital is more changeable than print, 
and a single command at the interface level could effect a ripple of changes: “A signifier 
on one level becomes a signified on the next higher level [and] the longer the chain of 
codes, the more radical the transformations that can be effected” (“Virtual Bodies” 77). 
Like light playing on the surface of water and reflecting through dimensions of depth 
below, the flickering signifier moves and flows, creating new meaning-making strategies 
not possible in print media.  
Scholars writing about e-lit have imagined the interpretive process as one of 
diving down, or moving away from the human face/interface through increasingly 
abstract and complex layers. As John Cayley argues, there are “many levels in the 
hierarchies of code and language” (“Time Code” 308), or as Hayles puts it, the 
“computer’s tower of languages” stacks words atop programming commands atop source 
code atop object code (i.e. machine code or binary code) atop voltage differences 
(“Traumas of Code” 136). Rita Raley has argued that “codework” (discussed in the next 
section) “illuminat[es] the many layers of code—the tower of programming languages 
that underlies the representation of natural languages on the screen” (“Interferences,” 
emphasis mine). Raley calls layering “a system of secrecy” to highlight the 
information-hiding function of abstraction layers. Source code could be conceived as a 
level below the interface text, but a level above (and a means of articulating) deeper 
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levels of machine code signifiers in human-readable terms. In that sense, Raley argues, 
we are getting deeper when we move from interface to source code in our interpretive 
efforts. 
 
The disease of codework 
 Although the e-lit community might mostly agree that the code layer of a digital 
text bears significance and (when it’s available for viewing) should not be wholly ignored 
in the interpretation of many second generation works, there is no agreement about what 
makes code different from natural language and the degree to which these layers should 
be kept apart in critical readings. Montfort and Cayley have advanced arguments for 
treating computer code as a distinct layer not to be confused with the interface layer in 
our act of reading or traversing the work. Others have focused on the interrelations and 
entanglements between linguistic/verbal and digital codes. Hayles suggests the term 
“intermediation” to imply loops between porous analog and digital layers, as well as an 
“Oreo” metaphor to describe a sandwiching of analog and digital. In The Language of 
New Media, Lev Manovich also theorizes a mash-up of a “computer layer” and a 
(human) “cultural layer” of meaning through the process of what he calls “transcoding” 
or “blending human and computer meanings” (63). Through transcoding, two historic 
trajectories converge, computing and media, which once developed in parallel to each 
other: “Mass media and data processing are the complimentary technologies of a modern 
mass society; they appear together and develop side by side, making this society 
possible” (Manovich 46). What is new about new media for Manovich is that the 
computational layer and the mass media or cultural layer merge inside the computer. In 
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both Hayles and Manovich, we find an amalgam of code and culture, of digital and 
analog, of underlying program and upper-level interface.  
The example of “codework” exposes the disagreement between hybridization 
advocates and code purists, proving to be a point of debate in the e-lit community. 
Codework is a general term for e-lit that makes computer code visible in some part of its 
user interface. Raley’s concise definition is often referenced as the accepted one: 
“Codework makes exterior the interior workings of the computer” (“Interferences”). In 
2001, Florian Cramer linked codework (or “code poetry”) to a sense of unrest over the 
primacy of the user interface in electronic literature and digital culture more broadly: “In 
my view, code poetry reveals that digital poetry has been misperceived in the last ten 
years, with too much attention for elaborate interfaces […] and too little attention for 
structures coded into its very language.” Again, we find the dual-layer system, with an 
interface layer hierarchically stacked on top of the code layer. 
While Hayles treats codework as a “hybrid discourse to bridge the divide between 
text and code” (Rieder 81), Cayley has not been so willing to cross that bridge. Cayley, 
whose critical work has been influential in the field, has expressed concern over this 
hybridization or blurring of “verbal art” and “operable code” (Raley, “Interferences”). He 
emphasizes the difference between executable or “real” code and symbolic or decorative 
code artifacts, “surface language or ‘interface text’” (Cayley, “The Code Is Not the 
Text”). Calling codework “code-infected writing” (“Time Code” 312), he implies that it 
is broken or diseased: “The code has ceased to function as code” (“The Code Is Not the 
Text”). Cayley constructs codework as the sicker, dirtier opponent of a Platonic code 
layer that is pure, uninfected, and healthy. Not only is codework dirtier, it is also 
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promiscuous and uncontained. Cayley uses words like “secret,” “internal,” and “hidden” 
to suggest this opposition to the visible, readable, exposed textuality on the screen (“Inner 
Workings”). At stake for Cayley is a call for different reading strategies for text and code, 
with the hope that readers will gain “better critical understanding of more complex ways 
to read and write” once they are informed by their knowledge of how code actually 
works, in its pure, operable form (“Coding as Practice”). Importantly, Cayley’s rhetoric 
constructs codework not only as broken code, but as a form of writing that harbors the 
potential to spread its brokenness to other structures, such as the tidy division between 
code-reading and text-reading strategies. For Cayley, then, codework is not only 
diseased—it is itself an infectious disease and a threat to source code / interface 
compartmentalization.  
Cayley has been perhaps the most committed to parsing and maintaining 
differences between code and interface. With a series of essays published between 2002 
and 2009, Cayley advanced a claim for the uniqueness of code as a medium. In essence, 
he is asking us to “assume that writing and coding are distinct practices and explore them 
and their interrelations as such” (“Coding as Practice”). Clean code advocates find an ally 
in Cayley’s argument. They uphold a craft of coding, particular to that profession; this 
effort relies on maintaining the boundary between computer code and other layers of the 
software system, such as the user interface. This is a form gate-keeping not too different 
from the sharp user/developer split in Facebook’s infrastructure, which I examined in 
Chapter 2. As we consider the present and future of digital creative production—indeed, 
a whole range of digital literacies that the humanities are poised to absorb and teach—any 
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lesson that offers intimidating or divisive rhetoric cannot be fruitful for the larger project 
of e-lit’s preservation and extension to wider audiences.  
Marino has drawn attention to the lack of diversity in the e-lit community 
stretching back to the release of the first Electronic Literature Collection (ELC) in 2006. 
In his 2008 review of the collection, he writes: 
The lack of diversity in the authors reflects the digital divide between 
these groups and historically (and apparently still) underrepresented 
groups, such as African Americans. […] The number of people with the 
time, training, and access to create these artistic works is quite small and 
were introduced to the form by another person, rather than a random web 
search. To an extent, electronic literature is a guild-based art form, one 
that requires mentoring just as it requires evangelists. The ELC may serve 
as a useful self-starter kit for those who do not have direct access to one of 
the initiated, especially since the collection is available free online. 
I stand behind Marino’s hope that electronic literature can serve that purpose or achieve 
that possibility, and I believe that it is important to ask what kind of code style or practice 
the e-lit canon, even a canon rethought as a “useful self-starter kit,” teaches and entrains. 
E-lit, though often seen as a skilled and elite practice, is really a popular art, sustained by 
“the wide circulation of JavaScript and HTML through the web, written fragments copied 
and pasted at will” (Glazier 104). Mark Amerika has termed web-based literary 
appropriation “surf-sample-manipulate,” or the cycle of reusing code scraps in creative 
digital production: “the so-called ‘source code’ itself is many times appropriated from 
other designs floating around the Net and eventually integrated into the screen’s 
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behind-the-scenes compositional structure” (“Surf-sample-manipulate”). Unsurprisingly, 
Amerika agrees with Glazier, Raley, and Hayles on the issue of hybridized code-writing: 
“it wouldn't be entirely suspect to suggest that ‘content’ and ‘source code’ are one and the 
same thing.” In contrast to a hands-off art gallery or a locked-down piece of proprietary 
software, the ELC could market itself more like a buffet of literary effects to be borrowed 
and modified in the creation of a new work. 
The historical importance and enduring popularity of Adobe Flash in the e-lit 
community complicates the free exchange of code among practitioners and learners, but 
it is a challenge that community members have addressed. Flash is a proprietary software 
program for creating dynamic animations and moving texts. A Flash player is required to 
view works in Flash, and the licenses for downloading these players explicitly warn 
against accessing the code: “You may not decompile, reverse engineer, disassemble, or 
otherwise reduce the Macromedia Software to a human-perceivable form.” Anne 
Wysocki further notes that “anything done in a higher level language or Flash does not 
have code that can be seen, unless the authors take special pains to release versions that 
could be read by someone else (and to read such code you’d have to already be fairly 
proficient).” A panel entitled “After Flash” at the 2014 MLA also discussed these issues, 
generally concluding the platform presents major difficulties concerning obsolescence, 
preservation, and study of a work. 
The “Acid-Free Bits” pamphlet, written by Nick Montfort and Noah 
Wardrip-Fruin, details “Recommendations for Long-Lasting Electronic Literature” on 
behalf of the Electronic Literature Organization (ELO). The pamphlet directly 
recommends to writers that they do not use Flash “to create elements that can be easily 
150 
 
created in open, non-proprietary systems,” thus increasing the likelihood of more 
preservable, accessible code. Here, “accessible” means not only that code could be 
un-black-boxed and made legible to others, but also that it could be accessible (i.e. 
readable and inviting) to e-lit novices. The digital poet Jason Nelson has approached the 
issue of Flash’s inaccessibility from a different angle. According to Scott Rettberg, who 
is writing here in 2009, 
Nelson is developing twenty small projects of electronic writing in Flash, 
and as he releases them at netpoetic.com, he is also releasing the code, 
descriptions of the works, and videos explaining how he put them 
together. He is in effect opening his source code and methodology to the 
community, and to writers who may be interested in electronic writing but 
have no idea where to begin. (“Communitizing Electronic Literature”)18 
Thus, even with a platform like Flash, there is a precedent for sharing knowledge, if not 
source code. Such sharing can break down a hierarchy of levels (of technical skill and of 
code) and help us see that all interfaces are permeable if we know how to start. 
In contrast, emphasis on code as clean and pure may well position digital 
literature as something to consume or gaze at rather than something to produce and play 
with. Such emphasis reinforces a popular perception of code not only as an inaccessible 
and secretive black box, but even worse as something to actually avoid seeing because it 
is a marker of a technical problem. Code cleanliness and encapsulation can lead to 
alienation. I argue that it is crucial to temper increasingly user-friendly interfaces with 
invitations to get involved in the source code without fear of “breaking something” or 
                                                
18 Miriam Posner has made similar efforts regarding seemingly complex, “fancy” digital 
humanities projects. She uses the phrase “reverse engineering” to indicate an unpacking of 
process and logistics, for the purpose of breaking down the learning curve.  
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“messing something up,” as my undergraduate students often say when I encourage them 
to customize the source code of their blogs. Raley points out in 2006 that “Code may in a 
general sense be opaque and legible only to specialists […] but it has been inscribed, 
programmed, written” (“Code.surface”). Similarly, “despite its algebraic-ideal image,” 
Adrian Mackenzie writes, code does not function in isolation nor is it pure math (12). It 
has many identities: “something to be written, something to be run, something to be 
circulated, something to be upgraded or forgotten” (Mackenzie 12). Code is just one of 
many necessary participants in a network of relations—in criticism and teaching about 
e-lit, it makes sense to view computer systems (and software specifically) less as 
hierarchical layers and more like assemblages. Looking for and examining comments left 
in source code can help us see software through this lens and de-emphasize the difference 
between computer code performance and natural language performance within a work of 
digital literature. Comments in source code are one way to trace the creative process of 
production, with the particular advantage that the documentation of the process (the 
comment) will remain embedded within the product. 
 
Comments in code as resistance to encapsulation and cleanliness 
Most programming languages and (to my knowledge) all scripting and markup 
languages allow programmers to document source code with inline comments, like the 
ones shown in Figure 3-1. Lines set off by asterisks (between /* and */) are comments:  
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Figure 3-1: Example of comments in Linux kernel source code (screen shot taken February 2013) 
 
The comments are intended for human readers and will not display in the interface or 
execute with the code (written in the programming language C). In Figure 3-1, the 
comments elaborate on the function of code sections and describe the programmers’ 
intentions. In one case, the comments host a dialog between programmers. We see that 
multiple authors have contributed to one comment block in lines 583-588, where one 
programmer notes a possible obstruction in the execution of the code, and a second 
programmer weighs in to confirm the possibility but question the likelihood that the 
situation might arise: “but is this really a problem, only the sysadmin is able to do this” 
(Figure 3-1, lines 587-88). Since the Linux operating system is an open source, 
153 
 
community-maintained project, standards for commenting are a bit looser and more 
difficult to uphold than they are in corporate or proprietary development projects. Source 
code comments within a website’s HTML, CSS, and/or JavaScript are easy to access by 
clicking View > Source (or some variation of that) within the browser.19 
Comments in source code exhibit a liminal textual condition, somewhere between 
content and markup, between the digital text we are studying and the code executed to 
enact that text on the screen. In addition, comments often serve to chart revision stages 
and to predict future programmers’ needs. Source code comments are not markup, insofar 
as the browser or compiler completely ignores them, but they are also not part of the 
“output,” i.e. the document, software program, website, game, etc. In fact, most 
comments in proprietary code are never intended to be read by the lay-user of the 
software or website. Source code comments are textually indeterminate signs on the 
threshold of execution and natural-language expression, performance and script, and 
between human readers of texts and machine readers of code.  
Like the issue of codework in the e-lit community, the question of whether or not 
code comments do more harm than good is a contentious one amongst programmers. The 
debate over code comments might be best represented in the flat contradiction between 
two article titles from top-tier computer science journals: “Programming Languages 
Should Not Have Comment Statements” (1988) and “Comments Are More Important 
Than Code” (2005). According to Steve McConnell’s popular textbook Code Complete, 
inline code comments (when they are used) should serve pragmatic purposes and never 
                                                
19 As Wysocki reminds me, rapidly changing web design standards and browsers are making this 
ideal less realistic. However, there is something to be said for getting in the habit of trying to 
view source code on a web page whenever one sees something of interest because it encourages a 
“how did they do that?” attitude towards the web. 
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be excessive, repetitive, or verbose. McConnell insists that comments cannot and should 
not be frivolous, or “squishy” in the words of one user on Stack Overflow. As part of 
good coding practice, McConnell affirms a tenet in software development: “the only two 
kinds of comments that are acceptable for completed code are intent and summary 
comments” (464). If we consider the range of possible code readers, especially for online 
source code, these are clearly not the only two kinds of comments that might be 
worthwhile. Elegant code, currently the dominant standard for formatting and structuring 
a program, has little patience and little room for nonsense. 
Code is considered “elegant” when it is simple, highly readable, modular, and 
easy to maintain. Minimal or no comments are often considered a characteristic of 
elegant code. Elegance is a priority of structured programming and OOP. The principle of 
elegance grew out of the software crisis of the 1960s, during which the computer industry 
dealt with challenges such as “low productivity of programmers, the poor reliability of 
programs, and cost overruns” (Campbell-Kelly 94). Thus, elegance is pragmatic, serving 
specific and important purposes for large projects and for commercial software 
development, including:20 
• code readability (better for collaboration when multiple people need to 
understand and maintain code) 
• reduction of errors (debugging takes time, and structured programming is 
designed to prevent bugs in the first place, saving time down the line) 
• faster system performance (less code to run requires less processor power) 
                                                
20 This is information that I have absorbed through my research and, as such, it is summarized 
from a range of texts that have been influential in the field of computer science. Qualities such as 
readability, performance, correctness, and succinctness are conditions of elegant code. Edsger 
Dijkstra’s paper “Notes on Structured Programming” (1971) is one of the earliest examples of a 
clear articulation of how to (and why) write elegant code. 
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Robert Martin (known in programming circles as “Uncle Bob”) is a well-known OOP 
specialist and proponent of elegance under his mantra of “clean code,” fully articulated in 
his 2008 book Clean Code: A Handbook of Agile Software Craftsmanship. Although 
elegant code serves distinct and important purposes, some of which are listed above, 
Martin’s clean code dogma recalls Vannevar Bush’s assumed connection between 
cleanliness and goodness, control, or intelligence. In the introduction to Martin’s book, 
computer scientist James Coplien makes that value system stunningly explicit: 
“Cleanliness is next to godliness. As beautiful as a house is, a messy desk robs it of its 
splendor. Clean code honors the deep roots of wisdom beneath our broader culture, or our 
culture as it once was, or should be, and can be” (xxi). Here we see Bush’s tidy memex 
desktop reincarnated as the surface of an elegant program. Just as Bush’s memex user 
sought to uncover wisdom buried beneath the “mass of the inconsequential” (37), 
Coplien expresses humanistic ideals of ordered knowledge, filtered and made pure by the 
conscientious programmer. For Bush and Martin both, the tidy desk is the ultimate 
representation of “organization and cleanliness” (Martin 139).  
An important aspect of clean code is the attempt to write a program so that it, in a 
sense, candy-coats labor and makes the development process appear smooth, just as the 
bright office spaces depicted in home décor magazines seem like enviable scenes of 
productivity and order. Again we find a comparison between a computer program and a 
desk, when Martin asks his readers, “Do you want your tools organized into toolboxes 
with many small drawers each containing well-defined and well-labeled components? Or 
do you want a few drawers that you just toss everything into?” (139). Of course we want 
the compartmentalized desk, bearing no sign of struggle, difficulty, or trial and error in 
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the writing process. Although the code may have indeed posed a struggle, the idea of 
clean code is to hide that struggle. Martin writes, paraphrasing software engineer and 
IBM researcher Grady Booch: “Our code […] should contain only what is necessary. Our 
readers should perceive us to have been decisive” (9). This style of coding sees no value 
in preserving evidence of revision, hesitancy, or mistakes within the code; such traces 
would be labeled noise or pollution and function only to obfuscate the true, intended 
meaning of the code: “Keep your source files clean, well organized, and free of clutter” 
(Martin 293). 
Simply deploying the old “cleanliness is next to godliness” aphorism is only half 
of the harmful work that Clean Code does. A further effort to actively polarize clean and 
dirty, organized and messy, imagines dirty or “bad” code to be a sign of ignorance, 
carelessness, or an outsider’s tampering. “Have you ever been significantly impeded by 
bad code?” Martin asks (3).  
 If you are a programmer of any experience then you’ve felt this 
impediment many times. Indeed, we have a name for it. We call it wading. 
We wade through bad code. We slog through a morass of tangled 
brambles and hidden pitfalls. We struggle to find our way, hoping for 
some hint, some clue, of what is going on; but all we see is more and more 
senseless code. (3) 
The “we” in this passage does not include those who write “senseless” code, indeed, 
those who are without sense. Bad, dirty code is the work of the “lazy and careless” 
(Martin 293). This additional step of associating dirtiness with laziness, and cleanliness 
with care and holiness, works to organize individuals into a classist binary wherein those 
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who are new to programming or have no special training in the field are already 
condemned as immoral and lazy, dirty in technique and perhaps also in character. The 
move further replays the racist inclination to associate black and brown skin with filth, 
sloppiness, and a substandard lifestyle (Sullivan 73). This logic operates subtly in Clean 
Code, but it appears blatantly in the whiteness of attendees at hackathons and developer 
bootcamps, as well as in the whiteness of all the programmers that Martin interviews 
throughout his book. 
No surprise that Martin is flatly opposed to comments in source code: “Every 
time you write a comment, you should grimace and feel the failure of your ability of 
expression” (54). Here we find more of the same dualism between the articulate, 
successful programmer and the failed programmer who must fall back on comments to 
supplement her inferior code. The programmer who displays weakness through 
commenting ought to feel ashamed, or even close to the devil: “Comments are not like 
Schindler’s List. They are not ‘pure good.’ Indeed, comments are, at best, a necessary 
evil,” he writes (53). Although Martin’s rhetoric is clearly colorful and exaggerated at 
times, we cannot dismiss even his most flamboyant analogies as harmless. His elitist tone 
may be familiar to any novice who has tried to get help with a coding problem on Stack 
Overflow, an online Q&A forum for programmers. It might also be familiar to anyone 
who has studied computer science. Dijkstra, one of the earliest advocates of structured 
programming, said in an interview that “[programmers] would be much better served by 
clean, systematic minds, with a sense of elegance” (qtd. in Misa). The tendency to align 
programming styles with indicators of character or intelligence is not new, but it is 
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persistent. We also find a version of clean code elitism in some of Cayley’s e-lit 
criticism, when he connects codework with infection and impurity. 
Clean code elevates itself as the best style of coding, as the more natural and 
sophisticated style, by actively devaluing other styles and denigrating these as messy, 
dirty, primitive, unreadable, and less worthy than cleaner, more “elegant” styles. The 
failure to acknowledge the worth of alternative and experimental styles of programming 
makes it unfortunate that clean code dominates the mainstream software development 
community and thus many of the software programs and web apps we use every day. In 
“Coding Values,” Annette Vee implores us to “imagine a world where coding is more 
accessible, where more people are able to use code to contribute to public discourse or 
solve their own problems.” A small step towards this world could be acknowledging the 
side effects of values like cleanliness and encapsulation—sterilization and 
compartmentalization—in code. Further, e-lit authors might resist or challenge those 
values by moving to open source platforms, commenting their source code more 
extensively, and encouraging amateur and non-programmer audiences to read or at least 
explore the source code.  
  
Commenting Sea & Spar Between 
Comments in source code can serve as a starting point for readers who are curious 
about learning code and the making of electronic literature. There is a precedent for code 
commenting in e-lit. An early example is Loss Pequeño Glazier’s “Mouseover,” a web 
essay written in HTML and JavaScript and published in 1998. In this piece, Glazier uses 
ample source code comments to make the case that writing and coding closely overlap: 
“A Document Source is writing too” (“Mouseover”). The source code of “Mouseover” 
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contains elaborate comments, written by Glazier, which are poetic extensions of the essay 
itself. As Glazier writes in a commentary about the piece, “it is essential for the reader to 
use the ‘reveal codes’ feature. […] Do not think you have ‘read’ this section without 
consulting its source” (Digital Poetics 125). Glazier poses interaction opportunities in the 
essay through the “onmouseover event” in JavaScript. Although the strategies seem 
simplistic today, the essay was innovative at the time.  
Similar to Glazier, Strickland and Montfort created a “text that requires an 
understanding of computation to be fully read” (“Spars of Language” 3). If clean code 
caters to the ideology of separating the user, through layers of abstraction, from the 
source code, then Sea & Spar Between works to undo some of that distancing by 
encouraging readers to look at and borrow from the source code. Strickland and 
Montfort’s Sea & Spar Between (Figure 3-2) is a poetry generator completed in 2010. 
From the authors’ introduction to the piece, its source code, and a follow-up essayistic 
expression of the work’s source code published in Digital Humanities Quarterly (DHQ), 
Sea & Spar Between is a testimony to the embodied practice of programming, a 
repository of source code for the taking, and an engaging web-based linguistic experience 
in its own right. Strickland and Montfort envision not a reader/user but rather a 
reader/user/programmer. 
According to the authors, their poetry generator “defin[es] a space of language 
populated by a number of stanzas comparable to the number of fish in the sea, around 
225 trillion” (“How to Read”). Although calling the work a “poetry generator” brings to 
mind something like Taroko Gorge—random combinations and unpredictable sequences 
of words generated on the fly—the nature of the HTML5 Canvas element allows the 
160 
 
whole text of Sea & Spar Between to be generated at once, and it will be the same text 
each time the reader visits it. As Strickland and Montfort explain, “the lattice of stanzas is 
unvarying; the only random thing about the generator is where it locates you each time 
you launch it (“Spars of Language” 5).  
 
 
Figure 3-2: Sea & Spar Between (screen shot taken February 2013) 
 
The words that Sea & Spar Between uses to generate stanzas come from selected 
Emily Dickinson poems and Herman Melville’s novel Moby-Dick. Captain Ahab’s 
watery quest and Dickinson’s own expansive travels through philosophical and personal 
inquiry lend a “nautical explorer” theme to the work, and the authors explicitly play with 
that theme in their statements about the piece, tying it to the experience of navigating the 
interface. Readers can use two fixed coordinates to “harpoon” or locate particular stanzas 
(“Spars of Language” 5). Elsewhere, the authors refer to the reader as one who “is 
deposited ‘at sea,’ located in a poem which surrounds or environs him or her, affording 
the view of a sailor [but] the shore has disappeared” (“cut to fit” lines 143-146). To 
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generate a number of stanzas “comparable to the number of fish in the sea”—such an aim 
resonates clearly with both its medium of the internet, a sea of text, and also a general 
sense of excess in our daily lives online.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Sea & Spar Between zoomed in at different levels (screen shots taken February 2013) 
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Sea & Spar Between uses JavaScript combined with the HTML5 Canvas element, 
which is an area on an HTML page that permits drawing of shapes and text dynamically 
and interactively. With JavaScript, text can also be animated and programmed to respond 
to user interaction. A small and well-commented JavaScript file contains the crux of Sea 
& Spar Between’s code. Unlike works of electronic literature (those composed in 
ActionScript, the language of the proprietary Adobe Flash platform, for instance) that 
make it difficult or impossible to ferret out the source code, Sea & Spar Between 
publicizes its code by summarizing and linking to it right from the author’s introductory 
statement.  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Sea & Spar Between JavaScript file as viewed in Chrome using the web inspector panel 
(screen shots taken May 2015) 
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The source code is also viewable by using web inspector tools that come 
packaged with most browsers, including Firefox, Chrome, and Safari. Anyone can access 
the web inspector by right-clicking on a webpage and choosing “Inspect.” To navigate to 
the Sea & Spar source code, click “sea_spar.js” in the Sources tab within the web 
inspector panel (Figure 3-4). The green text is a code comment that introduces the work 
and explains how to modify it. 
“Cut to fit the tool-spun course” further encourages readers to dive deeper into the 
text. This is an essay that Strickland and Montfort wrote about Sea & Spar Between, to 
“reflect on the nature of comments and the glossing of code,” as the authors say. The 
essay was published in DHQ in 2013. Instead of taking a traditional essay form, “cut to 
fit the tool-spun course” is written as an HTML file that elaborates on the original Sea & 
Spar JavaScript to further champion a digital literacy of reading code. The authors call 
this essay a “gloss on the original JavaScript code.” “Cut to fit the tool-spun course” is a 
richly confusing text, since it is in a way Sea & Spar Between and would execute if it 
were combined with the other files needed to make the site. However, it is also more than 
Sea & Spar Between since it adds meaning and significance that is neither in the 
displayed text nor its original source code. This significance is extratextual, as all 
comments in code are, but what it reveals is that the extratextual is no longer a 
compelling category for discussions of how to read digital literature. It is not clear where 
the text begins and ends, or what is extra and what is just textual. Significance ranges 
from code itself to code comments to interface to materiality of embodied experience.  
The borders of Sea & Spar Between also overflow authorial control. Recall 
Montfort’s 2009 poetry generator Taroko Gorge that has been remixed 18 times by other 
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authors at the time of this writing. Taroko Gorge did have source code comments, 
though. By “revealing the code at the core of the project,” as the authors write (“Spars of 
Language”), the authors extend an invitation like the one implicit in API directories and 
meme generators: take this and make something new.21 In doing this, Strickland and 
Montfort encourage readers to learn about commenting and the value of commenting, and 
that learning is a start to breaking down the hierarchy of layers, which facilitates divides 
text vs. technology, or author space vs. developer space, or creative vs. programmed. 
When readers view the comments, they are learning to decompartmentalize.  
Comments in Strickland and Montfort’s DHQ piece fly in the face of widely 
accepted commenting recommendations, like those we looked at earlier: use comments 
sparingly, be concise when writing comments, and do not use the comments like commit 
logs. The Sea & Spar comments include some reflections and notes that explicitly guide 
interpretation of the text, which is to also say the source code. For example, the most 
twitchy aspect of Sea & Spar Between is the text’s sensitivity to the cursor, which derives 
from the “function mouseMove(e)” in the code. This function tracks the position of my 
cursor on the canvas and generates new stanzas based on the movement of my mouse. 
Strickland and Montfort comment that the mouseMove function “makes for a trembling, 
rapidly updating image of sea, or sky, or canvas. The usual function of the mouse, to 
guide a pointer around a window or screen, is changed so that the mouse's movement 
replaces texts in the lattice of language, surprisingly and restlessly” (DHQ source code 
lines 770-774).  
 
                                                
21 Mark Sample remixed Sea & Spar Between into House of Leaves of Grass in May 2013. 
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Conclusion 
Digital literature has the potential to engage larger publics, generate wider interest 
in the process of making digital art, and thus promote literacies of reading and writing 
code if authors, critics, curators, and anthologists in this field work to bridge the gap 
between amateur and expert. One step towards doing this is to document the processes of 
constructing e-lit works and to include evidence of a “messy” construction zone in that 
documentation. The perception of programmers as “the ‘kind of people’ who demand 
perfection and are compelled by the controllable” (Turkle 186) is caustic and 
counter-productive. Additionally, working creatively and experimentally with digital 
media, especially web 2.0 tools, is more difficult because increasingly the interface itself 
exists precisely to avoid the experience of friction and resistance. Despite digital literacy 
and learn-to-code campaigns, the distance between a user of a digital technology and the 
people who designed and engineered that technology is gradually becoming more 
pronounced. Not only are their domains separate, but moreover (as I argue in the next 
chapter) their organization follows the same “hierarchy of levels” (Manovich 241) in a 
computer, with the interface considered as more superficial and less powerful than the 
interior or “backstage” of the computer. This logic helps to reinforce uneven power 
balances and keeps those without knowledge stuck on the surface. By breaking down the 
compartmentalization of code and text, Sea & Spar Between tries to help readers 
understand that boundaries are permeable and it is worth crossing them.  
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Chapter 4 
The Intimate Digital Other: Neither Friend nor Slave 
 
 “The permanent search for knowledge of the intimate other, and the inevitable comic and tragic 
mistakes in that quest, commands my respect, whether the other is human nonhuman or 
inanimate.” Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto  pgs. 35-6 
 
 
Since the mid-twentieth-century, designers and engineers of human-computer 
interfaces have assumed that the ideal computer would act as both a friend and a slave to 
users. The development of computing has been a quest for a computer that is personal—
one that enters into a close relationship with us and becomes a companion and intimate 
partner—but one that is ultimately submissive to us. Those two computer identities are 
not seamlessly compatible, and today they meet in our conflicted desire for digital 
interfaces as both personable, entertaining, lively things as well as dutiful, utilitarian, 
inert things. Douglas Engelbart was perhaps one of the first important thinkers to 
anthropomorphize the computer as a servant or “clerk,” as he put it. His influence on the 
emergence of personal computing, which extended like a ripple effect to Xerox PARC’s 
innovative “graphical user interface” and then to Steve Jobs’ revolutionary Macintosh 
and beyond, continues to shape our expectations for what a digital computer should be, 
how it should act, and what relations are appropriate for humans to have with computers. 
As I have been arguing since my introductory chapter, the goal of mainstream, 
proprietary hardware and software interfaces is—has always been—to repress mess and 
sanitize the human-computer relationship before it can become truly intimate. These 
interfaces, like the iPad and its sleek graphics, encourage a closer, more interdependent 
relationship between human and computer not through understanding digital counterparts 
as significant others but through discounting or ignoring them as inert tools and slaves. 
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The role of “friend” or “partner” sponsored by personal computing marketing campaigns 
since the late 1970s masks the subservient status of computational matter on the whole. 
Erasure of a body—that is, dematerialization of the computer’s presence and identity as a 
beloved, touchable, locatable thing—is a key strategy in demoting computers to the role 
of information appliance or glorified calculator, a move akin to labeling them secretaries 
and helpers. Another strategy has been to draw a clear line between “essentially repetitive 
thought” (the domain of machines) and “mature, creative thought” (the domain of 
human) and then to further organize these modes into a hierarchy, often with the 
cognitive dominating the affective (Bush 41).  
Figures such as the cyborg, the companion animal, and the humanoid robot are 
excellent conceptual models for rethinking and traversing the boundaries of humanity. 
These models expose questions of materiality and the role of material bodies and 
substances in shaping generous, less hierarchical human-computer relations. Through the 
figure of an artificially intelligent and emotional android, I hope to complicate the binary 
established, in large part, by Engelbart’s theorization of what he called the “two-domain 
system,” i.e. a master/servant or brains/brawn coupling, founded in a structure of 
hierarchical dominance rather than tolerant, horizontal relations. Engelbart’s thinking 
about this binary is not as clean-cut as liberal humanism’s pure, pre-technological human, 
but his reliance on metaphors of secretarial and slave labor to describe human-machine 
relations betrays a divisive logic, one that was deeply influenced by Vannevar Bush’s 
desire to transform the “arm nerves of a typist” into an unmediated flow and mastery of 
information in his 1945 essay “As We May Think,” which is considered canonical in the 
field of media studies. Alternative models of interacting with nonhumans, such as Donna 
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Haraway’s “significant otherness,” may help us re-imagine and expand a “story of 
co-habitation, co-evolution, and embodied cross-species sociality” (4) in terms of the 
companionship shared between human and computer.  
The computer’s role as pseudo-human companion has emerged in constant 
tension between [1] the computer as a threat to the ideal of “pure/natural human” and [2] 
the computer as a deeply intimate friend and partner. As I explored in previous chapters, 
we desire closeness with our technologies, but only up to a point. When our relationship 
with the technical other gets too intertwined or confusing, certain defensive strategies 
come in handy for dealing with the potential threat of intimacy with computers—and it is 
a threat because that intimacy affirms a nonhuman agency and the possibility of 
vulnerability and loss of control. Two tactics mitigate the threat. First, through what I 
have described as the tactic of compartmentalization, we reinforce how unhuman our 
technologies are by getting distance from them and drawing physical and ideological 
boundaries between their machine functions/spaces and our human functions/spaces. 
Second, through the tactic of sterilization, we purify and whiten (essentially 
dematerialize) the site of interaction (i.e. the interface) so that intimacy, if it occurs, 
happens within a restrained or appropriate relationship between us and a clean, safe 
technological ‘other.’  
These tactics are consciously deployed by computer engineers, interface 
designers, and corporate-level advertisers. However, other forms of cultural production, 
including science fiction, also represent and shape popular perceptions of computer use. 
The television series Almost Human, a science-fiction crime drama that aired on FOX for 
one season, from November 2013 through March 2014, shows these tactics in action but 
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also presents alternatives to the imperative of human control and the ideal of a rational, 
superior (white, male) user presiding over programmable, inferior (raced, feminized) 
machines that we witness in Engelbart’s account. Almost Human dramatizes the tension 
between a computer interface as servant (in the tradition of robotics) and a computer 
interface as a legitimate, willful subject (in the tradition of new materialism and 
posthumanism). Within the narrative of the show, the failure to reconcile this tension 
points to the faultiness of the human/machine opposition itself and ultimately encourages 
us to think beyond and against that ideological limit. The human/machine binary is 
inherently flawed not only because it assumes the human could ever exist without the 
technical but also because it assumes the technical contains no element of the human. We 
shall see how both Bush and Engelbart sought to enforce this binary in their early work 
on computer interfaces, and how their narratives of mastery offer a less-than-productive 
approach to learning technical skills. Significant otherness and compassionate 
companionship enfold the ethics of caring for nonhumans and may help computer 
literacies seem more inclusive and open—i.e. not so intimidating and masculine. Rather 
than a nightmare of slavery or a dream of dominance, we may instead imagine “joint 
futures” (Haraway 7) with nonhumans and pseudo-humans of all kinds.  
 
“A two-domain system” 
“The history of how the computer and its relationship to its human users was imagined is a dance 
of metaphors” (Bardini 34). 
 
In Bush’s 1945 article “As We May Think,” a clear opposition emerges between 
two types of thought: creative and repetitive (41). Creative thought, for Bush, is mature 
and belongs to the human, but only specific kinds of humans: scientists, historians, 
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lawyers, and other knowledge industries dominated by white men in the 1940s. Creative 
thought entails making associations and decisions, while repetitive thought includes data 
manipulation, indexing, and complex arithmetic. Creative thought is “on a high plane” 
and belongs to “the man of intuitive judgment” (42). Repetitive thought, however, 
belongs to the technical: “whenever logical processes of thought are employed—that is, 
whenever thought for a time runs along an accepted groove—there is an opportunity for 
the machine” (42). Bush’s organization of types of cognition into low and high levels 
essentially delegates tasks that he classifies as mindless—“laborious” and “detailed” 
(42)—to the people who he classifies as inferior, immature, and uncreative: typists, office 
workers, transcriptionists, and keypunch operators. He also encourages his readers to see 
these jobs as unskilled labor that could easily be replaced by a machine like the memex: 
“it would certainly beat the usual file clerk,” Bush remarks (44). Dividing work along the 
line of creative vs. repetitive helps Bush argue for not only the importance of letting 
technologies assist with overwhelming complexity, but also for taxonomies of humans 
(low- and high-level workers), showing how one is superior and the other occupies a 
class equal to or worse than the machine.  
One of the more disturbing aspects of his dualistic thinking is the fantasy that the 
laborer and the means of performing that labor could merge into pure, disembodied 
“electrical vibration” (47). Bush wonders, “Might not [the impulses which flow in the 
arm nerves of a typist] be intercepted, either in the original form in which information is 
conveyed to the brain, or in the marvelously metamorphosed form in which they proceed 
to the hand?” (47). Of course, such fusion would streamline the process of data 
management and eliminate the “cumbersome” interface altogether, granting users “the 
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privilege of forgetting the manifold things [they do] not need to have immediately at 
hand” (47). However, it would also vanish and devalue the sort of procedural, 
methodical, and—yes—repetitive thought needed to understand how computation works. 
This sort of thought Bush would like to bury below an interface, just as the driver “turns 
over the propelling of his car to the intricate mechanism under the hood” (42). 
In a world of increasing knowledge and complexity, Bush sought to help 
humanity preserve “the record of the race” (46) and manage information overload, but he 
failed to see the injustices being perpetuated in configuring human-computer relations as 
dominance in a quest for unmediated interaction with information. The history of 
interactive computing reveals a tradition of separating higher, creative thought from 
machine thought, and this tradition takes concrete form in the way we often design 
computer interfaces as partitions and beautiful walls, or as “hoods” atop car motors. We 
wish to designate some processes as important and presentable, while other processes 
involving code, logistics, and the gritty or raw workings of the machine seem better off 
enclosed and hidden, perhaps due to our own shame, fear, or detached indifference. Yet, 
in Bush, we find a desire to overcome the “two-domain system” and to efface differences 
in human-machine relations, after all. His penultimate fantasy, placed at the conclusion of 
his essay, is a cyborgian figure. Through it, Bush anticipates a future of direct 
communication, devices that could tap directly into the “varying currents […] inside the 
human frame” through “bone conduction” or “electrodes on the skull” (47). That future 
has everything to do with masculine control: “At the alleged origins of interactive, real-
time interfaces, then, is a desire to control, based on a promise of transparent 
technologically mediated contact” (Chun 87). The imagery of a white hand writing on the 
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memex screen (Figure 0-4) transforms into unmediated (unhanded or unhandled) thought 
transmission, from human brain straight to medium.  
Bush fantasizes that the body of not only the machine but also the secretary would 
get out of the way, in a sense, for they stand as obstacles to the masculine researcher who 
moves flawlessly and weightlessly in the space of information. In Bush’s concluding 
speculation, we may realize that such intimate human-machine hybridization could only 
occur once the typist had left the scene; all material accoutrements, including bodies and 
hardware, vanish as interfaces transform into pure electricity and we, at long last, achieve 
unmediated, flawless transmission.  
Engelbart identified Bush as the original augmentation visionary. In Engelbart’s 
view, “As We May Think” was groundbreaking and contained “six and half pages 
crammed full of well-based speculations” (Engelbart 49). In May 1962, while at Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI), Engelbart wrote a letter to Bush expressing his fascination with 
memex and requesting to use lengthy quotes from “As We May Think” in an upcoming 
report he was writing for the Air Force. The report, entitled “Augmenting Human 
Intellect: A Conceptual Framework,” articulates Engelbart’s vision for a new relationship 
between human and computer—one in which “man” would not have to adapt himself to 
the machine, but instead the computer would come to man as an obedient and “intelligent 
helper” (Engelbart 113). As Markoff summarizes the implications of Engelbart’s report: 
“Previously, teams of humans had served a single computer; now, the computer would 
become a personal assistant” (48).  
The goal of his report, Engelbart explained to Bush, was to detail the “objective of 
increasing the individual human’s intellectual effectiveness” (qtd. in Nyce and Kahn, 
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Memex to Hypertext 235). Engelbart tried to show his audience of potential government 
sponsors that “the intellectual effectiveness of a human being is dependent upon factors 
which are subject to direct redesign in pursuit of an increase in that effectiveness” (115). 
In other words, the design of the human-computer interface, for Engelbart, was not an 
afterthought but a gateway to achieving and elevating human potential. The interface, as 
a gateway, also constituted the “boundary across which energy is exchanged between the 
two domains” of human and computer (20). In his report, Engelbart does imagine the 
exchange as mutual and co-operative, at various points describing the computer as an 
agent. However, the human interacts with the computational agent through vertical rather 
than horizontal relations: Engelbart imagined that the goal of an augmentation system 
should be to “put the human up where he can see what is going on and can point the 
direction to move next” (47). The human user, finding “clean and direct ways to satisfy” 
(Engelbart 104) herself via the interface, is elevated to a superior position of pointing and 
directing. Indeed, when imperatives of ease and efficiency are at stake in the design of an 
interface, the free-moving, grasping, pointing hand is an expression and assurance of 
human mastery over the computer, which never fails to fold around and submit to 
“human cognitive powers” (Engelbart 45).  
Given their shared belief in the “two-domain system,” Engelbart thought highly of 
Bush, writing in a letter: “I re-discovered your article about three years ago, and was 
rather startled to realize how much I had aligned my sights along the vector you had 
described” (236). In his letter, Engelbart is not very specific about what improvements 
and augmentations he has in mind, nor which one of Bush’s “well-based speculations” 
(Engelbart 49) inspired him the most. However, the general division of labor we see in 
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the memex configuration clearly influenced the way Engelbart conceived of interaction 
between intelligent human and an inferior machine. Like Bush, who focused on how 
technology essentially exists to mitigate human problems, Engelbart also repeatedly 
emphasizes human capabilities and problems affecting the human, rather than other forms 
of life and nonlife. Like Bush, who blurred the line between the human administrative 
worker and the secretarial machine, Engelbart perceived a man-machine relationship in 
terms of computers in bondage, through giving the user a “‘control language’ […] for a 
‘master-slave’ dialogue, enabling the master to control application of the slave’s 
capabilities to his own service” (Engelbart and English).  
Engelbart believed that augmentation would increase ability of “man” to approach 
complex problems. Augmentation, for him, was not just about technology. The approach 
encompassed “a way of life in an integrated domain where hunches, cut-and-try 
intangibles, and the human feel for situation usefully coexist with powerful concepts, 
streamlined terminology and notation, sophisticated methods, and high-powered 
electronic aids” (Engelbart 1). Computers have thus emerged from dual expectations that 
sometimes conflict. On one hand, Bush, Engelbart, and others who were thinking about 
“man-machine interfaces” show us a vision of the computer as a subservient clerk 
committed to computer-like tasks. On the other hand, in the era of personal computing, 
engineers designed computers as friends and to even have an entertaining and “nice” 
personality.  
 The dream that Engelbart inherited from Bush is not simply a neutral fantasy of 
greater control over manipulation of data and efficient task completion for the intellectual 
worker. Engelbart also inherited the boundarywork that obsessively relegates the 
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computer to role of a clerk, and (as with many clerks assigned to menial, administrative 
labor) this role is not too distant from servant or slave. The expectation that a computer 
act dutifully and “be nice” is a move of subordination applied as much to women and 
“emotion workers”22 as to computers. 
 
The demo 
In a darkened auditorium at the Fall Joint Computer Conference in San Francisco, 
December 1968, Engelbart sat on stage in front of a huge projector screen and 
demonstrated a computer interface prototype so novel that “it looked like science fiction” 
and “made many people question [his] sanity and/or his honesty” (Segaller 126). The 
prototype, called “NLS” (or “oNLine System”), was not a single technology or tool but 
rather the larger idea of interactive computing framed in the context of Engelbart’s 
self-declared “crusade for the augmentation of human intellect” (qtd. in Bardini 11).  
After earning a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, Engelbart joined the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) in 1955. In the early 1960s, he received funding to start his own 
lab, the Augmentation Research Center (ARC), where he and his team developed 
concepts and prototypes to enhance the intellectual worker’s ability to navigate dense 
information spaces, or to use “modern technology to give direct aid to an individual in 
comprehending complex situations” (Engelbart 17). With his team of researchers at ARC, 
he developed online collaboration systems and experimented with video conferencing, 
collaborative text editing, outlining/listing programs (WYSIWYG), hyperlinks, and 
                                                
22 In The Managed Heart, Arlie Hochschild defines the conditions of “emotion work” in a 
postindustrial society, arguing that “gender tends to be called on to do different kinds of [emotion 
work]. Women are more likely to be presented with the task of mastering anger and aggression in 
the service of ‘being nice’” (163). We might say that the user-friendly interface is also being 
asked to (by being designed to) do emotion work. 
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peripherals like the mouse and “keyset,” which was a computer keyboard with five keys 
designed for one-handed typing.  
He showed all of these innovations in action at his 1968 demo, which has since 
been nicknamed “the mother of all demos” because of how radically it re-envisioned the 
relationship between human and computer: “In short, every significant aspect of today’s 
computing world was revealed in a magnificent hour and a half” (Markoff 148). And, as 
Thierry Bardini has noted, “Every book devoted to personal computing at some point 
reports this famous presentation” (138). NLS was novel in two main ways: it was a 
functioning computer network that supported real-time, remote collaboration, but it was 
also the first time anyone had seen a truly personal user interface—a computer that 
inclined towards the human much more intimately than any computer had before. As 
John Markoff puts it, NLS was “the personal computer and the Internet rolled into one” 
(47).   
Many computer historians view “the mother of all demos” as a momentous event 
that signaled a new future and identity for computers. In 1968, “mainstream computing 
was an exercise in remoteness” (Markoff 179), but Engelbart told a story about the 
potential of getting close to the machine. He believed that computers could help people 
communicate and collaborate; this was a departure from how most engineers saw 
computers in the 1950s, as giant calculators and data processors. Prior to Engelbart’s 
NLS, neither the public nor the technology industry viewed the computer as a 
communication tool that could also support an individual’s ordering and sharing of digital 
information. Engelbart’s prototype was novel because it presented the computer as an 
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interactive medium. Jeff Johnson and co-authors summarize what set the NLS apart from 
other computer systems of the day: 
It used CRT displays when most computers used teletypes. It was 
interactive (i.e., on-line) when almost all computing was batch. It was 
full-screen-oriented when the few systems that were interactive were 
line-oriented. It used a mouse when all other graphic interactive systems 
used cursor keys, light pens, joy sticks, or digitizing tablets. Finally, it was 
the first system to organize textual and graphical information in trees and 
networks, which today would be called an “idea processor” or a “hypertext 
system.” (“The Xerox Star”)  
Engelbart conceived and developed many of his concepts in the mid-1960s, long before 
the personal computer revolution, at a time when most computers were inaccessible to 
individuals who could only use computers through intermediaries (i.e. batch processing), 
and when software was often produced for proprietary systems and common tasks within 
business or government industries corporate or government tasks, such as calculating 
missile flight paths and payroll processing. Along with his small team at Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI), Engelbart built the NLS from scratch without the benefit of 
tools and conventions that are now standard in development communities. 
To begin the demo, Engelbart posed a question to his audience of approximately 
1,000 computer scientists and engineers: “If, in your office, you as an intellectual worker 
were supplied with a computer display, backed up by a computer that was alive for you 
all day, and was instantly responsible…[laughing]… responsive to every action you 
have, how much value could you derive from that?” The lavish praise that Engelbart and 
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his demo receive from media historians and scholars is similar to their treatment of 
Bush’s imaginary memex as an icon and origin story. Engelbart and Bush both have been 
recognized for the precedent they set in the dawn of the computer age, but less often do 
their speculations fall under critique as just one of many possible paths.  
 
Remediating intimacy 
In a sense, the tension between desiring to enter into a close bond with the 
computer versus also desiring to constantly reassure ourselves of the difference between 
human and computer could be interpreted as a form of remediation. Richard Grusin and 
Jay David Bolter have theorized “remediation” as the “oscillation” or negotiation 
between twin desires in visual media culture (19). On one hand, audiences derive 
pleasure from the immediacy or “liveness” (9) of representation and the illusion that one 
could enter into the virtual space, unencumbered by awareness of the mediation at work. 
On the other hand, conspicuous mediation is a source of pleasure. Instead of erasing the 
materiality of the medium and the process through which a representation gets made, 
hypermediacy surfaces these considerations to make audiences aware of “the new 
medium as medium” (19).  
 Fantasizing about close or intimate relationships with computers is perhaps one 
expression of the desire for immediacy in our use of interfaces. Bolter and Grusin write 
that immediacy hinges on “the belief in some necessary contact point between the 
medium and what it represents” (30). In photography, we could be assured that the thing 
represented actually exists or existed at one time and place: “the light establishes an 
immediate relationship between the photograph and the object” (30). For fictional and 
imaginative immediacy, such as trompe l’oeil and virtual reality, the contact point 
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requires suspension of disbelief because it asks the audience to trust their eyes and allow 
themselves to be immersed in the world of the representation. What is the contact point 
for computer interfaces? For mainstream usability design communities, the contact 
occurs through an easy and natural user experience—through the belief that one is 
interacting directly with information or the “object of interest” itself, in a goal-oriented 
and confident mode (Chun 63). Such interaction has close ties to the concept of direct 
manipulation, which Ben Shneiderman developed in the 1980s beginning with his book 
Software Psychology published in 1980. Shneiderman is a computer scientist who was 
one of the first to research the elimination of frustration and anxiety in the use of 
interfaces. Through direct manipulation interfaces, he believed, users might better 
perceive a one-to-one connection between an action and a computer’s response. 
Shneiderman was inspired by arcade games, which provided graphic representation and 
immediate visual feedback for players, who experienced more immersive, intuitive play 
(Montfort, “Introduction” 485). Shneiderman’s use of the word “manipulation” returns to 
the metaphor of handling our interfaces: by reaching, touching, and pointing, the 
computer user might avoid the frustration of a child who cannot grasp a desired object. 
 Wendy Chun notes that that direct manipulation systems yield “positive feelings” 
for users, including mastery, ease, and enjoyment. These systems bring users close to the 
representation through a transparent interface, as though looking at a scene “directly 
visible through the windshield” (Shneiderman qtd. in Chun 63). Thus, direct 
manipulation (and related HCI design methods, including those associated with Donald 
Norman) is an immediate mode of computer use, taking as its contact point the effortless 
control and closeness felt during the experience of computer use. As Bolter and Grusin 
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point out, software designers “prefer to image an ‘interfaceless’ computer offering some 
brand of virtual reality” (31). As in a realistic video game or a virtual reality experience, 
the immediate interface presents images and pathways as metaphors for computational 
actions, and “like good metaphors,” they “bring across only the essential aspects of the 
already-understood system” (Montfort 485).  
However, these interfaces are also more immediate because they appear more 
human—they strive for interfacelessness, but they are not faceless. Thus, direct 
manipulation and extreme usability design only tell part of the story. The pleasure of use 
comes through manipulating objects liberally as well as the personal relationship or bond 
forged between human and computer over days and weeks and years of use. More often 
than not, computer interfaces promise that this relationship will be satisfying. They 
promise that the computer will be a low-maintenance companion, always ready to serve 
and help out. That experience becomes immediate when we feel that we are interacting 
with a personality or quasi-person rather than a computer. Yet, the expectation is that the 
computer is not actually a friend or significant other. To believe otherwise would be to 
recreate the queer, discomforting scenario portrayed in the 2013 film Her, directed by 
Spike Jonze. The film was disturbing to some viewers because it showed real intimacy 
between a man and a female-gendered artificial intelligence. Their interaction crossed the 
threshold of what many would view as an acceptable or “natural” human-computer bond. 
Her imagines a human and computer on an equal plane, as the characters learn to respect 
each other mutually and show compassion towards each other. Although some critics felt 
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the film avoided the “uncanny valley”23 because, similar to Siri, Samantha has no body 
(Mattu), it does appear that the film was deeply upsetting to many because it fell into a 
different kind of uncanny valley (Popper). It entertained the possibility of falling in love 
with a computer, which required the intertwining of human affect with machine 
programmability—of a utilitarian operating system and a sensitive, seemingly willful 
consciousness.  
Such a relationship seems unnatural or disturbing outside the world of the film 
(Popper). While we may, at times, anthropomorphize the computer as a friend or buddy 
and so feel a closeness or connection to the computer through that metaphor, the status of 
parties in that relationship is obviously different. We would likely never presume the 
computer to be an actual partner, in the dictionary sense of the word: associate, peer, or 
comrade. Despite the attractiveness of “user-friendly” design, the computer never 
becomes a true friend, and we would not want it to become a true friend. User-friendly 
and anthropomorphic design has limits: “can we cease putting human faces on robots?” 
asks Rex Sorgatz in a popular Medium piece arguing against the trend of giving human-
like design features to powerful computers. Instead, in “real life” human-computer 
relations, we desire to maintain authority over the computer in a relationship that 
resembles master/slave more than friend/friend or partner/partner.  
That authority can never be reduced to a position of pure mastery, despite 
metaphors such as Bush’s “supersecretary,” i.e. dictation/typing machine (43) or 
Engelbart’s “computer ‘clerk’,” i.e. NLS (6). In the master/slave relationship, the master 
is in power, but she is not the sole agent in creating that power. As Judith Butler argues 
                                                
23 This phrase describes the phenomenon of a robot that looks and acts like a human, but is 
dissimilar enough to create an eerie, unsettling effect. The humanoid wants to be identified as 
human, but it misses the mark just enough to fall somewhere between human and nonhuman.  
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through her interpretive summary of Hegel in The Psychic Life of Power, mastery does 
not fall neatly into an either/or structure. Both lord and bondsman are in a tenuous, 
interdependent union; both experience “fear of a certain loss of control” (39). The 
bondsman fears constant loss; as a “relentlessly self-sacrificing being,” he has “his 
property expropriated” and must give up what he makes, the fruits of his labor (40). 
However, the lord also lives in fear, under the threat of losing “his place of pure 
consumption” (39). The lord relies on the bondsman to keep producing, since the source 
of the lord’s power is precisely in his ability to consume. The dominant and subordinate 
roles in the relationship are thus misleading, and the lord’s power is, in some sense, a 
fantasy of control not unlike the promise of direct manipulation interfaces.  
 
Significant digital others 
The labor division theorized by Bush and Engelbart depends on the computer’s 
materiality (and messiness) being suppressed and compressed; it depends on actions of 
dematerialization and corporeal erasure to sustain the dream of unmediated contact and 
endless control. Haraway’s significant otherness, which exalts both the cyborg and the 
companion animal as “figures for living within contradictions” (Haraway 11), refuses to 
let that dematerialization pass without marking it as a loss and injustice to people and to 
quasi-people. 
In a culture that increasingly associates the digital with the personal, 
human-computer relations might be more aptly described as relationships, with the ups 
and downs, rejections and intimacies, secrets and betrayals that come along with making 
commitments to significant others. Predictive digital marketing guesses everything from 
favorite products to pregnancies. Facebook is now rumored to be entering the health 
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tracking and monitoring market with an app that would gather data about the body for the 
supposed purpose of suicide prevention and early diagnosis of other health conditions. 
Apple has announced its anticipated Watch, a wearable device that could be set to 
monitor symptoms of diseases such as Parkinson’s. Google completes our sentences and 
knows when we leave for work and when we arrive home. As privacy researcher Julia 
Angwin recently said after she “broke up” with Google and began using a different 
search engine, “It was like a new relationship.” This is not just a personalized experience; 
it’s an intimately personal one. Our digital devices are not just lifeless tools—they know 
us and we know them. We touch them, and they touch us back.  
That mutual closeness has roots in the early years of the personal digital assistant 
(PDA), a term coined by Apple to launch its Newton MessagePad in 1992 (McCracken). 
One key point that emerges from the marketing of first-generation PDAs like Newton is 
that the more our technologies know about us, the smoother and more personal the 
experience of using them will be. A 1993 promotional video bragged that Newton’s 
handwriting-to-text feature improved over time as it adapted to its user’s individual style: 
“Your Newton will get to know you,” the video promises.  
Twenty years later, our digital assistants adapt to our voices, driving patterns, 
search and messaging habits, the minutia of everyday life, and even our heartbeats. The 
term “personal digital assistant” is now synonymous with a disembodied, robohuman 
voice—a secretarial artificial intelligence that advertises services like help with 
completing tasks (Apple’s Siri), predictive search (Google Now), or a combination of the 
two (Microsoft’s Cortana). Just as with the first PDA, Newton, these AI technologies are 
marketed as administrative wizards and magical mind-readers. But much more than 
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Newton, many of today’s smartphone AIs perform a personality that users can relate to, 
sometimes on an intimate level. Smartphone AIs are sold not as cool things but rather as 
lasting relationships. As the VP of Windows Phone and product design at Microsoft, Joe 
Belfiore, said at a launch event in April 2014, through communicating preferences to 
Cortana and deciding what she (always she) should learn or forget, “the user is in control 
of his or her relationship with Cortana” (qtd. in Malter). And like any good partner in a 
relationship, “she’s always looking out for you,” said Belfiore. We give pieces of 
ourselves to our networked devices so that they might serve us better. “For a truly smooth 
and personalized experience, our digital assistants need to know as much about us as 
possible,” writes one journalist about the trend of smartphone AIs (Nield). In other 
words, the more our AIs know about the world and know about us, the more flawless, 
efficient, and fulfilling our relationship with them will be. This is the logic born from the 
uneasy union of automation and individualization—of a conflicted desire for a friend and 
a loyal secretary, intimacy and professional distance.  
In mainstream digital culture, human-computer relationships are initiated and 
maintained not in the name of love or respect but rather in the name of efficiency and 
utility. Designer-technicians and their advertisers intend that our digital partners remain 
indentured inferiors and never equals, sometimes by explicitly coding their class status 
through a raced or gendered (inter)face. Over and over again, we see the technological 
other constituted as a servant, assistant, or helper, no matter how human and lifelike she 
is. I suggest that this dominant model of living with computational bodies is a choice—
just one mode of technical thinking out of many—that cuts off possibilities and deters us 
from seeking richer, more ethical relations with computers, relations that might better 
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ourselves and the nonhuman environments and things with which we associate. It is a 
choice that compartmentalizes and sterilizes the other, saying “you are less clean than I 
am.” Further, the more we imagine ourselves to be “in a relationship” with computers 
(such a fantasy is no doubt made possible by the friendly and cooperative “inter- or sur-
face” [Wegenstein 238] that covers the computer), the more that we will see 
consequences for subjugating them. If we could establish more caring and respectful 
relationships with our humanoid computers, we might, through the lens of that bond, 
correct power differentials in other spheres and activate healthier relationships with 
humans and nonhumans alike. Yet, cultural norms have instilled ideals of what it means 
to use a computer, ideals that privilege intentioned subjects and reinforce expectations of 
use as dominance and dictation. Thus, we become afraid and skeptical at the idea of a 
willful machine—a machine with which we could grow close, a machine that is not only 
anthropomorphic, but also erratic and error-prone. A machine that is neither fully subject 
nor fully object.  
Almost Human fantasizes about such a machine. This TV show is in the genre of 
other popular high-tech drama shows such as CSI and Numb3rs, but it is notable as an 
exception to the trope of flashy digital interfaces being worked upon and manipulated 
into service. Working against that instrumentalist take on police tech, Almost Human 
gives us a defiant and vocal computer interface. Set in a gritty-looking Los Angeles in the 
year 2048, each episode focuses on a homicide case and two main characters who track 
down the killer: Dorian (Michael Ealy), an artificially intelligent android, and John 
Kennex (Karl Urban), an impulsive and rebellious PTSD-plagued detective. In this not-
so-distant future, the crime rate has risen “an astounding 400%” and, as a measure of 
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protection, all police are partnered with combat androids. We see two classes of androids 
in the show: DRN androids (Dorian’s model) and the newer MX androids. Apart from the 
fact that Dorian is black and most (but not all) MX robots are a pasty white, there is one 
significant difference between the two models. The DRN runs on a “Synthetic Soul OS” 
which is “designed to emulate human emotion,” according to a mock police database that 
FOX created on Tumblr as part of the show’s fictional world. The unique and 
experimental OS gives the DRN androids a sharp sense of humor, intuition, and emotions 
like regret, anger, and compassion. Like other AIs such as Cortana, Microsoft’s version 
of Siri, and Samantha, the fictional OS who stars in Spike Jonze’s 2013 film Her, Dorian 
serves humans but has a personality while doing it.  
However, we quickly learn that DRNs like Dorian have some problems. As 
technician Rudy Lom (Mackenzie Crook) explains in the pilot episode: “They might have 
bugs. The idea behind the DRNs was to be as human as possible. Like humans, they have 
unexpected emotional responses.” According to the back-story on “MeetYourMX.com,” 
a website created by FOX to promote the fictional world of the show, the DRN line was 
pulled from police duty because of “cognitive instability and reckless action.” “We were 
considered emotionally unstable,” Dorian explains. In other words, the DRN model is 
crazy. The MX model was created to replace DRNs and correct their glitches: “In order 
to make logic-based and rule-oriented decisions, [the MX] is designed to feel nothing.”24 
The show thus stages two types of relationships with embodied computers: one is 
streamlined and white, and the other is rough around the edges and dark. One is 
                                                
24 Or, so we learn from a technical-looking “MX calibration” website created by FOX, 
meetyourmx.com. Like the Almost Human Tumblr, meetyourmx.com is another part of the 
show’s fictional world. 
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“synthetic” and the other authentic. Dorian acts like a “real guy,” while the MXes are 
expressionless yes men. 
During one of Kennex’s disturbing flashbacks in the pilot episode, we see him 
and his (human) partner, Martin Pelham, in the midst of a street shootout. The police 
force has been outmatched by “the Syndicate,” a criminal organization with access to 
advanced weapons and shadowy communication channels. While Kennex tries to carry 
his badly wounded partner to safety, an MX refuses to help: “others have a better 
statistical chance of surviving. I need to protect them,” the droid explains before leaving 
Kennex and Pelham to fend for themselves amidst a shower of bullets. We learn that 
Kennex was the only human cop who survived the ambush, although he lost a leg and 
now suffers from memory loss and anxiety disorders. In this plot framing, we find many 
similarities to the 2004 film I, Robot, in which police detective Del Spooner (Will Smith) 
loses an arm in a traumatic car accident and develops a bitter hatred of robots after one 
chooses to let a young girl drown because her statistical chance of survival was low. Both 
the car accident scene in I, Robot and the ambush flashbacks in Almost Human emphasize 
the dispassionate, rule-bound, black-and-white thinking of robots and ultimately show 
viewers that machines are cold and lack compassion.  
In the first episode of Almost Human, Kennex has just returned to duty after 
injuries from the ambush left him in a coma for over a year. He struggles to adjust to his 
prosthetic limb, a fragmented memory of the ambush, and a new department policy 
instituted during his medical leave: all police officers must partner with a droid, or a 
“synthetic.” Human partners are a thing of the past. The angry, depressed, and somewhat 
old-fashioned Kennex bristles at this policy. After throwing one strait-laced MX out of a 
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moving car, the department finds him a replacement partner: Dorian, a DRN who is the 
only available model cleared for active duty at the time. Unlike the cold, amoral robots 
that left Del Spooner and John Kennex feeling bitter and untrusting of nonhuman security 
workers, Dorian is different.  
Both Dorian and Kennex are flawed individuals and damaged bodies, and they are 
publicly labeled as such. In the early episodes of the show, we see them mocked and 
ostracized within the department, as they have both been absent from duty for almost two 
years. Kennex, who sometimes suffers tremors, blackouts, and angry outbursts, and 
Dorian, who likewise is prone to emotional rants and heart-over-head miscalculations, 
make an appropriate and often comical pairing. While Dorian has something human 
within him (the Synthetic Soul OS and some odd childhood memories that inexplicably 
begin appearing in his data files), Kennex has something nonhuman within him—a 
digitally enhanced prosthetic leg which occasionally emits beeps and “calibration 
incomplete” warnings. The show is only partly about futuristic crime-solving. A 
significant portion of the plot focuses on the psychological adjustments that take place 
between the two lead characters, as Kennex overcomes his hatred of androids (a thinly 
veiled type of racism) and Dorian learns the story of his creation and begins to accept his 
own flaws. Kennex initially expects Dorian to be obedient and to speak when spoken to, 
as though he were an MX, but those expectations strain the relationship and make Dorian 
uncomfortable and bitter. The pilot episode features an argument between Kennex and 
Dorian that highlights the uneven expectations: 
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Kennex: “When I want your help, I’ll ask for it.” 
 
Dorian: “MXs are designed to feel nothing. I can’t say that I was born or that I 
had a childhood, but I was made to feel. And I do. As much as you. […] I am 
nothing like an MX43. Do not talk to me that way.” 
 
Kennex: “Why don’t you take a second and reboot yourself. I’m not going to 
argue with a piece of silicon and carbon fiber.” 
 
Eventually, Kennex learns he cannot simply use Dorian as an interface or as a means for 
accessing police records, testing DNA samples, and searching through files and images at 
lightning speed. Although Dorian does those things, their relationship evolves into one of 
mutual respect rather than one-sided servitude.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Kennex performs repairs on Dorian after he experiences a malfunction in episode 5, “Are You 
Receiving?” 
 
The central message we can derive from this show is that nonhuman and even 
nonorganic things deserve to be treated with an ethic of care and respect. The erosion of 
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this ethic and the trivialization of the relationship between human and device in our 
thousands of encounters with screens in daily life negatively affects the relationships 
humans have with other humans. The relationship dramatized in the characters of Kennex 
and Dorian is a productive rejoinder to a majority of popular discourse and marketing 
strategies which construct the human/computer bond as one of mastery and control and 
overwhelmingly associate the use of interfaces with expectations of ease, logistical 
efficiency, and clarity. The characters enact Katherine Wilson’s argument for “greater 
emotional attachment to computational devices” (xii), as we see a relationship developing 
between Kennex and Dorian. Viewers do not see humans manipulating distant networks 
and databases through subservient interface controls. Instead, Dorian offers an example 
of a willful interface who does not always do as he is told. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation has explored possibilities for reconfiguring relations between 
humans and computers. I have thought critically about what (and who) interfaces are, 
digging into the history of interactive computing to better understand where particular 
fantasies and futures originated. By focusing on the interface as a site of vanished or 
enlivened materiality, I have tried to linger in a “middle ground” or borderland where two 
types of actors meet, where humans and nonhumans come together, but not always on 
equal ground. Through increased attention to sterilizing and compartmentalizing interface 
design choices, I have discovered acts of exclusion, homogenization, and denigration 
directed at both machines and people. I hope that my project indicates the importance of 
considering gender, race, and other kinds of difference in interface design and computer 
engineering. I believe we should question the ways they (other interfaces, other people) 
are exploited by means of not only hacking and viruses but also by the design choices of 
key figures in computer history who have anticipated the expectations and stereotypes 
that are currently circulating in mainstream digital culture.  
The computer, once defined as a tool of automation, has changed over time to 
meet and shape our expectations, both in the computer’s physical (or, as Jane Bennett’s 
work helped me to see, its antiphysical or antimaterial) form and in our culture’s 
imagining of it. My study has shown that the goal of creating the kind of personal and 
human-centered experience that many 21st-century users desire and expect is closely tied 
to seeing interfaces as “sturdy mediators” (Johnson-Eilola 237) that separate us from the 
incomprehensibility of the computer’s “insides,” shield us from the mass of information 
overload online, or protect us from the danger of hackers and other security threats. From 
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the designer or engineer’s perspective, I have observed that the act of screening is 
reversed: the interface separates and protects the computer from the public, particularly 
the inexperienced user, thereby ensuring “that only the right people get to rummage 
around in the secret insides” of software or hardware interfaces (Fuller and Goffey 120). 
Yet, in my research on the sanitizing and protective function of interfaces, I often 
returned to this statement: “Protection is itself a threat” (Derrida 55). When we perceive 
clean and enclosed computer interfaces as safer and “better” than other types of 
interfaces, what do we sacrifice by allowing our computer use to be so conditioned—
divided across lines of user/expert as well as human/machine and master/slave? Looking 
back at the history of personal computing, as I did in Chapter 1, I realized that other 
pathways were once available to society and that, today, alternative modes of computer 
use (such as hobbyist computing) are only available in limited contexts and niche 
communities. Even the tendency to customize a profile page by experimenting with web 
design, as some users did when MySpace was the leading social networking site in the 
early 2000s, has been stunted by Facebook’s popularity and source code lock-up, an 
argument I made in Chapter 2. Moreover, in this project, I suggested that such strict 
dividing lines (between expert and user, as well as human and computer) have 
contributed to far fewer women and marginalized people in computer science and other 
fields that shape (and sometimes dictate) what is considered “good” interface design.  
For these reasons, I have argued that the overly protective interface harms 
creative, generous, and diverse digital practice. As we saw in Chapter 3, the overly 
friendly (sterile and compartmentalized) interface threatens the likelihood that users who 
consider themselves technologically unfit or incompetent will ever undertake more 
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advanced digital practices or learn skills they could use to express their worldviews and 
contribute to the production of culture in digital media. Overly friendly (clean, enclosed, 
and otherwise smooth) interfaces threaten the flourishing of risky, non-mainstream 
composing and artistic practices. The consequences of accepting a sterilized and 
compartmentalized digital future extend not only to writers and artists but, more broadly, 
also to the exigency of humanists. Rosi Braidotti argues that in order to foster a 
humanities for “posthuman times,” we need to pursue ways of living that “are situated in 
close proximity to woman, the native, the dispossessed, the abused, the excluded, the 
‘other’ of the high-tech, clean, and efficient bodies that contemporary culture sponsors” 
(201). In a similar vein, tolerating inefficient or messy technologies, “the ‘other’” of 
consumer-oriented digital culture (like the character of Dorian, a glitchy but caring 
humanoid who I discussed in Chapter 4) can be read as a gesture of dissent and critique. I 
believe that tolerance of digital otherness can be a refusal to buy into the logic of 
companies like Apple and Facebook and an attempt to relate differently to computers and 
people through appreciating difference and friction, and so improving our chances of 
upsetting hierarchies.  
 
Recapping compartmentalization and sterilization 
These two terms have guided my project, so I would now like to summarize some 
conclusions I have drawn after focusing on them throughout my chapters. First, what is 
their purpose? When compartmentalization and sterilization are deployed as tactics in 
interface design, what effects do they have? They: 
o Help maintain a feeling or appearance of control over the machine as we draw 
closer to it or as it resembles an animate and intimate ‘other.’  
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o Work to make the computer disappear and allow the friendly, task-oriented 
interface to surface (they create a user experience). 
o Address/repress an unresolved and contradictory desire for their own opposites: 
vastness, excess, promiscuity, leakiness, and messiness. 
o Advance the interlinked goals of the computer’s development and use: abstraction 
and automation. 
o Prioritize and help achieve immediacy, or dissolution of the material medium 
through “electrical induction” (Bush 47). 
o Guard the border (both physical and conceptual) between human and machine, 
but keep it relegated to a gray area between friend and servant. Interfaces are both 
conceptual and physical marshals.  
Second, what have I learned from focusing on these two terms in the context of Bush’s 
memex?  
o The interface historically has operated in an in-between space—an actual and 
conceptual interval between human and machine.   
o The interface’s particular relationship to the user resembles something between 
obedient servant and friendly personal assistant.  
o The idealized human user is often male, educated, white, and “an empowered 
individual agent capable of governing through enhanced knowledge” (Chun 110). 
 
Current concerns and future questions  
Wendy Chun’s work has been a major influence on this dissertation. She 
frequently grapples with some of the tensions in digital culture that I have examined or 
that have been in the back of my mind: empowerment and enslavement, mastery and 
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suffering, enlightenment and obfuscation. A lesson that I have taken from her writing is 
“the theoretical necessity of using, rather than resolving, paradoxes” (Control and 
Freedom 26). In that spirit, I would like to summarize a couple of the paradoxes that have 
been circulating through these chapters and use them to suggest future considerations and 
questions for the issues I raised in my research. 
First, I have struggled with what often felt like competing priorities regarding 
attention to the nonhuman. I am thoroughly persuaded by nonhuman theory and its 
attempt to unsettle anthropocentrism through celebrating entanglements of people and 
things. In the history of mainstream digital culture, the human body has been at the center 
of designs of interactive interfaces, responsive systems, and artificial intelligence. I have 
tried to shift that imbalance a bit, by asking what can be discovered as we become closer 
to our computers. With Apple Watch’s recent launch and its ability to measure the body’s 
heart rate and movement, we may imagine a future cyborgian scenario in which the line 
between human and computer is impossible to draw. Less fantastically, even when we 
use social media like Facebook, we are not just investing in the imaginary of friendships 
and sharing with others. We are investing in friendships, and other kinds of relationships, 
with information technologies and corporations, as well.  
 Anthropocentrism seems often to do more harm than good, especially in an age 
of global climate change and species extinction. However, my dissertation research 
helped me see my own privilege so that I could no longer bracket issues of race, class, 
and gender embedded in digital culture. In the face of gross social inequity, human 
suffering, and everyday violence and micro-aggressions against people who are 
vulnerable, it can seem frivolous, esoteric, or even irresponsible to insist on the agency of 
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things. Imagine telling a mother, whose son’s body was broken while in the back of a 
police van, to “turn your attention to humans, and see them become electric circuits, 
automatic gears, or softwares” as Latour suggests in his essay “The Berlin Key, or How 
to do Words with Things.” So, a central concern or tension within these pages has been 
understanding how to amplify marginalized voices and respect human injustices without 
falling into a misguided, empowerment-obsessed understanding of technologies as inert 
things, as obstacles to move out of the way or standing ready to assist us as needed. 
Bennett’s theory that “the human is not exclusively human, that we are made up of its” 
(113) helps to chip away at the belief in a pure human body, as does Donna Haraway’s 
notion of the cross-contaminated cyborg. Yet, “the intimacy of the human and the 
nonhuman” (Bennett 166) seems harder to uphold in light of social justice issues rooted 
squarely in humanity. Sometimes human empowerment is exactly the word to describe 
what oppressed people need in order to face the conditions of their own survival. 
Second, I see a tension between the obvious benefits of usability and the creative 
potential of glitchiness. How can I reasonably suggest that computer troubles and 
malfunctions could be opportunities rather than mistakes? To accept the interface as an 
enlivened bearer of flawed, incomplete mediation is to break with a particular trajectory 
that has defined the computer for many decades. As I wrote in Chapter 1, the early 
computers of the 1940s and 1950s were designed primarily to complete calculations 
efficiently and ease the load of information workers, allowing them to focus on higher-
level, more abstract tasks. The manual, repetitive work of complex math could be 
automated by instructing a computer to do such tasks (i.e. programming). I argued that 
digital makers and writers would do well to re-examine this legacy of computing and ask 
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what we have taken from it, as well as what we have left behind—and why. Yet, the 
reality is that many people have neither time nor interest in finding creative opportunities 
on their computers. While Rosa Menkman claims that “the systematic distortion of 
communication […] helps to open media up for discussions of their internal politics” 
(40), in reality many media users are not privileged enough to engage in these discussions 
or to imagine how inefficiencies and glitches might be “wonderful interruptions” 
(Menkman 1).  
 In my own teaching, I try to help my students understand social justice issues 
related to digital culture, and I advocate usability and accessibility to student bloggers. 
The classroom seems to transform me into a true humanist, while outside the classroom I 
am passionately committed to understanding materiality from the perspective of 
nonhuman theory. One way to use rather than resolve this tension is to apply a feminist 
ethics as a framework for ongoing negotiation of commitments to both things and people, 
to nature and culture—to priorities that, at times, conflict. Another way to approach these 
questions is to ask how the care and respect of nonhumans may train us to practice that 
same care and respect of humans. In a sense, my dissertation has pursued the idea that 
technologies are themselves worthy of ethical treatment involving tolerance, patience, 
and empathy. We cannot replace our human relationships with technologies, but we can 
add technologies into the fold and relate more generously to all.  
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